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PART 1
I
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
For several years after the 1939—45 war Australia retained 
her price controls and administered them rigidly in order to prevent 
inflation arising from the consumer demand which had banked up during 
the war. When a second round of world inflation arose with the aban­
donment of price control in the United States of America in 1946, the 
effectiveness of the Australian controls was perforce diminished : the 
higher cost of many imports raised domestic prices and higher export 
income increased purchasing power. Nonetheless the competitive pos­
ition of Australia improved as retail prices increased far more slowly 
than import prices.
Had the federal government had control over working con­
ditions, it could perhaps have contained the inflation to a much 
greater extent. But the federal constitution placed much of the con­
trol in the hands of state governments and state and federal arbi­
tration tribunals. These tribunals had made two decisions which were 
to have a significant bearing on the post-war economic situation : the 
decision to vary wages in accordance with movements in retail price
2
3indexes and the decision to introduce a 40-hour working week •
To the inflationary effects of these two decisions were 
added those of two events : the depreciation of September 1949 and 
stockpiling for the Korean war. The effect of the former was a sudden 
increase in demand in an already overburdened economy $ the effect of 
the latter a considerable increase in demand for wool. Together with 
the sales by the Joint Organisation (which had been formed to dispose 
of wool stocks in the hands of the British government as an outcome of 
certain war-time arrangements), these two events led to a steep rise
in wool prices : in the course of fifteen months during 1950 and 1951
prices rose threefold, with the result that income from wool in the 
1950-51 season was approximately £330 million higher than in the 
previous season.
As export income rose so did the liquidity of the economy. 
The volume of money, which had been about £1,700 million in June 1948,
rose to over £2,100 million by June 1950. The government made very
little attempt to offset the increase in liquidity. During 1950-51 it 
collected £110 million as advance taxation payments by wool—growers 
and the sum of £125 million was drained out of the banking system into 
special accounts. Nonetheless the volume of money rose by about £400 
million during the twelve months and national income for the year rose 
by 37% in money terms over that for the preceding year.
This decision was handed down in 1921, but it did not start to be­
come an embarrassment until 1948.
Application was first made to the federal court soon after the end 
of the war. The court gave its decision in September 1947. About 
the same time various state governments and wages boards intro­
duced a similar privilege for workers under state awards.
2
4The immediate cause of the economic difficulties of 1952 was 
the failure, or inability, of the authorities to adjust the economy to 
this boom* Two answers were possible* The fact that export prices had 
been rising considerably faster than import prices, with a large con­
sequent increase in Australia's international reserves, suggested that 
the currency should be appreciated, and indeed this course was pub-
o
licly advocated by various prominent economists . Speculation mounted 
that Australia would appreciate its currency, and the inflow of specu­
lative capital reinforced record earnings from wool sales to increase 
the reserves from £281 million in June 1948 to £630 million in June 
1950, and to £804 million in June 1951.
The alternative answer would have been for the government to 
appropriate the bulk of the extra income from the sale of wool during 
1950-51 and perhaps use it as the initial payment into a stabilisation 
fund. In the event, however, the government allowed most of the money 
to fall into the hands of consumers. The liquidity of the economy was 
clearly excessive. Unfortunately, it spilt over into imports at the 
time of a sudden easing in world supply and the availability of 
shipping. An import boom began early in 1951, but for some months the 
seriousness of the position was masked by continuing high prices for 
wool. As wool prices fell again at the end of the 1950-51 season, so 
did export income, and with it the international reserves, while
o J. E. Isaac, "Wages Policy for Australia", Economic Record, June 
1950, Volume 26, page 16.
Colin Clark, "The Budget and the Basic Wage", Economic Record, De­
cember 1950, Volume 26, page 181.
5imports continued to rise until October 1951, and, with the exception 
of December, continued at a high level until March 1952.
4In his 1951-52 budget speech the Treasurer stated that the 
government expected a significant import surplus during the coming 
financial year. The tone of the speech made it clear that the govern­
ment regarded this prospect as a welcome aid in the fight against 
domestic inflation, but as additional deflationary measures the gov­
ernment introduced tax increases designed to raise an extra £160 
million during 1951-52, and budgeted for a surplus of £115 million.
Reaction to the budget was bitter, and a period of business 
uncertainty followed. When nonetheless the following two months showed 
continuing signs of inflationary pressure and high imports, it seemed 
clear that further measures would be necessary. Ifl November the central 
bank called for a restrictive credit policy and in particular for a 
reduction in the terms of deferred payment available to importers.
Although bank advances continued to rise, many businesses
began to experience difficulties, either through not being able to get
sufficient credit, or because of competition from imports. This was
particularly true of the textiles and motor vehicles industries, and
"an appreciable number of undertakings (were reported to) have passed
§over their dividends" .
About the end of the year difficulties also became apparent 
in other spheres. Industrial production, which had been rising fairly 
steadily throughout the earlier part of the year, fell by about 9% in
4 Parliamentary Debates, 26th September 1951, page 52.
5 Bank of New South Wales, Review, February 1952, page 13
6October, and this fall continued until after the middle of 1952* The 
recession affected particularly the metal-working group of industries, 
whose production fell by about 40ft; to a lesser extent it affected 
also the clothing and textiles and the basic materials groups* The 
"All Groups" index fell by about one-fifth.
A similar picture is evident from the employment statistics. 
Whereas employment had been rising at the rate of about 8,000 a month 
for some years, the curve began to flatten out after June 1951, and to 
fall after November 1951. The number of registered vacancies began to 
fall in September 1951, and from October 1951 to the following June 
decreased at an average of about 11,500 a month.
The number of persons registered for employment increased 
fourfold over the financial year 1951-52, but the absolute increase 
was a small proportion of the total work force (slightly more than one 
per cent). After the beginning of 1952 unemployed persons were mainly 
school-leavers and workers dismissed from the textiles and clothing 
industries. The inflationary gap as measured by the excess of the 
number of registered vacancies over the number of persons registered 
for employment was closed in June 1952.
By early 1952 it was beyond dispute that action had been 
left too late. The economic situation demonstrated the danger of 
trying to cure inflationary pressure by increasing supply instead of 
by restricting demand. If the authorities had deflated at the time of 
the depreciation of the currency or shortly afterwards, and compen­
sated for the effects of the wool exports boom of 1950-51, much of the 
subsequent rise in prices might have been avoided. Instead the author-
7ities allowed the Australian cost structure to deteriorate relatively 
to that overseas^ then took limited deflationary action in the hope 
that the increased supply of imports would ease the inflationary 
pressure. When they dared no longer gamble on the hope that imports 
would decline of their own accord as the inflationary pressure was 
eased) they introduced quantitative restrictions which limited the 
rate of importing to approximately that of 1948-49.
For the remainder of the decade balance of payments diffi­
culties were to plague the authorities) but certainly better regu­
lation of the internal economy could have alleviated the difficulties. 
Twice more the economy was allowed to expand beyond the limit of its 
capacity and corrective action was so long delayed that the government 
could contain the inflation only by reducing the level of economic 
activity. After each restriction the economy again expanded) at first 
slowly) but soon the rate of expansion of demand rose above that which 
could be sustained by the growth in population and productivity. For a 
short period the economy was fairly well balanced) with little unem­
ployment and relatively stable prices. But the rate of increase of 
demand was not reduced as the economy reached full employment of re­
sources. With time the economy once more began to show signs of stress 
and the cycle recommenced.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the quantitative 
restrictions were used as an instrument of economic policy) and the 
extent to which they contributed to, or impeded, economic development, 
during the nineteen-fifties. In particular we shall inquire :
1 Why did the government impose quantitative restrictions on
8imports in March 1952 ?
2 Did the government need to continue the restrictions until
February 1960?
3 Was the decision to abolish the restrictions in 1960 sound?
4 Was it sound to impose restrictions in the form of quanti­
tative restrictions by licensing in 1952 $ should this 
form have been changed at any later stage ?
5 How severe were the restrictions initially, and how did
their severity vary over time ?
6 Did the government manage to overcome the main disadvantages
of quantitative restrictions?
7 What would have been the flow of imports in the absence of
restrictions ?
8 What was the effect of the restrictions on domestic prices?
9 To what extent did the restrictions contribute to import
replacement ?
10 Did the existence of the restrictions encourage the develop­
ment of uneconomic industries?
11 Was there, and is there now, in any sense a "fundamental
disequilibrium" in the Australian balance of payments?
Chapter 2
ADMINISTRATION OF IMPORT LICENSING
The federal government obtained its statutory authority to 
restrict imports with the passage of the first Customs Act» Section 
52 of that statute read, in part t
’•The following are prohibited imports :
(g) All goods the importation of which may be prohibited 
by proclamation.
Except for a minor change in wording this provision remained in the 
legislation until 1952» When the legislation was extensively amended 
in 1952 to place beyond doubt the government's power to attach con­
ditions to licences, its substance was retained, although in a 
different form of words.
The paragraph quoted was a blanket provision in a section 
which otherwise prohibited or regulated the importation of certain 
specified commodities which were undesirable in themselves. At the 
time, the government justified its insertion by claiming that reserve 
powers were necessary in case an emergency arose during a parlia-
9
10
mentary recess, or at a time when parliament, though sitting, could 
not be prevailed upon to pass enabling legislation immediately^. This 
reason, if it was given in good faith, was soon forgotten : in fact
the power came to be regarded as a simple alternative to amending the 
legislation whenever the government wished to add another commodity to 
the list of prohibited imports.
Most uses of Section 52(g) were to prohibit, for social 
reasons, the importation of individual, specified, commodities, but 
the government used the provision as an economic tool :
(a) towards the end of the 1914— 18 war, with the intention
of ^restricting unnecessary private expenditure and so increasing
2the ability of the people to contribute to war loans’1 ;
(b) in 1930, in order to conserve London funds ;
(c) in 1936, to ’’divert a certain amount of our import
trade from . • • very indifferent purchasers of Australian ex­
ports, first as far as practicable with respect to Australian 
secondary industry, and next to countries which are, or recentlyghave been, heavy purchasers of our exports” ;
(d) at the start of the 1939-45 war, ”to conserve resources
of non-sterling exchange, and, in particular, to prevent the ab-
 ^ Par1iamentary Debates, 15th August 1901, replies by Senator R. E.
O’Connor, representing the Minister for Trade and Customs, to 
objections raised in committee by the Senate, pages 3783- 5.
Official Yearbook 11, page 559.
Q Par1iamentary Debates, speech by Sir Henry Gullett, Minister 
directing negotiations for trade treaties, 22nd May 1936, 
page 2213.
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s o r p t i o n  of  t h o s e  r e s o u r c e s  in  th e  p u rc h a s e  of  u n n e c e s s a r y  im p o r t s
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t o  th e  d e t r i m e n t  o f  t h e  more v i t a l  n a t i o n a l  n e e d s ” $
( e )  l a t e r  in  t h e  w ar ,  t o  p r o t e c t  th e  London f u n d s .
Most of  th e  p r o h i b i t i o n s  m e n t ioned  in  g ro u p s  ( a ) ,  (b)  and 
( c )  were l i f t e d  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h e i r  i m p o s i t i o n *  Most of  th e  r e m a in d e r  
were l i f t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  few y e a r s  which  f o l l o w e d  th e  end of  the  w ar ,  
b u t  t h o s e  on i m p o r t s  f rom J a p a n  and th e  d o l l a r  a r e a  s t i l l  e x i s t e d  in  
e a r l y  1952*
The o n ly  d e p a r t m e n t  w i th  th e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  n e c e s s a r y  t o
a d m i n i s t e r  im p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  was t h e  Depar tm en t  of  Trade  and Customs,
whose main f u n c t i o n s  were t o  c o l l e c t  cus toms and e x c i s e  d u t i e s ,  a d v i s e
th e  governm ent  on im p o r t  p o l i c y ,  a d m i n i s t e r  t r a d e  t r e a t i e s  and to
5 6p r o t e c t  A u s t r a l i a n  i n d u s t r y  • T h i s  d e p a r t m e n t  had i t s  head o f f i c e  
in  C a n b e r r a ,  and i t s  c h i e f  o f f i c e r  was s t y l e d  t h e  " C o m p t r o l l e r - G e n e r a l  
of  Customs” * I t  had an o f f i c e  in  e a c h  s t a t e  c a p i t a l  u n d e r  a  " C o l l e c t o r  
of  Customs” , who had j u r i s d i c t i o n  w i t h i n  th e  s t a t e ,  and in  each  p o r t  
l i k e l y  t o  r e c e i v e  o v e r s e a s  v e s s e l s  an o f f i c e  u n d e r  a "Sub—c o l l e c t o r
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  D e b a t e s t s t a t e m e n t  by Mr John  Lawson,  M i n i s t e r  f o r  
Trade and Cus toms,  3 0 th  November 1939,  page 1840.
A l a r g e  number of  e x t r a n e o u s  f u n c t i o n s  were a l s o  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
of  t h i s  d e p a r t m e n t .  Because  of  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i m i t s  on th e  
power of  t h e  Commonwealth g o v e rn m e n t ,  any r e s t r i c t i o n  t h a t  was 
t o  be p l a c e d  by t h a t  governm en t  on c e r t a i n  a r t i c l e s  c o u ld  on ly  
be a p p l i e d  a t  t h e  moment o f  i m p o r t .  Thus t h e  D epar tm en t  of  Trade 
and Customs came t o  h a n d le  such  s e em in g ly  u n r e l a t e d  m a t t e r s  as  
t h e  bann ing  of  d ru g s  and th e  c e n s o r s h i p  of  books  and f i l m s .
Th i s  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  of  th e  D epar tm en t  of  Trade and 
Customs r e f e r s  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a t  March 1952.  The p r e s e n t  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  of  t h e  D epar tm en t  of  Customs and E x c i s e  i s  sub­
s t a n t i a l l y  th e  same a s  f a r  a s  cus toms d u ty  i s  c o n c e r n e d .  A
" C h ie f  I n s p e c t o r  of  L i c e n s i n g "  m a i n t a i n s  l i a i s o n  w i t h  th e  
Depar tm ent  o f  T ra d e .
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of  C us tom s" .
In C a n b e r r a ,  d i r e c t l y  u n d e r  th e  C o m p t r o l l e r - G e n e r a l  and the  
Deputy C o m p t r o l l e r - G e n e r a l ,  was an A s s i s t a n t  C o m p t r o l l e r - G e n e r a l  
( T r a d e ) ,  who was t h e  o f f i c i a l  t o  have d i r e c t  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  new scheme* 
He c o n t r o l l e d  a Trade A greements  s e c t i o n ,  a Commercial  P o l i c i e s  
R e s e a r c h  s e c t i o n ,  and th e  " C e n t r a l  Im por t  L i c e n s i n g  B ra n c h " .  Most 
o f  t h e  l a t t e r  b r a n c h ,  u s u a l l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  t h e  " C . I . L . B . " ,  was l o ­
c a t e d  i n  Sydney f o r  r e a s o n s  of  s p a c e ,  b u t  a sm al l  s e c t i o n  was l o c a t e d  
in  C a n b e r r a  f o r  b e t t e r  l i a i s o n  w i t h  th e  A s s i s t a n t  C o m p t r o l l e r - G e n e r a l  
( T r a d e ) .  Th i s  b ran ch  a d m i n i s t e r e d  t h e  im p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a l r e a d y  
e x i s t i n g  on im p o r t s  f rom J a p a n  and t h e  d o l l a r  a r e a .  W i thou t  e x c e p t i o n  
i t s  s e c t i o n  l e a d e r s  were men who had been s e c t i o n  o r  s u b - s e c t i o n  
l e a d e r s  i n  the  D i v i s i o n  o f  Im p o r t  P ro c u re m e n t  d u r i n g  th e  1939-45 w ar ,  
and who had h a n d le d  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  s i d e  of  t h e  l e n d - l e a s e  a r r a n g e ­
ments^  •
The r e s t r i c t i o n s  on many com m odi t ies  were to  be s t r a i g h t ­
f o r w a r d  : i t  was p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  c e n t r a l  o f f i c e  t o  p r e s c r i b e  s i m p l e ,
c l e a r - c u t  r u l e s ,  which c o u ld  be a d m i n i s t e r e d  by c o l l e c t o r s  and sub­
c o l l e c t o r s  a t  th e  p ro p o s e d  p o r t  o f  i m p o r t a t i o n .  As f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  
s y s tem  was to  be d e c e n t r a l i s e d  : t h e  l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s  would m a i n t a i n
t h e  r e c o r d s  of  each  i n d i v i d u a l  i m p o r t e r ,  and i s s u e  him w i t h  l i c e n c e s  
w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  to  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y .
But th e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  tw e lve  y e a r s  had shown
T h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  was s u p p l i e d  p e r s o n a l l y  t o  t h e  w r i t e r  by Mr W. 
C a l l a g h a n ,00^  d ep u ty  Chairman o f  th e  T a r i f f  Board ,  f o r m e r l y  
C h ie f  I n s p e c t o r  of  L i c e n s i n g .  In th e  judgem en t  of  Mr C a l l a g h a n  
i t  was l a r g e l y  t h i s  f a c t  which e n a b l e d  th e  scheme to  f u n c t i o n  
a s  e f f i c i e n t l y  as  i t  d i d .
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t h a t  t h e r e  were many i t e m s  -  m a in ly  raw m a t e r i a l s  and c a p i t a l  e q u i p ­
ment -  f o r  which  i t  would be i m p r a c t i c a b l e  t o  d e v i s e  s im p le  c l e a r - c u t  
r u l e s .  Rather  eac h  a p p l i c a t i o n  would have t o  be c o n s i d e r e d  in  con­
j u n c t i o n  w i t h  the  g e n e r a l  econom ic  s i t u a t i o n  and w i t h  o t h e r  a p p l i ­
c a t i o n s  f o r  p e r m i s s i o n  t o  import  s i m i l a r  c o m m o d i t i e s .  Such an exam­
i n a t i o n  c o u l d  be und er tak e n  o n l y  by t h o s e  who had had c o n s i d e r a b l e  
e x p e r i e n c e  in  h a n d l i n g  the  problems t h a t  were l i k e l y  t o  a r i s e ,  t o  w i t ,  
the  s t a f f  o f  C . I . L . B .  Hence,  f o r  a s p e c i f i e d  l i s t  o f  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  the  
l o c a l  f u n c t i o n a r i e s  would be empowered t o  i s s u e  import  l i c e n c e s  o n l y  
a f t e r  a p p r ova l  by C . I . L . B .
To h e l p  both  the  C a b in e t  and the  Department o f  Trade and 
Customs in  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  the  import  l i c e n s i n g  scheme,  the  
governm ent ,  on the  18 th  March 1952 ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  the  " C o n s u l t a t i v e  
Committee on Import  L i c e n s i n g " ,  a committee  c o m p r i s in g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
from i n t e r e s t e d  Commonwealth government  d e p a r tm e n ts  and e i g h t  p r i v a t e  
members. The terms o f  r e f e r e n c e  o f  the  committee  were :
" ( a )  To meet  a t  a p p r o p r i a t e  i n t e r v a l s  t o  r e v i e w  broad
p o l i c y  in  th e  import  l i c e n s i n g  f i e l d  and the  g e n e r a l  e f f e c t s  on the  
economy o f  the  import  r e s t r i c t i o n s  in  f o r c e ;
(b)  To p r o v i d e  a forum f o r  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  any g e n e r a l  
problems a r i s i n g  in  c o n n e x io n  w i t h  import  l i c e n s i n g ;
( c )  To have the  r i g h t  t o  s u b m it ,  through  the  chairman,  to  
the  C a b in e t  Committee on Import  P o l i c y ,  any v iew i t  may w i s h  to
g
e x p r e s s  on c u r r e n t  p o l i c i e s . "
g
P a r 1 iam entary  D e b a t e s , 19 th  February  1953 ,  s p e e c h  by Mr E . J .
H a r r i s o n ,  page 114 .
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The private persons on the committee were members of the 
Associated Chambers of Commerce, the Associated Chambers of Manu­
factures, trade unions, rural industries, the Australian Council of 
Retailers and the National Council of Women. They were not represent 
tatives of these organisations in the sense that they were appointed 
to look after their interests $ rather they were selected for their 
knowledge of and interest in the economic affairs of the nation. The 
committee had no statutory basis, nor did its decisions have any legal 
force. It was established as a channel through which the government 
hoped to receive the views of all interested sections of the community.
During the course of 1952 it became apparent that the 
existing regulations did not give the department the power to close 
certain loopholes. The department had allowed certain importers to 
import goods, mainly American cars, but had stipulated certain con­
ditions to be complied with after the importation. When various
importers subsequently did not comply with their undertaking, the
9department found itself powerless to take further action •
Accordingly, the Department of Trade and Customs asked the 
Attorney-General's Department to draft new regulations giving it the 
power it lacked. Subsequently it decided to make a comprehensive re­
view of all its regulations restricting imports rather than amend its 
regulations piecemeal. The review took some years. Only one section of 
the new regulations differed materially from the earlier regulations : 
a licence might be subject to conditions to be complied with after 
importation.
9 This point is amplified in Chapter 9, page 121.
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In January 1956 the  government  r e o r g a n i s e d  the  two d e p a r t ­
ments  o f  s t a t e  which  had p r e v i o u s l y  shared  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the  
o v e r s i g h t  o f  A u s t r a l i a ' s  o v e r s e a s  t r a d e .  As w e l l  a s  the  Department o f  
Trade and Customs t h e r e  had e x i s t e d  the  Department o f  Commerce and 
A g r i c u l t u r e ,  wh ich i n c l u d e d  t h e  Bureau o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  Econom ics .  The 
l a t t e r  departm ent  a d m i n i s t e r e d  governm ent  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  A u s t r a l i a n  
primary and s e co n d a r y  i n d u s t r i e s ,  and m a in t a i n e d  the  Trade Commissioner  
s e r v i c e ,  through  which i t  p r o v i d e d  commercia l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  on f o r e i g n  
m arkets  t o  A u s t r a l i a n  e x p o r t e r s  and s o u g h t  t o  expand e x p o r t  m arkets  
f o r  A u s t r a l i a n  pr od u c e .  T h i s  arrangement  had t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  t h a t  de­
p a r t m e n t a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  on t r a d e  were f r e q u e n t l y  d e a d l o c k e d .  I f ,  as  
o f t e n  happened ,  a d i s a g r e e m e n t  c o u l d  n o t  be s e t t l e d  on a d e p a r tm e n ta l  
l e v e l ,  i t  had t o  be r e f e r r e d  t o  m i n i s t e r s .  As eac h  m i n i s t e r  u s u a l l y  
s u p p o r t e d  h i s  d e p a r t m e n t ,  even  r e l a t i v e l y  t r i f l i n g  m a t t e r s  o f t e n  had 
t o  be r e f e r r e d  t o  C a b in e t .
With the  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  the  Bureau o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  Economics  
and th e  o t h e r  s e c t i o n s  o f  the  Department o f  Commerce and A g r i c u l t u r e  
h a n d l i n g  primary produce became the  Department o f  Primary I n d u s t r y ;  
the  Trade Commissioner s e r v i c e  and a l l  work a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  the  pro­
m otion  o f  A u s t r a l i a n  e x p o r t s  were handed over  t o  a new Department o f  
Trade* The Department o f  Trade and Customs became the  Department o f  
Customs and E x c i s e ,  and i t  handed over  t o  the  new departm ent  i t s  work 
on t r a d e  t r e a t i e s ,  i m p o r t in g  p o l i c i e s  and th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  the  
T a r i f f  Board.  I t  t h e r e f o r e  handed over  the  C e n t r a l  Import  L i c e n s i n g  
Branch,  which  de ter m in ed  a l l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  i t e m s ,  and the s e c t i o n  
which  hand le d  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y .  The new Department o f  Customs and E x c i s e
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r e t a i n e d  the  f u n c t i o n  o f  i s s u i n g  l i c e n c e s  and o f  c h e c k in g  im ports  
a g a i n s t  l i c e n c e s  i s s u e d ,  but  on q u e s t i o n s  o f  p o l i c y  i t  a c c e p t e d  the  
d e c i s i o n s  o f  the Department  o f  Trade .  S i n c e  the d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  p o l i c y  w e r e ,  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  p u r p o s e s ,  s e p a r a t e  
q u e s t i o n s ,  no c o n f l i c t  a r o s e  such  a s  had e x i s t e d  between th e  former  
d e p a r tm e n ts  o f  Trade & Customs and Commerce & A g r i c u l t u r e  , but  on 
Diinor m a t t e r s  the  s i t u a t i o n  t e n d e d  t o  c ause  a l i t t l e  c o n f u s i o n .  For  
e x a m p le ,  some members o f  P a r l i a m e n t  n e v e r  seemed t o  know to  which  
m i n i s t e r  t h e y  s h o u l d  a d d r e s s  t h e i r  q u e s t i o n s .  The p e r s o n n e l  o f  the  
v a r i o u s  s e c t i o n s  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  new Department o f  Trade w i t h  t h e i r  
s e c t i o n s .  There was t h e r e f o r e  no q u e s t i o n  o f  a change in  p o l i c y  as  a 
r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n .
There were minor d i s a g r e e m e n t s ,  and the  s i t u a t i o n  had i t s  humorous  
s i d e .  On one o c c a s i o n ,  when the  Department o f  Customs and E x c i s e  
proposed  t o  im port  a cus tom s  p a t r o l  l a u n c h ,  the  M i n i s t e r  f o r  
Trade o b j e c t e d  t h a t  h i s  department  had n o t  a u t h o r i s e d  the  
g r a n t i n g  o f  an import  l i c e n c e  f o r  th e  l a u n c h .  The M i n i s t e r  f o r  
Customs and E x c i s e  r e p l i e d  t h a t  i f  th e  l a u n c h  were imported  
w i t h o u t  an im p or t  l i c e n c e  he would d e c l a r e  i t  a p r o h i b i t e d  im­
p o r t  and would c o n f i s c a t e  i t .
C h a p te r  3
THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
In 1955 P r o f e s s o r  T. W. Swan a n a l y s e d  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
be tween t h e  l e v e l  of  employment,  r e a l  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  r e l a t i v e  c o s t s  and 
the  b a l a n c e  of  payments in  a p a p e r  which he p r e s e n t e d  t o  S e c t i o n  G of 
th e  A u s t r a l i a n  and New Zea land  A s s o c i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  Advancement of  
S c i e n c e 1 . In P r o f e s s o r  Swan’ s d ia g ra m ,  r e p r o d u c e d  be low,  t h e  h o r i ­
z o n t a l  a x i s  r e p r e s e n t s  r e a l  d o m e s t i c  e x p e n d i t u r e  and th e  v e r t i c a l  a x i s
Cos t
R a t i o
Rea l  d o m e s t i c  e x p e n d i t u r e  ( ”E” )
T. W. Swan, ’’L o n g e r - r u n  P rob lem s  of  t h e  Ba lance  of  P aym ents” , 
p r i n t e d  in  A rnd t  and  Corden ( e d . ) ,  The A u s t r a l i a n  Economy, 
pages  384 -  395.
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t h e  r a t i o  of  f o r e i g n  c o s t s  t o  d o m e s t i c  c o s t s .  A c o u n t r y  can s u s t a i n  a 
g iv e n  l e v e l  o f  employment d e s p i t e  low d o m e s t i c  e x p e n d i t u r e  i f  i t s  c o s t  
r a t i o  i s  so f a v o u r a b l e  t h a t  i t s  e x p o r t s  a r e  h ig h  and i t s  im p o r t s  low; 
i f  i t s  c o s t  r a t i o  i s  u n f a v o u r a b l e ,  i t  can s u p p o r t  t h e  same l e v e l  of  
employment o n ly  by means of  h ig h  d o m e s t i c  e x p e n d i t u r e .  T h i s  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p  i s  d e n o te d  by "A" on t h e  g r a p h ,  one of  a m u l t i t u d e  of  c u r v e s  
which e a c h  d e s c r i b e  a d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l  of  employment.  On th e  o t h e r  hand 
i f  t h e  c o s t  r a t i o  i s  low ( i . e .  i f  do m e s t i c  c o s t s  a r e  h i g h )  t h e  p ropen ­
s i t y  t o  im p o r t  w i l l  be r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h .  As d o m e s t i c  e x p e n d i t u r e  r i s e s ,  
so w i l l  e x p e n d i t u r e  on i m p o r t s .  Hence a g iv e n  b a l a n c e  o f  payments r e ­
q u i r e s  a  c o m b in a t io n  o f  low e x p e n d i t u r e  and an u n f a v o u r a b l e  c o s t  r a t i o  
or  of  h ig h  e x p e n d i t u r e  and a f a v o u r a b l e  c o s t  r a t i o .  T h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
i s  d e n o te d  by MB" on th e  g r a p h ,  one of  a m u l t i t u d e  o f  c u r v e s  which 
e a c h  d e s c r i b e  a d i f f e r e n t  b a l a n c e  o f  paym en ts .  As e x p e n d i t u r e  i n c r e a s e s  
beyond th e  l e v e l  a t  which  f u l l  employment i s  r e a c h e d ,  l o c a l  r e s o u r c e s  
a r e  o v e r s t r a i n e d  more and more,  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  an i n c r e a s i n g  
p r o p o r t i o n  of  i n c r e a s e s  in  d o m e s t i c  e x p e n d i t u r e  a r e  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  im­
p o r t s ,  u n t i l  f i n a l l y  th e  improvement in  th e  c o s t  r a t i o  needed  to  
o f f s e t  an i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p e n d i t u r e  i s  i n f i n i t e .
I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  a  governm ent  f a c e d  w i t h  a b a l a n c e  of  payments 
d e f i c i t  must  f i r s t  e a s e  any i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e ,  and t h i s  i s  t r u e  
w he the r  t h e  q u e s t i o n v i s  b e i n g  c o n s i d e r e d  as  a  s h o r t - r u n  o r  a s  a l o n g -
ru n  prob lem ,  s i n c e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  changes  in  t h e  l e v e l  o f  "EM i s  im-
the  e f f e c t  of
m e d i a t e .  On th e  o t h e r  hand ,  Nch an g e s  in  t h e  l e v e l  o f  "R" -is- n o t  im­
m e d i a t e .  Moreover ,  t h e  r e a l  p o s i t i o n  may be o b s c u r e d  by s h o r t - t e r m  
v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  t e rm s  o f  t r a d e ,  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and c a p i t a l  i n f l o w .
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P r o fe s s o r  Swan t h e r e fo r e  s u g g e s t s  th a t  "R" should  be in t e r p r e te d  as a 
lon g -ru n  moving average) and warns th a t  any attem pt to  m ainta in  sh o r t­
term e q u i l ib r iu m  by movements in i t  may lead  to  w a s te fu l  i n s t a b i l i t y
2
in  the c o s t  s t r u c tu r e  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  incomes •
In the sh o r t-ru n  a government can avo id  the u n p lea sa n t  
ch o ic e  between unemployment and an adjustm ent to  the c o s t  r a t i o  by 
u s in g  q u a n t i t a t iv e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  to  p r o te c t  the c o u n tr y 's  in t e r n a t io n a l  
r e se r v e s*  Indeed , as a s h o r t - te r m  s o l u t i o n ,  q u a n t i t a t iv e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
have a number o f  advantages  : most im p o r ta n t ly ,  they  work ( a t  l e a s t
they  do i f  they  are p rop er ly  a d m in is te r e d ) ,  whereas o th er  p o s s ib l e  
measures may n o t ,  o f  oiay not w ith o u t  a c o n s id e r a b le  d e la y  $ th ey  are  
more e a s i l y  a d ju s ta b le  than t a r i f f s  ; th ey  are l e s s  l i k e l y  to  have 
u n p lea sa n t  p o l i t i c a l  r e p e r c u s s io n s  than unemployment, d e p r e c ia t io n  or 
w a g e -c u ts .  There i s  in  f a c t  l i k e l y  to  be c o n s id e r a b le  p u b l ic  support  
fo r  the p r o te c t io n  a f fo r d e d ,  w h ile  powerful s e c t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  can 
o f te n  be accommodated w ith o u t p u b l i c i t y ,  and s o c i a l  r e s i s t a n c e  i s  
l i k e l y  to  be p oor ly  o r g a n is e d .
These advantages  are bought a t  a p r i c e : a s h o r t - term  s o lu t io n  
to  the problem may i n h i b i t  the  search  fo r  a lon g -term  s o l u t i o n .  No 
harm i s  done thereby  i f  the problem i s  s h o r t - te r m . But i f  in  f a c t  i t  
should turn out to  be more in t r a c t a b l e  than was i n i t i a l l y  supposed, 
p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e s  may le a d  the government to  turn a b l in d  eye to  the  
development o f  lon g -term  d isa d v a n ta g e s  s w ith  the in t e r p la y  of market 
f o r c e s ,  the w e lfa r e  l o s s e s  are l i k e l y  to  be turned  in to  f i n a n c i a l  
l o s s e s  caused by p r o f i t e e r i n g  and in vestm en t in  im p o r t -r e p la c in g
2 l o c * c i t .  page 389
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industries; administrative difficulties are likely to lead to a 
freezing of import industry unless the government periodically removes 
the restrictions or at least relaxes them very considerably; period­
ical relaxations, while enabling us to avoid the latter danger, are 
likely to lead to speculation.
A government can afford to ignore these possibilities if it 
is reasonably certain that the balance of payments problem ijs short­
term. But this cas clearly not true of the Australian balance of 
payments problem. What then are the long-term solutions ? First and 
foremost, and most important from the point of view of maintaining the 
level of current spending, is the development of export and of import­
replacing industries. As a means to this end, and as a mid-term stop­
gap, the government may manage to finance the deficit by overseas 
borrowing or by the encouragement of more capital inflow.
If the deficit cannot be financed, whether by borrowing or 
by economic development, there is no alternative to a loss of real 
spending power, and the main points to be decided are how the sacri­
fice should be distributed among the community and whether the re­
strictions should be in a form to encourage exports. The choice lies
between deflation, export subsidies, depreciation, a floating exchange
Deflatio n works by reducisg demand; the other 
rate, wage-cuts and tariffs, fivaxmethedsxwhickx&Ktxbasifiaiiyxxsimilar 
five divert demand to the domestic market, 
but have important differences in effect.
Deflation : The method used under the gold standard, deflation is
politically unacceptable since it places the whole of the burden upon 
the unemployed.
Export subsidies : An export subsidy increases the competitiveness of
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d o m e s t i c a l l y  produced goods in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  market.  I f  i t  d i v e r t s  
p roduct ion  to  the ex p o r t  market,  i t  may cause sh o r ta g e s  of  supply in  
the dom est ic  market.  I f  i t  ca u s es  an in c r e a s e  in p ro d u ct io n ,  i t  may 
absorb r e s o u r c e s  from other  i n d u s t r i e s ,  but th e s e  can presumably be 
r e p la c e d  by imports  bought w i th  the e x t r a  f o r e i g n  currency o b ta in ed .  
Otherwise i t  does not  a f f e c t  the domest ic  market.  I t  encourages  the  
development of  exp or t  i n d u s t r i e s .  Part  of  the  l o s s  i s  borne by the  
taxp ayers  who have to  f in a n c e  the s u b s i d i e s  ; part  of  i t  i s  r e f l e c t e d  
in lower terms of t r a d e .  I t  i s  p a r t l y  o f f s e t  by the g r e a t e r  income of  
e x p o r t e r s .
D e p r e c ia t io n  s D e p r e c ia t io n  i s  broadly  e q u i v a l e n t  to  the combinat ion  
of a uniform customs t a r i f f  and a uniform ex p o r t  s u b s id y ,  but w ith  the  
a d d i t i o n a l  e f f e c t  th a t  i t  a f f e c t s  currency movements as w e l l  as  
v i s i b l e  t r a d e .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  not  to  be undertaken l i g h t l y ,  s in c e  i t s  
f r e q u e n t  use  may g iv e  r i s e  to  s p e c u l a t i o n  a g a i n s t  the currency a t  a 
t ime when s p e c u l a t i o n  could  do most harm. C erta in  of  i t s  consequences  
o f f s e t  one anoth er ,  e . g .  the c o s t s  of  imported raw m a t e r i a l s  w i l l  
r i s e ,  but s i n c e  th ese  c o s t s  w i l l  in g e n e r a l  form only  a small  pro­
p o r t io n  of  the t o t a l  c o s t  o f  a product ,  the  n e t  r e s u l t  must be a f a l l  
in p r ic e  when the a r t i c l e  i s  e x p o r te d .  The l o s s  i s  shared by buyers  
of imported goods and buyers  of  dearer  home-produced goods .  I t  i s  
p a r t l y  o f f s e t  by the g r e a t e r  income of  e x p o r t e r s .
F l o a t i n g  exchange r a t e s  : With a system of f l o a t i n g  exchange r a t e s  the  
r a te  i s  l e f t  to  f i n d  i t s  own l e v e l  in  a f r e e  market.  In the c o n t e x t  of  
A u s t r a l i a  during the second h a l f  of  the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s  the r e s u l t  of  
a f l o a t i n g  exchange r a t e  cou ld  on ly  have been d e p r e c i a t i o n .
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Wage r e d u c t io n s  : Wage r e d u c t io n s  r e d i s t r i b u t e  income and spending  
power in  favour o f  th o se  in  u n s h e l te r e d  i n d u s t r i e s ,  and in c r e a se  the  
c o m p e t i t iv e n e s s  of e x p o r t s .  The l o s s  i s  borne by th o se  whose incomes  
are reduced but i t  may be p a r t ly  o f f s e t  by an in c r e a se  in  the incomes  
of e x p o r t e r s .  S in c e ,  u n l ik e  the a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  wage r e d u c t io n s  do not  
p reserv e  the money i l l u s i o n ,  th ey  are most l i k e l y  to  meet p o l i t i c a l  
o p p o s i t io n .
Higher t a r i f f s  : By r a i s i n g  the f i n a l  c o s t  o f  manufactured a r t i c l e s  
which use imported goods as raw m a t e r i a l s ,  a t a r i f f  d is c o u r a g e s  the  
development of ex p o rt  i n d u s t r i e s  and ca u ses  a r i s e  in  wages to  the  
e x t e n t  th a t  the wage index i s  dependent upon the p r ic e s  o f  imported  
good s .  The l o s s  i s  shared by the buyers o f  imported goods and buyers  
o f  dearer home-produced good s ,  and by e x p o r te r s  the c o m p e t i t iv e n e s s  of  
whose goods has d e c r e a se d .  These l o s s e s  are p a r t ly  o f f s e t  by g a in s  in  
government revenue from in c r e a se d  customs duty .
PART 2 
HISTORY OF
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
1952-1960
Chapter 4
IMPOSITION OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS 
ON ALL AUSTRALIAN IMPORTS,
MARCH 1952
After the exceptional wool prices of the stock-piling boom, 
prices fell even more quickly than they had risen, and this fall coin­
cided with a seasonal fall in exports. The one reinforced the other, 
and by September 1951 monthly export income had fallen to about £40 
million, less than one-third of export income in the previous April. 
But the excessive liquidity remained and continued to spill over into 
the import market.
Commentators were quick to see the implications. Already in 
September the Australian Financial Review foresaw the dissipation of 
reserves in less than two years if imports were high and the level of 
wool prices fell further. As reserves continued to fall month after 
month, public statements were made by various private economists. Foe 
example, on the 19th November 1951, three and a half months before the 
restrictions were announced, Professor H. W. Arndt commented :
"It appears probable that the current year will see last year’s 
surplus converted into a deficit of not less than £300 million and
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possibly as much as £600 million . . . the situation clearly
demands a quick readjustment of thought and policy. It is very 
doubtful whether we can any longer afford to treat a balance of 
payments deficit as a welcome aid in the fight against domestic 
inflation.” *
By the end of December 1951, the reserves had fallen to
£506.3 million, a level which of itself need have given no cause for
alarm, even when one allowed for the fact that inflation and the rise
in the volume of trade since the end of the war necessitated higher
reserves. What was alarming was the extent of the fall in the level of 
reserves in the previous six months (nearly £300 million). Clearly 
they would not be able to stand a similar drop in the following six 
months.
Fortunately it appeared unlikely that the existing rate of
fall would continue, as the deflationary effect of the government's
economic measures and of the balance of payments deficit began to
operate. Meanwhile it was part of government policy to allow London
2funds to be used to increase imports as a deflationary measure •
In January the Treasurer attended the Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers' conference in London, the main subject of which was the 
sterling crisis vis-a-vis the dollar. The communique issued at the end
News commentary given for the Australian Broadcasting Commission 
on the 19th November 1951.
See Sydney Morning Herald, 31st January 1952, page 2, for a state­
ment issued on behalf of senior federal ministers in answer to 
continuing complaints that the high level of imports was causing 
unemployment among textile workers, of whom about 4,000 had 
been dismissed in the previous two months.
2
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of the conference called for a long-term policy to restore the strength 
of sterling, but mentioned reduction of imports as a last resort.
No announcement was made by the Australian government until 
the 4th March, when the Prime Minister announced that the Cabinet 
would the next day begin to hold "very, very weighty and important" 
discussions. The BYiday following (the 7th) the Commonwealth Bank 
instructed trading banks s
"Banks are asked immediately to refrain from issuing further 
credits for imports or making clean payments for goods not already 
landed.
"The above does not apply to goods from Appendix B countries for 
which an import licence has already been issued."
In the same instruction the Commonwealth Bank limited the amount of 
money that pleasure travellers might take to the United Kingdom and to 
continental Europe to £500 and £100 respectively.
On the next day the Prime Minister announced that the 
existing system of import licensing would forthwith be extended to 
cover all imports into Australia, but that the government would relax 
and remove the controls as soon as the balance of payments position 
permitted. The quotas being established were tentative : government
departments would Confer, and the industries affected would be con­
sulted, so that there would be a certain amount of flexibility within 
the limits of the finance available.
When parliament reassembled, the Treasurer explained the
o
Payments made in anticipation of shipping documents, which estab­
lish that the goods have been landed.
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reasons for Cabinet’s decision:
" . . .  By the middle of February, however, there was 
sufficient information to indicate that a major fall in the rate of
imports could not be expected before April at the earliest 
On the best estimates that could be made it appeared that unless 
imports were restrained, the total for 1951-52 was likely to be of 
the order of £1,100,000,000 f.o.b. or, taking freight and insurance 
into account, about £1,250,000,000 • . • It was clear that by
the 30th June international reserves would be well below £300 
million. Thereafter, because the September quarter in any year is 
always a relatively lean period for export earnings, we could 
expect to go on losing London funds at a relatively rapid rate. 
When such a point is reached there is a grave risk that capital 
movements may begin through a loss of confidence in the situation. 
We confronted the stark possibility that unless drastic action were 
taken our international reserves could easily be exhausted before 
the end of 1952.” 4
On the following day Mr Nenzies stated the date on which
g
Cabinet had decided on the restrictions1 :
” . . .  on Thursday the 6th March • • . Cabinet after
protracted sessions decided upon the import restrictions and gave 
instructions there and then to the Commonwealth Bank that it should 
place an embargo upon the issue of any further letters of credit so
4 Parliamentary Debates, 6th May 1952, House of Representatives, page 
36.
Parliamentary Debates, 7th May 1952, House of Representatives, page 
130.
5
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that the new arrangement might be put into force at once without 
undue gossip or warning.”
According to the Treasurer's speech cited above, the govern­
ment had obtained the opinions of "people in the business and financial 
worlds" about the volume of import orders and prospects for delivery. 
The general consensus was "that a fall would occur after Christmas" • 
The main events during January, February and March which no doubt 
influenced Cabinet were :
7th January 1952 Issue of November 1951 overseas trading figures
showing a trading deficit of £30*4 million.
30th January 1952 Issue of December 1951 overseas trading figures
showing a trading deficit of £18.2 million.
24th February 1952 The New Zealand Prime Minister announced that
7imports would be cut .
28th February 1952 Issue of January 1952 overseas trading figures
showing a trading deficit of £53.4 million.This 
was the largest monthly deficit since Septem-
Parliamentary Debates, 6th May 1952, House of Representatives, page 
36.
The restrictions imposed by the New Zealand government were inten­
ded to achieve external balance for the year ended 30th June 
1953, including a surplus with the non-sterligg area. They were:
All licences issued for "scheduled" countries (mainly U.S.A., Canada, 
Japan) were cancelled and fresh licences required for future imports.
There was no general licensing of imports from the sterling area but 
trading banks were instructed to restrict the amount of foreign 
exchange sold to an importer during 1952 to 80$ of that sold in 
1950.
No import Licences were granted for assembled cars, trucks or vans.
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ber 1951 and the third largest monthly deficit 
ever recorded. The figures were an especial 
shock since it had been expected that the 
government's deflationary measures would have 
taken effect.
5th March 1952 The Treasurer reported to Cabinet. At gome time
during the same week, preliminary overseas 
trading figures for February became available 
to the government. They showed a trading deficit 
of £50 million.
The work entailed in drafting restrictions for about 2,500
gtariff items and sub-items separately, and in estimating their effect , 
would have been prodigious. If in fact Cabinet did not begin to 
discuss the economic situation until Wednesday the 5th March, it could 
have done little more than accept a plan prepared by the adminis­
tration. While it could have made trivial alterations, and sweeping 
alterations of a general nature (such as, for example, that luxuries 
should be restricted by 80%, and not 70%), it would have had no time 
to make extensive and detailed alterations to individual items. One 
suspects therefore that the Cabinet discussions were devoted mainly 
to the task of explaining the proposals and of convincing the ministry 
of the need for action. Presumably the scheme was drafted during the 
week between the Treasurer's return to Canberra and the Cabinet 
meeting of the following Wednesday.
The only legal requirement for the introduction of the
8 This may not have been done in detail; see note 16 on page 39
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restrictions was the signature of the Minister for Trade and Customs. 
(The Customs (import Licensing)Regulations provided that no goods 
might be imported into Australia without a licence except those 
specifically exempted by the Minister for "Trade and Customs. The 
Minister had exempted all imports except those from the dollar area 
and Japan.) By a decision gazetted on the 8th March 1952, he revoked 
this exemption for all goods except those of no commercial value, 
goods which did not form part of normal trade (e.g. passenger*! 
baggage and personal effects, samples, trophies) and goods which were 
the produce of an Australian external territory. The effect of this 
amendment was that all goods entering Australia commercially became 
subject to a licensing system from the midnight preceding the 8th 
March.
On Saturdays the 8th March the Comptroller-General of 
Customs issued to all Collectors and Sub-collectors of Customs a
9memorandum setting out the detailed administrative arrangements. By 
these arrangements, a category ("A", "B" or '’administrative*') was 
allocated to each tariff item or sub-item, to represent the category 
in which corresponding imports were to be licensed. In general, goods 
were described by tariff item, but in a few instances where the tariff 
classification was insufficient they were further described Verbally.
Category "B" comprised the goods which it was intended to 
restrict most severely. It included general consumer goods, machinery 
for home use, most foods and certain essential goods in adequate local 
supply. Imports of goods in this category were to be reduced to 20^ of 
9 Licensing instruction number 18 of 1952.
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i m p o r t s  of  a l l  i t e m s  in  c a t e g o r y  "B" d u r i n g  1950-51 ,  i . e .  c a t e g o r y  MBM 
was t o  be a s i n g l e  g ro u p  s an i m p o r t e r  who had d u r i n g  1950-51 im por ted  
goods  c l a s s i f i e d  t o  t a r i f f  i t e m s  in  c a t e g o r y  "B" had a q u o t a  e q u a l  t o  
o n e - f i f t h  of  th e  v a l u e  of  t h o s e  g o o d s ,  and m igh t  use  t h a t  q u o t a  t o  
im p o r t  any c a t e g o r y  "B" goods .
C a teg o ry  "A" co m p r i s ed  th e  goods  which i t  was i n t e n d e d  to  
r e s t r i c t  q u i t e  c o n s i d e r a b l y ,  b u t  l e s s  s e v e r e l y  th a n  th o s e  in  c a t e g o r y  
"B".  They were m a in ly  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  com m odi t ie s  f o r  f u r t h e r  manu­
f a c t u r e  in  A u s t r a l i a ,  and e s s e n t i a l  consumer go o d s .  Im p o r t s  of  goods 
in  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  were t o  be r e d u c e d  t o  60^ of  im p o r t s  of  t h e  c o r r e ­
s p o n d in g  i t e m s  d u r i n g  1950-51 ,  i . e .  q u o t a s  were t o  be a l l o c a t e d  f o r  
i n d i v i d u a l  com m o d i t i e s ,  f o r  th e  governm ent  w ished  t o  f o r e s t a l l  r e ­
q u e s t s  f o r  s u p p le m e n ta ry  l i c e n c e s  f o r  e s s e n t i a l  goods which had n o t  
been  im p o r t e d .
C a t e g o r i e s  "A" and "B" were o c c a s i o n a l l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  th e  
’’q u o t a  c a t e g o r i e s " .
The ’' a d m i n i s t r a t i v e "  c a t e g o r y  c o v e re d  a "wide range  of  im- 
p o r t s A s u c h  a s  raw m a t e r i a l s  and components f o r  i n d u s t r y  and c a p i t a l  
e qu ipm en t  • . • ( o f  which  i t  was)  e i t h e r  i m p r a c t i c a b l e  or  u n d e s i r ­
a b l e  t o  r e s t r i c t  im p o r t s  . . .  t o  a  g iv e n  p e r c e n t a g e  based  on a 
p a s t  t r a d i n g  p e r i o d "  •
The government made no announcement of  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  
i t  had f o l l o w e d  in  d e t e r m i n i n g  the  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on i n d i v i d u a l  t a r i f f  
i t e m s .  The on ly  s t a t e m e n t s  made were of  a g e n e r a l  fo rm,  t h e  g o v e r n -
U n p u b l i s h ed  s t a t e m e n t  e n t i t l e d  "The A u s t r a l i a n  Im por t  L i c e n s i n g  
Sys tem " ,  p r e p a r e d  by th e  D epar tm en t  of  Trade f o r  G .A .T .T .  (page 
5 ) .
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ment’s aim being:
"(a) as far as possible to share importing opportunities equit­
ably amongst those whose business was importing;
"(b) to ensure that local industry can obtain reasonable supp­
lies of raw materials and producer goods for manufacturing purposes;
M(c) to minimise the incidental protective effect for local 
industries of direct restrictions upon imports. The latter are 
patterned solely upon the need to conserve foreign exchange, and 
any protective effect is, from this point of view, accidental and, 
as it were, unintentional. Deliberate protection is, according to 
government policy, to be provided only through the customs tariff 
after a public inquiry and recommendation to the government by the 
Australian Tariff Board;
"(d) to conduct import licensing administration in such a way 
that the structure could readily be dismantled if the need dis­
appeared. This reflects the government's opposition, in principle, 
to direct economic controls, as well as its reluctance to see a 
permanent element of protection introduced by this means as distinct 
from the normal tariff method;
"(e) to maintain as much flexibility as possible in the admin­
istration of import controls."**
In the absence of a more precise statement one can only infer a policy 
from the restrictions imposed. The table on pages 41-43 comprises a 
list of the main commodities licensed in the "administrative" category
Draft report by the study group of the Canberra branch of the 
Royal Institute of Public Administration on "Administration of 
Import Licensing", para. 14.
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at the start of the scheme, and a comparison of them with commodities 
of a similar nature which were placed in one or other of the quota 
categories* From this table it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
"administrative" category consisted of the following types of goods s
i) raw materials whose restriction would necessarily re­
strict industry and probably cause serious unemployment (e.g. 
metalgy machinery, rubber, cotton yarn, paper pulp, certain 
chemicals);
ii) other items whose restriction would not necessarily cause 
unemployment, but which were important to the economy and not 
suitable for the quota system because they were imported at irreg­
ular intervals (e.g* aircraft, vessels, railway vehicles);
iii) goods which played an important part in earning export 
income (e.g* bags and sacks for primary produce, animals for 
breeding) ;
iv) goods which were important for various social programs 
- housing, health, education (e.g. prefabricated buildings, drugs 
and chemicals, scientific instruments for use by universities) ;
v) goods which would have had to be rationed if supplies 
had been restricted. This group comprised tea and petrol. The 
former was subsidised at the time. Since it was a conventional 
necessity, any restriction in supplies of it might well have led 
to a blackmarket if rationing had not been reintroduced. Petrol 
had been rationed until 1950, and a major plank in the government's 
platform at the 1949 elections had been the abolition of petrol 
rationing.
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An importer who wished to  import a commodity in the "admin­
i s t r a t i v e "  ca te g o r y  a p p l ie d  d i r e c t  to  the  C . I . L . B .  in S y d n e y .C .I .L .B .  
c o n s id e r e d  each case  i n d i v i d u a l l y ,  mainly  on the b a s i s  of  the  
e s s e n t i a l i t y  of  the  it em and the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  l o c a l  su pp ly .  I f  i t  
d ec ided  t h a t  a l i c e n c e  should be i s s u e d ,  i t  informed the (Sub-)  
c o l l e c t o r  a t  the in tended  port  o f  im p o r ta t io n ,  and the ( S u b - ) c o l l e c t o r  
i s s u e d  a l i c e n c e .
An importer who wished to  import goods in e i t h e r  of  the
quota  c a t e g o r i e s  fu r n i s h e d  to  the ( S u b - ) c o l l e c t o r  r e t u r n s  showing
p a r t i c u l a r s  of  h i s  im p o r ta t io n s  of  goods in the  quota c a t e g o r i e s
during the  f i n a n c i a l  year  1950-51 .  He fu r n i s h e d  a separate~returns  fo r
each item in  ca teg o r y  "A", but in c lu d ed  a l l  i tems in  c a teg o r y  "B" in
the one f e t u r n .  The ( S u b - ) c o l l e c t o r  e s t a b l i s h e d  a separate  "quota" in
the im p o r te r ' s  favour ( i . e .  determined the  t o t a l  value of  the goods
t h a t  he might import in each l i c e n s i n g  p er iod )  fo r  each item w ith in
ca teg o r y  "A" and another  quota to  cover  a l l  i t ems in c a teg o r y  "B".
The forniula fo r  each o quota was t
(l  ^ 3} 1^ 115 £A f . o . b .  va lue of  imports of
(5 ° r 5)  X 4 X 100 it em during 1950-51
The f i r s t  f a c t o r  was l / 5  fo r  ca teg o r y  "B" quotas  and 3 /5  fo r
ca teg o r y  "A" q u o ta s ,  and r e p r e s e n te d  the degree  of  r e s t r i c t i o n  to  be
imposed. The formula in c lu d ed  the f a c t o r  ^ because the quota  r e l a t e d
to  a p e r io d * o f  th ree  months. The f a c t o r  115 /100  r e p r e s e n te d  a con ver-
12s io n  f a c t o r  between c . i . f . e .  and f . o . b .  p r i c e s  . As each  import  
12 Imports are recorded  on an f . o . b .  b a s i s .  The currency needs o f  an 
imported are the f . o . b .  va lue  o f  h i s  imports  p lu s  f r e i g h t  and 
in surance  c h a r g e s .  The department could  have i s s u e d  two l i c e n c e s  
to  each  im porter ,  one fo r  the f . o . b .  va lu e  o f  h i s  im ports ,  and
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arrived, the importer’s quota for goods in its licensing classification 
was reduced by its c*.i.f.e* cost. This procedure was referred to as 
"debiting the quota".
Quotas were not transferable from one category to another, 
nor from one person to another. They were allocated on a quarterly 
basis, and quotas or portions of quotas unused at the end of a quarter 
were not carried forward into a subsequent quarter except in special 
circumstances (usually goods of a seasonal nature).
Applications for import licences had to be submitted in 
sextuplicate, the various copies being used as follows:
1 (white) When signed by the Collector, the first copy of the
application constituted the licence. It was returned 
to the importer for presentation to his bank when he 
applied for foreign exchange, and for subsequent 
presentation to customs when the goods were imported.
2 (white) Returned to the importer in case he wished to send a
copy of the licence to the supplier.
3 (old gold) Retained for record.
4 (pink) Sent to the Australian trading bank named in the
application.
5 (blue) Used for statistical record.
6 (yellow) Retained for record.
The details of the new scheme having been se&iled, it was
the other for freight and insurance, but this procedure would 
have necessitated the issue of twice as many licences. It was 
less cumbersome to determine the average ratio of c,i.f.e. and 
f.o.b. prices from sample checks.
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necessary to bring it into operation as smoothly and as speedily as 
possible* Technically, any article imported into Australia after the 
midnight preceding the 8th March without an import licence was a pro­
hibited import, and, as such, liable to be confiscated. It would, 
however, have been unduly harsh, as well as an infringement of Article 
XIII (b) of G.A.T.T., to prevent the importation of goods already at 
sea, and pointless to prevent the importation of those already paid 
for, or for which an irrevocable letter of credit had been issued. 
Accordingly, the following special arrangements were made to cover 
initial problems t
i) goods in transit at the 8th March and already paid fort 
aö import licence was required but the imports were debited against 
any future quota established in the importers favour^
ii) goods in transit at the 8th March but the whole or part 
of the payment had not been made: the importer had to apply for
an import licence (which would be issued automatically) for presen­
tation to his bank so that he might obtain the necessary foreign 
exchange. This foreign exchange was debited against any future 
quota established.
iii) goods on firm order before the 8th March and covered by 
13an irrevocable____ letter of credit (or a commitment of an equally
A letter of credit is a type of bank cheque, and may be neither 
modified nor cancelled except with the consent of all parties 
to the transaction. As far as a bank is concerned, therefore, 
every letter of credit is irrevocable.However, many outstanding 
letters of credit had been established by Australian importers 
in favour of a foreign branch of their own company. These 
letters of credit were not regarded as irrevocable in the sense 
that the Australian importer had the power to instruct his 
foreign branch not to present them to the bank.
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binding nature) : an import licence was issued automatically, but
as a debit against any future quota established.
iv) Goods oprdered but not in transit by the 8th March and 
where no binding financial commitment had been entered intot orders 
had to be cancelled unless an import licence for the goods could be 
obtained in the normal way* No special consideration was given to 
these orders 14 .
Notwithstanding bitter public reaction, more controls were 
to come. Within a fortnight it was announced on successive days that:
i) Cabinet had discussed the question of restricting
imports from countries whose exports to Australia had been subject 
to licensing before the 8th March;
ii) Cabinet had called for a report on means of cutting
dollar expenditure;
iii) Cabinet had decided that licences issued for goods men­
tioned under (i) were to be recalled for review. Importers were to 
ask suppliers to suspend shipment.
By decision (iii) there were to be no further restrictions on the im­
portation of goods being bought of the United States or Canada under 
the International Bank Loan, nor of bulk petroleum products. These 
restrictions affected goods originating in the dollar area, Japan, the
"The government would have liked to license all goods on firm order 
as at midnight on the 7th March, but the volume involved was so 
great that to have done so would have prejudiced the success of 
the whole operation." (Parliamentary Debates, 22nd May 1952, 
page 757, speech by Sir Arthur Fadden.) It is difficult to see 
how the government could have known the value of goods on firm 
order at the time it fixed the restrictions. Presumably Sir 
Arthur meant simply that requests since lodged for supplementary 
licences had shown the government’s fears to be justified.
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U.S.S.R., the Russian zone of Germany, Argentina and Iran, and certain 
other goods under licensing schemes before the 8th March. No licence 
was to be confirmed by the Collector of Customs unless the goods it 
covered were in transit before the 21st March, or full payment had 
already been made or an irrevocable letter of credit established. Im­
porters whose licences were cancelled in this review had to reapply 
to the C.I.L.B. if they still wished to import the goods concerned.
Why did the government impose these subsequent restrictions?
It seems unlikely that the government really felt a need to conserve
further resources of international currency. The effect of the
restrictions was to cut dollar imports back to their level of the
second half of 1951, viz. about £100 million. But dollar imports for
the first half of 1952 were running at the rate of about £150 million.
Hence, unless the government had -already authorised licences for a
later period at a much greater rate of importing (and given the
economic situation, this hardly seems likely), the additional saving of
international reserves is unlikely to have been more than £25 million
at the most. And even if the government was interested in this extra
saving, why did it wait a fortnight after the initial restrictions?
It seems more likely that the government wished to pacify sections of
had
the community which/felt that British manufacturers had been asked 
to shoulder too much of the burden.
No economist or commentator seems to have suggested how 
severe the restrictions ought to be. Nor was there an official 
estimate of their intended effect. An ’’unofficial” estimate was that
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imports for 1952-53 would be between £500 million and £600 million .
It is doubtful whether the government knew the extent of the re-
16strictions in detail . Sven if it did, the estimate is so loose that
17one wonders whether it came from a governmental source .
As imports were currently entering Australia at an annual 
rate of about £1,100 million, a reduction of the extent reported would 
reduce imports by about 50^, i.e. to a rate approximating that for 
1948-49.
The government made no attempt to justify the reported nor 
any other amount of restriction. But it is possible to think of a 
number of reasons it may have had in mind. Perhaps it planned to err
on the side of caution and to impose restrictions of such severity
18that it would not become necessary to impose further restrictions • 
also
Perhaps/it thought that, imports being likely to decline fairly
sharply of their own accord, mild restrictions might turn out to be no 
restrictions at all, and thereby make the government a laughing stock. 
A third possibility is that the government wished to leave itself room
Sunday Herald, 9th March 1952, page 1.
See Parliamentary Debates, 8th October 1952, page 2659. According 
to Senator O’Sullivan, the Minister for Trade and Customs, the 
division of imports into three licensing categories "was 
adopted without any mathematical basis of calculation”.
It would not be a very difficult guess: base year imports of £744 
million would set a maximum figure; the value of producers' 
goods and capital equipment (about 80$ of total imports, i.e. 
about £600 million), together with some allowance for excess 
stocks (say £100 million ? ) would set a minimum.
In point of fact further restrictions were imposed on the 21st 
March 1952 (see page 37).
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for manoeuvre in case the regulations or system should be found to 
contain serious loopholes, or it should become necessary to issue many 
supplementary licences.
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COMPARISON OF THE LICENSING CATEGORIES 
OF GOODS OF A SIMILAR NATURE
(Column 1 c o m p r i s e s  th e  most im p or tan t  o f  the  goods  l i c e n s e d  
in  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c a t e g o r y  i n  March 1952« Columns 2 and 3 co m p r i s e  
a s e l e c t i o n  o f  the  goods  l i c e n s e d  in  th e  two qu o ta  c a t e g o r i e s  ( i * e .  
c a t e g o r y  A and c a t e g o r y  B ) ,  and are  d e s i g n e d  o n ly  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  how 
the  two q u o t a  c a t e g o r i e s  d i f f e r  from e ac h  o t h e r  and from the  a d m in i s ­
t r a t i v e  c a t e g o r y * )
I n c l u d e d  in  
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
C ategory
I n c lu d e d  in  
C a te g o r y  "A”
I n c lu d e d  in  
Category  ”BM
Bags and s a c k s  f o r  
bran ,  c h a f f ,  p o t a t o e s ,  
c o a l ,  w o o l ,  o n io n s
B l e a c h e d  c o t t o n  p i e c e -  
g o o d s ,  woven a r t  s i l k  
p i e c e g o o d s  f o r  the  
m anufacture  o f  p r i n t e d  
s i l k  p i e c e g o o d s
P i e c e g o o d s  n o t  r e q u i r ­
in g  f u r t h e r  manufac­
t u r e
■■.74
Tea - -
-
Unmanufactured t o b a c c o  
t o  be m anufactured  i n ­
t o  t o b a c c o
Unmanufactured t o b a c c o  
t o  be m anufactured  i n ­
t o  c i g a r e t t e s  
Cut t o b a c c o  and c i g a r ­
e t t e s
- Raw c o f f e e R o a s te d  or ground
c o f f e e
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Cocoa beans Chocolate
Diving suits, miners 
hats,firemen 1s helmets
Apparel in general
Iron and steel in gen­
eral
Aluminium, nickel and 
copper bars, not fur­
ther manufactured than 
plated, polished or
decorated
Cutlery and plated ware
Machinery in general Parts of machines, Lawn mowers, washing
(except household 
machinery)
minor machinery such as 
sheep-shearing machin­
ery, adding machines, 
cash registers
machines,refrigerators
Railway and tramway Unassembled chassis and Assembled part motor
materials and parts, 
aircraft and parts, 
vessels,yachts,dredges
chassis parts of motor 
vehicles
vehicles
Crude rubber,pneumatic 
tyres and tubes
Rubber latex, elastic Rubber floor coverings, 
rubber sheets
Prefabricated buildings Unsawn^logs, undressed 
timber
Plywood, venceers
Pulp for manufacturing Strawpaper,strawboards Manufactures of paper
paper and bogrds having advertisements
thereon
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A n i m a l s  f o r  b r e e d i n g - O t h e r  a n i m a l s
P e t r o l e u m  p r o d u c t * - -
D r u g s  a n d  c h e m i c a l s  in E s s e n t i a l  o i l s O i l s  f o r  t h e  m a n u -
g e n e r a l f a c t u r e  o f  p e r f u m e s
S c i e n t i f i c  a p p a r a t u s
f o r  u n i v e r s i t i e s  a n d  
p u b l i c  h o s p i t a l s ; s c i e n ­
t i f i c  i n s t r u m e n t s  n o t  
m a n u f a c t u r e d  in A u s ­
t r a l i a
S c i e n t i f i c  a p p a r a t u s  of 
g l a s s
Chapter 5
IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPORT LICENSING
Public Reaction
No doubt the government had expected a fairly hostile re­
action to the restrictions. Mr Menzies had worked his hardest to soften 
the blow by explaining the economic situation in lengthy press state­
ments, public and radio talks, and interviews. On each occasion he had 
emphasised that the controls were temporary.
Although there had been speculation on the subject for 
several months, the question of restricting imports seems to have 
aroused little more than academic interest. Even on the 5th March 1952, 
when it was reported * that restrictions expected to be introduced 
shortly would reduce imports by "more than £100 million", very little 
interest seems to have been aroused, if press comment is any criterion. 
(Admittedly, the restrictions imposed were very much more severe than 
this report, but most of the criticism was directed against the 
principle of government controls.
With the announcement of the restrictions on the 8th March 
came realisation by individual traders of the extent to which they 
would be personally affected. The press and leaders of commerce and
A Sydney Morning Herald, 5th March 1952, page 1
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industry were outspoken and bitter i many of them castigated the re­
strictions as ill-considered and panic-stricken, since, as they 
maintained, imports would certainly have declined of their own accord 
before Australia’s international reserves were exhausted.
In general better-informed comment by economists and bankers
varied from unenthusiastic acceptance to a discussion of the dangers
2of yet more government controls • Only Professor P.H. Karmel spokegunreservedly in favour of the restrictions $ he and two other
4 5prominent economists, Colin Clark and Sir Douglas Copland , pub­
licly expressed doubts that the controls would be short-lived. 
Administrative Consequences
The government did not delay long in making concessions.
First, it gave supplementary licences to businessmen who could show
that they had been affected to such an extent that they could not
carry on business. The value of supplementary licences granted was
6about £20 million •
See in particular s National Bank, Monthly Summary of Australian 
Conditions, 11th March 1952, page 3$ A.N.Z. Bank, Quarterly Sur­
vey, April 1952, page 2) Bank of New South Wales, Review, May, 
1952, page 2»
3 ’’Australia should have imposed import restrictions sooner to check
the tremendous overseas buying spree during the past 16 months 
. . . earlier checking of imports would have avoided any
impression of panic . . . The crisis is likely to be of 
long duration,” See Sunday Herald, 9th March 1952, page 5.
4 Article in the Sydney Morning Herald, 13th March 1952, page 2.
5 Speech to the Sydney Junior Chamber of Commerce, 18th March, re­
ported in the Sydney Morning Herald, 19th March 1952, page 2.
q September
Parliamentary Debates, 9 t h 1953, (House of Representatives) 
page 52 (Treasurer’s budget speech for 1953-54)
As might be expected of a scheme drawn up hurriedly, the 
scheme proved insufficiently flexible to cope with the heterogeneity 
of various tariff groups. Anomalies arose because many items were com­
plementary. For example, a merchant may not, during the base year, 
have ordered various machine parts in the proportion in which he would
have wanted them on a permanent basis. Even if he had, they may have
been licensed at differing rates. So that the flexibility of the
scheme might be increased, certain items were transferred to the
^administrative" category, and the quotas of certain others were
jraised to 80$, 100$ and even 120$ of base year imports • Related items 
were grouped in "banks" and importers were given the opportunity of 
combining their quotas for all items covered by a "bank" and of using 
them to import any item or group of items within the "bank".
It proved practicable to decentralise the administration of 
various items within the "administrative" category. Quotas for a number 
of goods were established in favour of specified importers with 
Collectors of Customs by the C.I.L.B., and these items were licensed 
by the Collectors without further reference to C.I.L.B. This licensing 
category was designated "Adm*".
With each change the importers affected were required to 
submit revised returns in order that new quotas might be calculated*
Although it had been expressly stated in the licensing 
instruction which laid down the initial arrangements that transfers 
between categories would not be permitted, transfers did come to be
7 For a short period the group of imports licensed at the three 
higher quota rates was known as category "D".
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a l l o w e d  t o  a l i m i t e d  e x t e n t »  but  i t  was no t  u n t i l  the  8 t h  September
g
1952 t h a t  the  p r a c t i c e  was f o r m a l i s e d  by a l i c e n s i n g  i n s t r u c t i o n .  
Under t h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  a t  th e  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  C o l l e c t o r s ,  a "B" q u o ta  
m ight  be used  to  import  c a t e g o r y  "AM g o o d s ,  and one c a t e g o r y  "AM q u o ta  
m igh t  be u se d  f o r  a n o t h e r  c a t e g o r y  "A" i tem  i f  a s t r o n g  c a s e  c o u ld  be 
made o u t .  Under no c i r c u m s t a n c e s  might an im porter  u s e  a c a t e g o r y  nA" 
q u o t a  t o  import  goods  in  c a t e g o r y  MB".
Economic Con sequences
A f t e r  the  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  in  March,  
i m p o r t s  f e l l  more or l e s s  s t e a d i l y  u n t i l  in  the  f o l l o w i n g  August  t h e y  
r e a c h e d  the  l e v e l  a t  which  t h e y  were to  s t a b i l i s e  f o r  the f o l l o w i n g  
e l e v e n  months : a monthly a v e r a g e  o f  £ 4 2 . 2  m i l l i o n  ; an annual  r a t e  of
£506  m i l l i o n .  S i n c e  the  l i c e n s i n g  scheme o p e r a t i n g  in  A p r i l  was j u s t  
a s  s e v e r e  a s t h a t  o p e r a t i n g  l a t e r  in  the y e a r ,  i t  seems r e a s o n a b l e  to  
i n f e r  t h a t  the r e s t r i c t i o n s  c o u l d  n o t  have had t h e i r  f u l l  e f f e c t  
b e f o r e  A u gus t ,  t h a t  i s  to  s a y ,  t h a t  i r r e v o c a b l e  l e t t e r s  o f  c r e d i t  had 
been taken  ou t  b e f o r e  the  8 t h  March t o  c o v e r  many o f  the  goods  which  
a r r i v e d  in  the n e x t  f i v e  months .
I t  does  n o t  f o l l o w ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  im p o r t s  would n o t  have  
f a l l e n  t o  t h i s  l e v e l  w i t h o u t  the  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  There were a number o f  
av e n u e s  through which  econom ic  c o n d i t i o n s  were o p e r a t i n g  to  reduce  
im p or t s  -  f i s c a l  p o l i c y ,  monetary  p o l i c y ,  e x c e s s  o f  s t o c k s ,  e x p e c ­
t a t i o n s  -  and the  government  had imposed the  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n l y  when 
i t  dared  no lo n g e r  gamble on th e  s peed  a t  which  t h o s e  f a c t o r s  would  
o p e r a t e .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  any e s t i m a t e  o f  movements in  the  l e v e l  o f
8 L i c e n s i n g  I n s t r u c t i o n  No 93 o f  1952
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international reserves in the absence of restrictions must remains 
highly conjectural, so great is the range of error inherent in any 
estimates of the effect on imports of changes in employment, fiscal 
policy, monetary policy, excessive stocks of imported goods, and more 
particularly since it is impossible to say at what point speculative 
capital movements might have started.
The Department of Trade and Customs did not compile a com­
prehensive range of licensing statistics during the early years of 
import licensing. At the request of the writer the Commonwealth Stat­
istician compiled the tables on pages 49 and 50 by redistributing 
according to statistical class, economic class and licensing category 
figures shown in Imports Cleared for Home Consumption, Classified 
According to Individual Items of the Customs Tariff. These tables do 
give some idea of the extent to which the initial restrictions affected 
various types of commodity, but they are subject to a number of qual­
ifications :
i) they were compiled from preliminary statistics of clear­
ances;
ii) the calculation does not take account of imports from Japan 
and the dollar area;
iii) no allowance was made for importing by governmental author­
ities;
iv) no allowance was made to initial debits to quotas;
v) the table on economic class was compiled by the use of re­
constructed codes (see note 10 on page 50).
Under the restrictions imports of goods licensed under cate-
49
Distribution of Australian imports during the 
base year between licensing categories^
(£ million)
Stat. 
Class. Item A B Admin. Ex Total
1 Foodstuffs of animal origin 1 4 5
2 Foodstuffs of vegetable origin 4 7 14 - 25
3 Spirituous & alcoholic liquors - 1 - - 1
4 Tobacco 8 8 - - 16
5 Live animals - - - - -
6 Animal substances 2 - 2 - 4
7 Vegetable substances & fibres 6 3 17 - 26
8a Yarns & manufactured fibres 15 1 13 - 29
8b Textiles 5 84 4 - 93
8c Apparel - 14 - - 14
9 Oils, fats & waxes 4 - 65 - 69
10 Pigments, paints & varnishes 2 - - - 2
11 Rocks, minerals & hydrocarbons 1 - 8 - 9
12a Metals & metal manufactures 77 43 56 - 176
12b Dynamo electrical machinery 4 2 20 - 26
12c Machines & machinery except ) 12 8 67 87electrical machinery )
13a Rubber & rubber manufactures - 1 28 - 29
13b Leather & leather manufactures 1 - - - 1
14 Wood & wicker 15 1 - - 16
15 Earthenware, cement, china )
glass & stoneware ) 2 8 1 - 11
16a Pulp, paper & board 11 4 9 — 24
16b Paper manufactures & stationery 3 3 — — 6
17 Sporting material, toys, fancy) 
goods, jewellery & timepieces) - 7 2 - 9
18 Optical, surgical & seien- )
tific instruments, etc. ) 3 3 1 - 7
19 Chemicals, medicinal & pharma—) 
ceutical products, etc. ) 11 4 4 - 19
20 Miscellaneous 2 4 24 3 33
21 Gold & silver; bronze specie — — 4 — 4
189 210 339 3 741
This table was compiled by the Commonwealth Statistician at the 
request of the writer.
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Distribution of Australian imports during the
base year between licensing categories 10
(£ million)
Economic Class A B Admin. Exempt Total
Producers' materials for use in
Building and construction 24 3 4 — 31
Rural industries 3 - 1 - 4
Food, drink, tobacco 9 3 - - 12
Motor vehicle assembly 41 33 - - 74
Other manufacturing 69 64 116 - 249
146 103 121 - 370
Fuels and lubricants - - 30 - 30
Auxiliary aids to production - 1 14 - 15
Capital equipment
Farm 4 - 18 - 22
Commerce 18 3 69 - 90
22 3 87 - 112
Transport equipment 5 5 16 - 26
Finished consumer goods
Food, drink, tobacco 1 18 14 33
ülothing - 11 - - 11
Other goods 15 69 41 - 125
16 98 55 - 170
Munitions - - 1 - 1
Other - - 15 3 18
189 210 339 3 741
The writer is indebted to the Commonwealth Statistician, who 
prepared the tabulation from which this table was compiled.
The codes used in 1950—51 to relate statistical item to 
economic class are no longer available; this tfcable was compiled 
by the use of the earliest codes now available, those for 
1955-56, and is presented here as the best table which it now 
seems possible to compile. It does not agree with figures 
shown in earlier issues of Monthly Review of Business 
Statistics.
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gory "A” were to be cut by 40j& of £189 million, i.e. by £76 million; 
imports of g>ods licensed under category "B" werd to be cut by 80$ of 
£210 million, i.e. by £168 million. Thus the total value of imports of 
goods licensed in the quota categories was to be of the order of £155 
mil lion.
The government did not announce the degree of restriction 
that it intended to impose on goods in the "administrative" category 
except to say that imports of petroleum would be licensed up to the 
level of imports of petroleum during 1950—51. A comparison of the 
table shown on page 49 and statistics of imports during 1952-53 
suggests that, on the average, a similar policy was adopted towards 
the importation of other goods included in this category^ .
The figure for imports during 1950-51 of goods subsequently 
included in the "administrative" category is £339 million. The 
difference between the rate of importing after the restrictions 
became effective (£506 million) and the value of imports in the 
quota eategories which were to be admitted (fil55 million) is fairly 
close to this amount (£351 million). Note, however, that this near 
equality could be due to a number of causes other than the severity 
of licensing in the "administrative" category as well as those already 
mentioned on page 48 :
i) licences taken out and not used;
ii) licences not taken out;
iii) easing of the restrictions in April 1953, which may have had 
dome effect before the end of the financial year;
iv) issue of hardship licences.
Chapter 6
CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF LICENSING
In general the level of import restrictions varied roughly 
with changes in the level of economic activity* As the economy ex­
panded so also did the permitted level of importing. When signs of 
stress began to appear, the government tried to increase imports as a 
counter to inflation, but each time it was forced to curb the rate of 
increase in economic growth after it became clear that the economy 
could not afford the rate of importing necessary to contain the 
inflationary pressure. One can discern four phases in the pattern of 
the restrictions :
i) no change while the restrictions were having their full 
impact (one year) ;
ii) progressive relaxations (one year) $
iii) reimposition of harsher and initially ineffective re­
strictions (two years) ;
iv) progressive relaxations culminating in the abolition of 
the restrictions (four years) .
I - INITIAL SEVERE RESTRICTIONS 
The full impact of the initial restrictions coincided with
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the start of the new export season. By August 1952, the rate of im­
porting had fallen to £40 - £45 million a month; that they were rarely 
outside this range for the remainder of the financial year shows the 
rigour with which the restrictions were continued. In the first few 
months the governments only concession was to grant certain supple­
mentary licences on the ground of hardship1 . With a relatively*good 
export season after September international reserves began to rise 
rapidly : by the end of the year they had risen again by about £100
million.
II - RELAXATION OF THE RESTRICTIONS
The immediate problem solved, the government began to feel
able to make systematic concessions. The first major concession took
the farm of a much more lenient attitude towards importers whose
quotas were still overdrawn because of the value of goods in transit
or covered by firm orders and irrevocable letters of credit on the 8th 
2March 1952 . The licensing scheme had operated harshly against some
of these importers. For example, since quotas had been debited with
the full value of goods landed on and after the 8th March 1952,
importers whose goods had been landed on that date had a special
no
grievance : they had after all made attempt to circumvent the regu-A
lations, and if their goods had been landed on the day before their 
quotas would not have been debited at all. It therefore seemed reason­
able thqt these importers should be among the first to receive con-
The value of these licences was only about £20 million ( see note 
6 on page ).
At the current rates of licensing the quotas of a number of im­
porters had been overdrawn for as much as twenty years.
2
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cessions, and the government cancelled all remaining debits to their 
quotas on the 1st January 1953.
With the beginning of each of the next four licensing 
periods concessions were extended to practically all importers.
Easing of restrictions, 1st April 1953
i) Category "A" quotas were raised by one-sixth,
ii) Category "B" quotas were raised by one-half,
iii) Varying increases were made in the "D" and "admin*" cate­
gories.
iv) It was announced that licences for certain raw materials  ^
would be issued without reference to the quota restrictions upon 
production of satisfactory evidenee that the goods covered by the 
licence would be imported within one year. This new category was 
designated "N.ß.R.M (MNo quota restrictions")• Imports during the 
base year of goods listed as "N.Q.R." were approximately £40 million.
Together with relaxations on imports of certain items in the
"administrative" category, these relaxations were expected to increase
gthe annual value of imports by about £50 million.
Easing of restrictions, 1st July 1953
i) Category "A" quotas were raised by one-seventh, 
ii) Category "B" quotas were raised by one-third.
2 Mainly iron and steel plates and sheets, and crude rubber,
g On page 28 of "History of Australia's Import Licensing Measures" 
£50 million is stated to be the value by which imports would 
increase in 1953-54 as a result of these relaxations, and that 
1953-54 imports would increase by £45 million as a result of 
the relaxations six months later. But since in the October re­
laxations, which would have operated for only three months of 
the year, quotas were raised by the same amount, it seems that 
this is an error.
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iii) Varying increases were made to the quotas for goods in the
4"administrative” and "admin*" categories and the former "D" cate­
gory.
No items were added to the "N.Q.R." category. These relaxations were
gexpected to increase the annual value of imports by about £40 million. 
Easing of restrictions, 1st October 1953
i) Category "A" quotas were raised by one-eighth,
ii) Category "B" quotas were raised by one-quarter.
iii) Varying increases were made to the budgets for the "admin*" 
and fixed percentage categories.
iv) Goods listed in most banks, certain "admin*" items, tea 
and unmanufactured tobacco were transferred to the "N.Q.R." list. 
Also transferred were about forty other items for which the demand 
was strictly limited.
v) It was announced that future licensing periods would be of 
six months’ duration instead of three.
These relaxations were expected to increase the annual value of 
imports by about £45 million.
Easing of restrictions, 1st April 1954
i) Category "B" quotas were raised by one-fifth.
ii) Category "A" was abolished. M0st goods formerly in category
4 At this stage it was decided to discontinue use of the term "cate­
gory D". Many different percentages were being used, and it 
ceased to be convenient to refer to them all as a single cate­
gory.
"History of Australia's Import Licensing Measures", page 28, but 
see also note 3 on page 54.
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"A" Were transferred to the "N.Q.R." list. A small number, of which 
undressed timber was the most important, were transferred to the 
’•admin*" category. A number of minor items were transferred to the 
"administrative" category.
The government did not announce the amount by which it expected that 
annual imports would be increased as a result of these relaxations.
Ill - INTENSIFICATION OF THE RESTRICTIONS 
After July 1953 the rate of importing remained stable but at 
a higher rate than in 1952-53 (about £620 million a year). For the 
first five months of 1954 the annual importing rate was about £I$0 
higher again, and the monthly figures less stable. Prospects changed 
dramatically in June, for which month imports were nearly £77 million. 
Amports for the following two months, though lower, were still rel­
atively high, and the monthly importing rate for the three months June, 
July and August was over £70 million.
The significance of the higher rate of importing was not
0
lost on various pressure groups. In its bulletin "Canberra Comments", 
the Associated Chambers of Commerce said that AustrAiia1s reserves of 
foreign exchange were sufficient to stand the probable trade deficit 
in 1954-55, and urged that the government should not allow itself to 
be "stampeded" into tightening import controls simply because export 
prospects might be less favourable. The secretary of the Retail 
Traders1 Association, Mr J. B. Griffin, claimed that "the general 
tightening up of credit, which (was) already becoming apparent, (would)
6 Issue of 13th September 1954.
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7be sufficient to correct any unbalance that might eventuate" •
Clearly these comments were made in ignorance of the reason 
why imports were- rising : "N.Q.R." licences were being taken out to 
values far in excess of the levels on which the government had plannedg
when determining the April relaxations • By September the rate at 
which 'fJ.ß.R." licences were being issued was causing the government 
some concern« The question was discussed by Cabinet on the 14th 
September 1954, but a decision was deferred pending further investi­
gation. Meanwhile, the Minister for Trade and Customs directed that 
licences for goods subject to "N.Q.R." treatment were to be granted 
only for normal requirements. The precise meaning of the term "normal 
requirements" was left to the discretion of individual Collectors of 
Customs, who were asked only to observe the general principle that the
value of licences for "N.Q.R. "s goods issued to an importer should not
9exceed his base year imports of similar goods • This instruction was 
confidential and the new procedure was followed without publicity 
for the rest of the licensing period. On the last day of the September 
quarter Senator Spooner (the Minister for Trade and Customs) announced : 
" . . .  in recent months some importers have been obtaining 
licences to a value which seems to be far beyond their normal and 
reasonable needs. These importers are obtaining an advantage over 
those who sought licences to a value no greater than their current 
7 Sydney Morning Herald, 1st October 1954, page 3.
g Between April and September 1954 "N.ß.R." licences were taken out 
to the value of £237,008,708.
or, if an importer had a special quota, an imputed base-year fig­
ure calculated from his special quota.
9
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r e q u i r e m e n t s .
" T h i s  p r a c t i c e  i s  b u i l d i n g  up & l a r g e  p o t e n t i a l  commitment 
a g a i n s t  our  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s e r v e s ,  and as  th e  l i c e n c e s  may n o t  be 
u s e d ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t i m a t e  how much of t h a t  commitment w i l l  
c r y s t a l l i s e . "
I n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  1 s t  Oc tober  1954
The goods  on which q u o t a  r e s t r i c t i o n s  had been abandoned th e  
p r e v i o u s  A p r i l  were r e c l a s s i f i e d  t o  c a t e g o r y  "A" and r e s t r i c t e d  t o  
100$ ( f o r  a  s m a l l  number of  goods  120$) of  i m p o r t s  in  th e  base  y e a r .  
Q uo tas  b e i n g  r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  were b a c k - d a t e d  t o  t h e  1 s t  A p r i l  1954 and 
d e b i t e d  w i t h  im p o r t s  of  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  "N .Q .R ."  goods  im p o r t e d  s i n c e  
t h a t  d a t e .
B r o a d l y ,  the  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  was t o  c a n c e l  th e  
e f f e c t  o f  t h e  r a i s i n g  o f  q u o t a s  s i x  months e a r l i e r ,  and t o  r e d u c e  th e  
r a t e  of  i m p o r t i n g  so t h a t  t h e  a v e r a g e  r a t e  ove r  th e  tw e lve  months 
A p r i l  1954 t o  March 1955 would be on ly  s l i g h t l y  h i g h e r  th a n  b e f o r e
A p r i l  1954.  .'‘As a r e s u l t  the  q u o t a s  of  a number of  i m p o r t e r s  who had
drawn h e a v i l y  on "N .Q .R ."  l i c e n c e s  were overdrawn f o r  s e v e r a l  y e a r s  
a h e a d .
I n t e n i i f i h A t i d r i  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  1 s t  A p r i l  1955
i )  The l i c e n s i n g  p e r i o d  was t o  be r e d u c e d  to  t h r e e  months,
i i )  C a t e g o ry  "A" q u o t a s  were r e d u c e d  by 15$.
i i i )  C a t e g o ry  "B" q u o t a s  were r e d u c e d  by o n e - t h i r d ,
i v )  The t o t a l  b u d g e t  f o r  t h e  " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e "  c a t e g o r y  was 
r e d u c e d  by 20$ .
10 Sydney Morning H e r a l d , 1 s t  Oc tober  1954,  page 1.
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A s l i g h t  l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  in  the r e s t r i c t i o n s  took  the  form 
of  a c a n c e l l a t i o n  of  d e b i t s  made to  quotas  fo r  goods which had pre­
v i o u s l y  been l i c e n s e d  on an "N.Q.R." b a s i s ,  but which had been t r a n s ­
f e r r e d  to  ca tegor y  "A" in the p r e v io u s  October.
The government announced t h a t  i t s  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were intended  
to reduce the r a te  of  im port ing  by about £75 m i l l i o n  in 1955—56** . 
I n t e n s i f i c a t i on of  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  1 s t  October 1955
i )  Most c a teg o r y  "A" quotas  were reduced by 12-£$ of  t h e i r  
va lue  during the p rev iou s  q u arter  $ the  remainder were reduced by
Til*.
i i )  Category "B" quotas  s p e c i a l l y  granted  fo r  manufacturing  
purposes (mainly  t e x t i l e s )  were reduced by 1 2 i $  $ o th er  ca teg o r y  
"B" quotas  were reduced by 25$.
i i i )  The t o t a l  ’' a d m in i s t r a t i v e "  budget was reduced by 12^$.
i v )  Most quotas  fo r  goods in the "admin*" c a teg o r y  were reduced  
by 7^$ $ quotas  fo r  assembled motor v e h i c l e s  were reduced by 25$  
and th ose  for c . k . d .  motor v e h i c l e s  by 12-&$« Quotas fo r  a few items  
(mainly  ir on  and s t e e l ,  rock phosphate ,  paper pulp) were n ot  r e ­
duced, but con t in u ed  as 100$ o f  imports during 1954.
v) The p r a c t i c e  of  g r a n t in g  s p e c i a l  l i c e n c e s  in a d d i t io n  to  
quota was d i s c o n t i n u e d .  The Import L ic e n c e s  Committees were d i s ­
banded and a l l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  in  t h e i r  hands were r e f u s e d .
A small  c o n c e s s io n  was made to im porters  of  e l e v e n  b a s i c
11 Sydney Morning H e ra ld , 22nd March 1955,  page 1
m a t e r i a l e  • Henceforth  th e s e  m a t e r i a l s  might be bought from any
source of  su pp ly ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of  cxirrency c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  These
m a t e r i a l s  were d e s c r ib e d  as  be ing  " l i c e n s e d  on a world b a s i s "  and t h i s
f a c t  was denoted in  the  l i c e n s i n g  i n s t r u c t i o n s  by the code "adm(w)".
The aim of  th e s e  f u r t h e r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  was to  reduce the r a te
13of import ing  to  £640 m i l l i o n  by the end of  the f i n a n c i a l  year  • 
I n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  1 s t  J u ly  1956
By the s t a r t  of  th e  f i n a n c i a l  year  1956-57 the annual r a te  
of  import ing  had n ot  been brought below about £720 m i l l i o n ,  but the  
government had r e v i s e d  i t s  e s t i m a t e  of  the va lu e  of  imports  t h a t  the  
country could  a f f o r d .  I t  reduced the annual r a t e  of  l i c e n s i n g  by 
s l i g h t l y  l e s s  than £50 m i l l i o n  ( i . e .  to  about £680 m i l l i o n )  in the  
hope t h a t  imports  f o r  1956-57 would not  exceed  £700 m i l l i o n .  Moreover,  
the c u t s  were imposed with  an eye to  the i n t r o d u c t io n  o f  much g r e a t e r  
f l e x i b i l i t y  in to  the system.  Category "B" was d iv id e d  i n t o  seven  
groups ,  to  reduce the scope fo r  t r a f f i c k i n g ,  and an importer was g iven  
a s e p a r a t e ,  n o n - t r a n s f e r a b l e , quota  fo r  each group. The quotas  fo r  
a p p a re l ,  paper and f o o d s t u f f s  were reduced by o n e - t h i r d  $ a l l  o ther  
ca teg o r y  "B" quotas  were reduced by o n e -q u a r te r .  Items in ca tegor y  "A" 
were l i c e n s e d  a t  vary ing  p e r c e n t a g e s ,  and in f a c t  c a teg o r y  "A" ceased  
to  be one ca tegor y  in any s t r i c t  s e n s e .  These vary ing  p erce n ta g e s  were 
to  be rev iewed  p e r i o d i c a l l y  to  take account  of  f l u c t u a t i o n s  in demand. 
12 Titanium d i o x i d e ,  su lp h u r ,  paper pu lp ,  c o t t o n ,  aluminium, n i c k e l ,  
copper ,  tobacco  l e a f ,  hog c a s i n g s ,  crude a s b e s t o s  f i b r e ,  news­
p r i n t .
1 Parl iamentary  Debates (House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) ,  27th  September 
1955,  page 969 ,  speech by the Prime M i n i s t e r .
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IV -  RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS 
Easing of r e s t r i c t i o n s »  l a t  January 1957
Being s a t i s f i e d  th a t  the economy would be ab le  to  a f fo r d  
im ports a t  the r a te  o f  £700 m i l l i o n  a year  a t  l e a s t  fo r  1957 -58 ,  the  
government in tro d u ced ,  on the 1 s t  January 1957, a number o f  r e l a x a t io n s  
d es ign ed  to  b r in g  the r a te  o f  im porting  up to  th a t  l e v e l*
i )  a d d i t io n a l  im ports to  the t o t a l  va lu e  of £10 m i l l io n  were 
a llow ed  on 12 item s (m ain ly  t e x t i l e s  fo r  rnanufactaring) ;
i i )  th e  rem aining t e x t i l e s  q uotas  were in c r e a se d  by o n e - f i f t h ;
i i i )  c e r t a in  n o n -r e c u r r in g  in c r e a s e s  ,were made on c a p i t a l  p la n t  
and machinery f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  im plem ents.
The d i v i s i o n  o f  c a teg o r y  "8" in to  seven groups was m o d if ie d .
E asing  of r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  1 s t  A p r il  1957
On the 1 s t  A p r il  the Prime M in is te r  announced th a t  the  
value of imports to  be adm itted  in  1957-58 would be £775 m i l l i o n ,  i . e .  
£75 m i l l io n  h igh er  than th a t  fo r  1 956 -57 .  The government would r e ­
co n s id er  t h i s  r a te  from time to  t im e ,  but i t  would not be p o s s ib l e  to  
make a r e l i a b l e  e s t im a te  o f  e x p o r t  income during 1957-58 u n t i l  a f t e r  
the s t a r t  o f  the 1957-58 w o o l - s e l l i n g  se a so n .
The h igher  r a te  of l i c e n s i n g  a llow ed  in c r e a s e s  on most 
quotas  (which would n o t  take e f f e c t  u n t i l  the new f i n a n c i a l  y e a r )  *
i )  ca teg o ry  "A” q u otas  were in c r e a se d  by p e r c e n ta g e s  rang ing  
from 7 | $  to  2 3 3 ^  (m o st ly  10^ or 20^) ;
i i )  quotas  fo r  a l l  item s in  ca teg o r y  MB" e x c e p t  paper were in ­
cre a se d  by tw o - th ir d s ;
i i i )  the quota fo r  paper was in c r e a se d  by 10J&;
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iv) imports of a number of goods in the "administrative" cate­
gory were increased by varying amounts*
An amount of £9 million was set aside for the correction of anomalies. 
The government proposed a number of other changes which would not 
increase the rate of importing :
i) the category "B" sub-divisions which had been introduced 
nine months earlier were abolished and a composite quota again 
established for all items in category "B";
ii) the licensing period was extended to four months;
iii) there would be a new scheme of licensing for motor 
vehicles and motor vehicle*parts, to be known as "sales replacement". 
Easing of restrictions, 1st August 1957
On the 1st August, the Minister for Trade announced that the 
yearly importing rate was to be raised by £25 million to £800 million. 
This increase permitted further relaxations :
i) bulk petroleum products were exempted from licensing 
control ;
ii) the quotas for a small number of items were raised by per­
centages varying from 20^ to 400^$
iii) the replacement system was extended;
iv) 16 items were transferred to a "world" basis of licensing. 
Quotas for these items, for which a new category (MQ(w)") was 
introduced, were established in favour of specified importers. 
Easing of restrictions, 1957-1959
For the next two years the announced annual rate of im­
porting continued unchanged. While there was no extensive relaxation
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o f  the  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  the  g r a d u a l  improvement of  s t e r l i n g  v i s - a - v i s  the
d o l l a r  made i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  e a s e  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  a g a i n s t  im ports  from
the  d o l l a r  area» By the  middle  o f  1959 about  70^ o f  im ports  were f r e e
14of  d o l l a r  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  . Other c hanges  were the exem pt ion  of  
v a r i o u s  i t e m s  and minor v a r i a t i o n s  in  the q u o t a s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  i t e m s .  
E a s i n g  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  1 s t  August  1959
An i n c r e a s e  o f  £50  m i l l i o n  in  the  annual  r a t e  o f  im p o r t in g  
and the  removal  o f  n e a r l y  a l l  d o l l a r  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  p e r m i t t e d  c o n s i d ­
e r a b l e  r e l a x a t i o n  of  the  r e s t r i c t i o n s  :
i )  250 i t e m s ,  im p or t s  o f  which were £56  m i l l i o n  a y e a r ,  were 
added to  the  r e p la c e m e n t  c a t e g o r y  $
i i )  60 i t e m s ,  im p or t s  o f  which  were £50  m i l l i o n  a y e a r ,  were 
exempted ;
i i i )  90^ of  im ports  were t o  be f r e e  o f  d o l l a r  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ;
l i m i t e d  a c c e s s  was t o  be a l l o w e d  t o  the  d o l l a r  a r e a  f o r  the 10^ o f
im ports  s t i l l  s u b j e c t  to  d o l l a r  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  ;
i v )  a l l o c a t i o n s  f o r  v a r i o u s  c a t e g o r i e s  were i n c r e a s e d .
With t h e s e  c hanges  im ports  to  the  v a l u e  o f  about  £400  m i l l i o n  were
15e i t h e r  exempt from l i c e n s i n g  or l i c e n s e d  f r e e l y  •
E a s i n g  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  1 s t  December 1959
The M i n i s t e r  f o r  Trade announced an i n c r e a s e  o f  £25 m i l l i o n  
in  the  y e a r l y  r a t e  o f  i m p o r t i n g ,  s m a l l  i n c r e a s e s  in a number of  q u o t a s
14
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and the addition of a number of items to the exempt and replacement
i * 16lists •
16 .Sydney doming Herald, 30th November 1959, page 1
PART 3
GOVERNMENT POLICY ON 
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
Chapter 7
FORM OF THE RESTRICTIONS
The general form of any restrictions which might become 
necessary had been considered by the authors of the White Paper 
"Full Employment in Australia" in 1945* The authors foresaw the 
use of international reserves as a buffer for minor fluctuations 
in export income (para. 89); they did not favour building up 
reserves against a vague future contingency, but advocated that 
we should maintain "demand for imports up to the limit of our avail­
able oversea. funds"(para. 92).
Of the difficulties of maintaining full employment in the 
face of a more severe fall in export income they stated:
"If the deficit in the balance of payments is primarily due 
to a permanent decline in oversea demand . . .  an alteration 
in the exchange rate may be the appropriate method of correction. 
If, however, the fall in export income is one which, although 
prolonged and severe, is not permanent, the more appropriate 
method may be quantitative restriction, of imports" (para. 91)»
At the time of the initial imposition of the restrictions 
there was no room for doubt about the form which the restrictions 
should take. In 1951? the basic problem had been to bridge a very 
large inflationary gap, and the government had sought to solve this 
problem by fiscal and monetary policy, and by allowing imports 
financed by the international reserves to increase supply. 
Unfortunately the reserves threatened to fall to a dangerously low 
level before the inflationary pressure was brought under control,
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and the main problem became to prevent the drain in reserves. At 
this stage cost inflation persisted, and unemployment, while 
insignificant in total, was becoming unduly heavy in the textile 
industry ^.
By March 1952 the need to stop the drain on reserves was 
urgent. A reduction in domestic spending was out of the question, 
even if it had been politically acceptable, for it was most unlikely 
that deflationary measures, unless they were on the most drastic 
scale, could take effect soon enough to prevent large-scale 
speculation against the currency. A general increase in the customs 
tariff was unacceptable for the same reason. Depreciation of the 
currency and wage-rates were rejected because the government 
conceived of the balance of payments deficit as a short-term problem.
But if the general policy to fee followed was clear, there 
was still plenty of room for argument about its detailed execution.
The most urgent problems were : "Who were to be permitted to import?",
"What goods were to be imported?" and "How much could the country 
afford to spend?". These questions had to be answered in terms of 
the government’s social and economic policy : a rising standard of 
living^ full employment; an increase in primary production and 
productivity; the diversification of the Australian economy; the 
development of overseas markets for Australian exports; a high rate 
of immigration and economic development; the provision of considerable 
social services by the government; the prevention of rationing.
1 About 4)000 workers had been dismissed by textile factories 
during December 1951 and January 1952.
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Certain of these objectives were threatened by the 
possibility that Australia might not be able to afford sufficient 
imports to keep her manufacturing industry operating at close to 
its capacity. For the need to curtail production would cause 
unemployment, and discourage investment and innovation, which in 
turn would lead to a decrease in productivity and a loss of export 
markets, and thereby a further curtailment of production. The social 
objectives - social services, full employment, the prevention of 
rationing - were primarily short-term matters in the sense that 
certain classes of the community stood to lose immediately if the 
aims were not met, and would bear the brunt of the sacrifice, but 
that the loss would probably not outlast the restrictions. The 
remaining aim - immigration - was probably the most expendable . On 
the other hand, the migration program; o was, and still is, a major 
policy objective of all political parties. "While a temporary 
suspension of the program! would not have seriously impaired 
Australian economic development, it would have had a bad psychological 
effect upon intending migrants and thereby have prejudiced the 
future success of the scheme.
If it was to maintain all the major objectives mentioned 
above, the Australian government had to be certain that it could: 
i) obtain from overseas adequate supplies of raw
materials and capital equipment for Australian 
industry;
ii) prevent a blackmarket in materials which could not 
be produced in Australia;
' t>9
iii) prevent shortages of supplies or increased import
replacement from giving rise to inflationary- 
pressures and thereby endangering export markets. 
Since about 80% of imports consisted of raw materials and capital 
equipment, these conditions were tantamount to a requirement that 
scarce resources of international currency should be reserved for 
essential imports, and that inessentials should bear the brunt of 
the restrictions by being either prohibited or at least severely 
restricted. If the restrictions were to be of very short duration, 
this argument was unexceptionable, but it would become progressively 
weaker the longer the controls were maintained. For its eventual 
result would probably be that excluded luxuries would be produced 
in Australia because they were protected by the equivalent of a 
prohibitive tariff and that their costs of production would grow 
increasingly out of line with overseas costs.
In March 1952, the government, to judge from its 
public statements, was quite certain that th^crisis was purely 
short-term: there was no question that there may have been a 
fundamental disequilibrium. When in later years it became obvious 
that the balance of payments problem was longer-lasting than had 
been thought in 1952, it became necessary to give more serious 
consideration to long-term solutions.
The government was not lacking in professional 
advice. Varying remedies were suggested by a number of prominent 
economists, all by implication admitting that the crisis was 
fundamental, and advocating an adjustment of relative costs.
. 1.7 0
2Professor Meade argued that the authorities should deflate even 
at the cost of temporary unemployment of up to 2% of the work force, 
that the exchange rate should he allowed to float, and that there 
should he some machinery to ensure that increases in wage rates 
were kept down to the rate at which the productivity of labour -was 
rising.
Professor Mat hews  ^ advocated a depreciation, arguing 
that its benefits would he an increase in productivity (through the 
utilisation of idle machinery), a fillip to expert earnings, an 
inducement to direct investment (because of the improved competitive 
position of Australian industry), a weakening of speculative press­
ures to send capital abroad and the elimination of the balance of 
payments deficit.
Dr Corden proposed ^ a uniform ad valorem tariff near the 
average of existing tariffs, an export subsidy at the same rate and, 
subsequently, the replacement of both by a depreciation of the 
currency sufficient to allow the removal of import restrictions and 
export subsidies.
One can only conjecture why the government did not accept 
any of these suggestions, or take any other course which would have
2 J. E. Meade, "The Price Mechanism and the Australian Balance of
Payments", Economic Record, November 1956, pages 239 - 256.
3 R. Mat hews, "The Australian Economy", Economic Record, December
1958, pages 298 - 301.
4 W. M. Corden, "Import Restrictions and Tariffs : A fcJew Look at
Australian Policy", Economic Record, December 1958, 
pages 331 - 346.
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implied a concession that the problem was fundamental. Probably 
the main reason was political : a depreciation would have incurred 
considerable political unpopularity and may have discouraged 
capital investment from overseas. For an increase in tariffs or in 
export subsidies the government would at least have had the support 
of a substantial section of the community, but it would still have 
had to tread carefully lest it provoke retaliation by trading 
partners. As long therefore as the government could continue to 
relax the restrictions, and could claim that a modest increase in 
export prices would suffice to wipe out the balance of payments 
deficit, it no doubt felt justified in extricating itself from its 
problem by continuing the quantitative restrictions.
Ultimately the government did increase tariffs, although 
first a continuance of the restrictions and later a recession enabled 
it to put off this action for about six years. It did not then 
increase tariffs uniformly, as Dr Corden had suggested, but select­
ively, as they were needed to protect industries unable to stand 
competition from imports. What is not clear is whether the government 
acted throughout in accordance with a deliberate economic policy or 
whether it allowed its hand to be forced by the course of events.
Chapter 8
GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS EASING THE RESTRICTIONS
Although the government imposed the restrictions because 
it feared a run on international reserves, it did not, later in 
1952, regard the success of its deflationary policy as sufficient 
reason to abandon the restrictions ^• Certainly there was no fear 
of an immediate resurgence of inflationary pressure nor of an early 
increase in importing to build up stocks. Nonetheless by maintaining 
the restrictions the government could keep a tight rein on speculation 
and make it less likely that there would be another balance of 
payments crisis in several years’ time.
In order that the effect of the restrictions on the economy 
should not be more severe than could be avoided, it became a matter 
of some importance that the government’s forecasts should be reason­
ably accurate. Hitherto the government had had very little 
experience in making forecasts.
The fact that a government has imposed restrictions at all 
means that it must be making some forecasts about the future trend 
of events. These forecasts might be of a very general form, such as
1 "(When) exports are paying for our imports . . • the restrictions 
will be progressively eased . . .  We must ensure that we 
do not again relapse into the position from which we are now 
struggling." Parliamentary Debates, 8th October 1952, page 
2659, speech by Senator O'Sullivan, Minister for Trade and 
Customs, (author's emphasis)
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that the prospects are "frightening", "promising", and so forth, or 
they might he based on an arithmetical calculation in which each 
unknown is estimated as accurately as possible, and an attempt is 
made to balance receipts and expenditure of foreign currency*
In 1952 the forecasts made by the Australian government 
were of the former kind. In that year, and for several years 
afterwards, the government regarded the balance of payments crisis 
as a passing phenomenon, and did not think it necessary to formulate 
any long-term proposals other than that the restrictions would be 
abolished as soon as possible. To this end, it progressively eased 
the restrictions as the level of international reserves rose.
This approach gave satisfactory results as long as export 
income and capital inflow were rising. The restrictions were first 
eased for the quarter beginning in April 1953 (the licensing period 
then being three months), and thereafter with every licensing period 
up to and including that beginning in April, 1954« The relaxations 
made in October 1953 included an extension of future licensing 
periods to six months. While the extension reduced the speed with 
which the government could impose new restrictions should the need 
arise, the government had had nearly 18 months* experience of the 
licensing measures, and the stability in the rate of importing 
between August 1952 and June 1953 suggested that the scheme was 
operating smoothly and that the government had it well under control. 
Advantages of the change were a halving of the work of businesses in
making, and of the government in approving, applications for licences.
The succession of relaxations became possible partly as a
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consequence of the severity of the initial restrictions, and partly 
because of the increasing volume of Australia's main exports, but 
it no doubt helped to reinforce the government's impression that 
the restrictions would be short-lived.
The limitations of this approach became apparent during 
1954-55» A decline in export income, necessitating the intensifi­
cation of restrictions, led to dislocation of trading activity 
among importers and among commerce and manufacturing industry 
generally. The point was driven home with further force when the
restrictions had to be intensified for the second timejin AprilI
1955» On this occasion the licensing period was reduced to three 
months.
The reduction of the licensing period to three months gave 
the government the opportunity of further tightening restrictions 
in July 1955» Why did the government want this opportunity? The 
announced explanation was that it was "necessary to look ahead and
not run risks • • . restrictions (were) not effective for six
2months" • But this "explanation" does not really explain anything. 
What specific risks did the government think that it was running?
Did it fear that export prices might fall still further? Did it 
fear a bulge on imports as importers presented the last of their 
extra W.Q.R. licences obtained in the six months April to September 
1954? As the last of these licences were to expire during September
2 Sydney Morning Herald, 22nd March 1955> page 1
1955 > the government may have feared unusually heavy importing during 
the six months April to September 1955 If its statistics of the usage 
of the extra N.Q.R. licences showed that a great number of them 
remained to be presented, or if it did not have an adequate statis­
tical coverage of the usage of licences. But if this is so, why did 
the government cancel debits made to quotas because of heavy imports 
of goods licensed on an N.Q.R. basis?
Bid the government on the other hand fear a reduction of 
capital inflow through fear of a depreciation of the currency?
This may be so, since the economic situation was beginning to cause 
some concern. Alternatively, the government may ha-ve thought it 
desirable to make this change at a time when the situation was not 
so serious, lest a similar move at a more serious time cause much 
greater speculation.
In the event, the government did not take its opportunity 
of intensifying the restrictions in July 1955* Nonetheless, 
inflationary pressure was increasing, and it s ■•aras.jee;.we clear that 
further restrictions would soon be necessary.
While many N.Q.R. licences were presented in the six months 
April to September 1955> licences taken out against the new quotas 
were held over for use after the N.Q.R. licences expired. That is 
to say, there was no bulge in imports, but the average period between 
the grant and the presentation of a licence increased. The importing 
bulge of the previous January did not contract during the first half 
of 1955 and imports arrived at an annual rate of about £900 million. 
Australia ended the financial year with a trading deficit of
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£85 million and a fall of £142 million in the international reserves.
The Prime Minister's statement of the 27th September 1955 
on the Australian economy, in which he spoke of the need to bring 
overseas earnings and payments into balance  ^represented the first 
official acknowledgement that there should be any long-term concepts 
about equality of receipts and expenditure of foreign exchange and 
that (by implication) the scheme was likely to last for several more 
years at least,
Mr. Menzies went on to explain that further restrictions 
designed to reduce the level of imports by about £00 million f.o.b. 
a year would be brought into effect on the 1st October 1955« The 
figure of £80 million represented the difference between the value 
of imports in 1954-55 (£846 million) less the amount by which the 
restrictions of the previous April were calculated to reduce imports 
(about £120 million), and the probable receipts of foreign currency 
for 1955-58 after due allowance for freight costs and loan and capital 
transactions (about £640 million). The £80 million would not be 
saved in the current financial year. Since the present restrictions 
would probably not affect the flow of imports before the following 
April, the saving in 1955“56 would probably be of the order of £20 
million. He added: "We must therefore be prepared to see our over­
seas balances run down substantially over the next few months but
3 Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) 27th 
September 1955> pages 964 - 989.
6 77
by the 30th June ^ we should have brought our overseas earnings and 
our overseas payments into balance and the run on our reserves would 
have come to an end . . .  The important thing is to have the 
rates of external receipts and payments equated by the end of the 
financial year."
Mr Men^ies announced furthermore that the government would 
not hesitate to take any further measures necessary to achieve the 
intended reduction. This was a rather unwise announcement, as the 
event showed. If it took six months für the results to show, the 
government could not know before May whether the cuts had had the 
desired effect. But any further cuts then imposed could not have 
taken effect before November 1956 •
But even the third successive intensification of restrictions 
did not suffice. At no stage between October 1955 and the following 
June did the monthly importing rate fall to £54 million. In fact, 
in only one month (February) was it below £60 million • In isolated
Q
months after July imports were below £54 million , but a three- 
monthüy moving average for the period does not fall below £55*5 
million, even though the restrictions were again intensified in July
4 The restrictions did not provide fpr any increa.se in their
severity once they came into effect. A strict reading 
of Mr Menzie’s speech would therefore be that full 
balance would be achieved by April 1956.
5 ibid.page 969
6 In fact the target was not met; the government did not intensify
the restrictions before the end of the financial year.
7 Because February is a short month.
8 September £53*9; December £52.5; February 1957 £51*4 m.
1956
The higher rate of importing seems to have heen due in part
/to a lower rate of wastage of licences (tobe expected at times when 
restrictions have become more severe) and in part alsoto the fact 
that licences which would otherwise have been presented earlier had 
been held over while imports were made against N.Q.R. licences issued 
during the period April to September 1954»
By June 1956 imports were still arriving at the rate of about 
£720 million a year (i.e. about £60 million a month). Because of the 
improvement in the balance of payments, this fact was less serious 
than might have been expected on the basis of the calculations i$iade 
nine months earlier. The earlier aim that external balance should be 
achieved by the 30th June 1956 was quietly abandoned, but it was still 
considered desirable that imports for 1956-57 should not exceed 
£700 million. The licensing instruction detailing the new restrictions 
explained:
"The further restrictions imposed from 1st July 1956 are
designed to bring Australia's external payments
Qsituation into balance by 30th June 1957•
The idea expressed by the Prime Minister was carried a step 
further by the acting Minister for Tradein June 1956 when he said:
r )
"The government intended to encourage developments which 
could be expected to lead to a long-term
"  78
9 Licensing Instruction 1956-62
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strengthening of the external payments position.”
The announcements marked the beginning of a policy whereby
the government periodically announced the annual rate of importing
that it proposed to allow. The various rates allowed, described as
”ceilings” ^  are set out on the following page, together with the
level of imports in the later years of quantitative restrictions.
The government fixed these limits at the highest rate of importing
that it felt reasonably confident the economy would be able to
maintain, and refused to sanction a higher ceiling until it was
reasonably certain that it would not later be forced to intensify 
12the restrictions
10 Reported in the Sydney Morning Herald, 29th June 1956, page 3.
11 The term "ceiling” was really a misnomer, since the specified
rate was as much a "floor” as a "ceiling”. Presumably 
the term was selected because interest was centred on 
the figure as an upper limit to the rate of licensing.
12 "Further major relaxations would not be made until it was
reasonably certain that a higher rate of licensing 
could be maintained with some degree of permanence." 
(Statement by the Minister for Trade, reported in 
the Sydney Morning Herald, 18th January 1957> page 4•)
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Importing Ceilings
Date of Annual Year Merchandise Merchandise
Announcement Ceiling Imports Bullion Specie
during Year Imports during
27. 9. 55 640 (rate to be achieved by 30. 6. 56)
1 . 7. 56 700 1956-57 717 719
1 . 4. 57 775)
1957-58 789 792
1 . 8. 57 800 J
M »1 1958-59 794 797
•i—1ro 7. 59 850 |
1959-60 924 927
29. 11. 59 875 j
Under the "ceiling" policy no individual importer knew the value of
the imports that he wouldhe allowed to buy after the current licensing
/
period, hut all businessmen could be reasonably certain that the level 
of economic activity would be maintained at the existing level, or at 
least that it would not be curtailed because of balance of payments 
difficulties.
The policy was neverput to any real test, for export receipts1 J
were relatively stable in the following years: in three of the four
years 1955“56 to 1958-59 they were within £18 million of £800 million; 
in the fourth, 1958-57? they were £993 million. If the government had 
in the latter year yielded to pressure to increase the ceiling to 
perhaps £900 million, it would almost certainly have been forced to 
intensify the restrictions in 1957-58, perhaps limiting imports to 
about £700 million. We may say that the "ceiling" policy was a success 
to the extent that it avoided the dislocation that this action would
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have entailed.
The implicit admission that the restrictions were to last 
for several years more forced the government to rethink its policies 
in other directions. As long as the government was intensifying the 
restrictions no concessions were possible, hut the lifting of the 
annual ceiling by £75 million in April 1957 enabled the government to 
introduce major changes in its licensing policy: "correction of 
anomalies", "sales replacement", "new importers".
Correction of anomalies
An amount of £9 million was set aside for the correction of 
anomalies and was used to establish small quotas for new importers 
and to increase the allocations of:
i) "traditional importers" (importers who had imported in 
1950“5l) whose current quotas were less than varying specified 
percentages of their imports in 1950-51;
ii) "traditional importers" the imported content of whose 
sales had declined as a result of expanding sales;
iii) importers who were expanding their premises or plant;
iv) importers whose new line of business required a higher 
level of importing;
v) certain importers against whom the restrictions had 
operated harshly;
vi) established exporters whose exports had been 
restricted by import licensing.
New importers
Prospective new importers of any article which had been 
transferred to the replacement category were invited to apply for
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licences and to state their name, type of business, source of supply, 
the quantity and value of the articles which they proposed to import 
and the purpose for which they wished to import them. If the 
Department of Trade approved, it authorised the Department of Customs 
and Excise to issue a provisional licence with a validity of one 
month. The validity was extended to the normal period (usually 
twelve months) if during that month the importer placed a firm order 
and arranged payment. Otherwise the licence lapsed.
In all 827 persons applied. A large proportion of them 
wished to import foodstuffs (mainly frozen fish and tea), but many 
had applied in the hope of obtaining a share of a restricted market. 
Their enthusiasm waned when they realised that the field would be 
competitive.
Sales replacement
The administration of the restrictions on certain items in 
category A had proved cumbersome. A change in the rate of licensing 
a given item varied each importer’s quota in the same proportion, 
but there was no way in which the department could know in advance 
whether an importer wanted the increase nor whether the extra imports 
would arrive at the port where they were required. It was therefore 
impossible to foretell the ultimate effect of a given increase in 
the rate of licensing. To overcome this disadvantage, Cabinet instr­
ucted the department to work towards a policy of varying allocations 
in accordance with sales.
But the variation of licensing in accordance with sales 
was in fact tantamount to a lifting of the restrictions, and the
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department did not know to what extent importing would increase. It 
was therefore out of the question to introduce the system generally, 
and the department decided to work towards this policy by stages.
The first concession was restricted to importers of motor vehicles 
who had not been building up their stocks. If the value of an import­
er's stocks and outstanding licences did not exceed his quota for 
the six months October 1956 to March 1957? his quota for c.k.d. 
motor vehicles was increased by 10%, and his quota for fully assembled 
motor vehicle by 20%.
The next step (taken in August 1957) ‘was to relate quotas 
not to previous imports but to sales. The increases in quotas granted 
in April were continued, but subject to the restriction that the 
allocation was reduced by the amount by which the value of stocks on
hand and outstanding licences of c.k.d. motor vehicles and fully
h
assembled motor vehicles exceeded six and four months' sales 
respectively.
The replacement scheme was further extended by the inclusion 
of 56 items previously in the quota and administrative categories 
It soon became apparent that the system, although suitable for the 
motor industry, was not well suited to the more varied group of items 
to which it had been applied, for it required firms to maintain 
separate statistics of sales, purchases and stocks of every item for 
which a separate licence was required. Accordingly, this part of the 
system mas replaced by a scheme known as the "Import Licensing
13 "completely knocked down"
14 Licensing Instructions 82 and 93 of 1957.
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Replacement Plan". Under the system an importer might take out 
licences at any time up to an amount equal to the difference between 
a certain predetermined limit and the total value of his outstanding 
licences. That is to say, there was a limit to the value of the 
licences which an importer might hold at any given time, but he would 
be issued with more licences (if he wanted any) once he had imported 
against the licencesthat he already held. The limit for the licensing 
period August to November 1957 was set at twice the licensing 
allocation for that period, but with the proviso that an importer 
might obtain licences to at least the value of his current allocation, 
regardless of the value of his outstanding licences. Once he had 
obtained licences to this value, he might not obtain any more licences 
until the value of his outstanding licences fell below the limit.
For all subsequent periods the limit was twice the value of imports 
in the preceding period.
The new system aimed at allowing each importer to import 
as much as he could sell. Since it contained no provision to prevent 
importers from building up stocks, the Department of Trade warned 
importers against doing so;
"The success of the plan could be prejudiced by the excessive 
accumulation of stocks • • . The Department of Trade proposes
guarding against such a situation occurring by making periodical 
investigations into the stock and sales position of individual 
firms."
"Whenever such an investigation reveals that an importer is 
holding excessive stocks in relation to his sales, his allocation
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under the Import Licensing Replacement Plan will he propor­
tionately reduced. Should it he necessary at a later stage 
to impose more restrictive control over imports . • •
care will he taken in the establishment of quotas to see 
that speculative building up of stocks does not give the 
importers concerned an advantage over other importers."
No further increase in the ceiling was announced until
August 1959? hut the approval of this increase did no more than
sanction a fait accompli. The following table shows monthly imports
from January 1959 to August i9 6 0 and the approximate corresponding
15annual rate of importing
Month Imports Approximate Annual
Rate of Importing
(£ million)
J anuary 1959 74.4 783February 58.9 786
March 58.9 789April 73.2 793
May 63.2 801
June 69.5 818July 7 0 . 8 824
Augus t 70.9 836
September 63.9 854
October 74.1 865
November 74.3 877
December 7 6 . 0 909
J anuary I960 75.5 932
February 78.5 947
March 88.3 979
April 7 2 . 6 1,008
May 91.3 1 ,0 4 6
June 90.9 1,071
July 89.0 1,098
August 103.5 1,124
15 The figures shown for the annual rate of importing are based 
on a six-monthly moving average.
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On the as sumption of an average lag of six months from the 
issue of licences to the date of importation, it is clear that the 
government began to issue licences above the current ceiling as early 
as November 195Ö? at the end of July 1959 > when the ceiling was 
raised from £800 million to £850 million, the government was already 
issuing licences at an annual rate of over £930 million* by the end 
of November 1959? when the ceiling was raised to £075 million, the 
annual rate of licensing was over £1,050 million and was rising on 
the average by about £30 million a month.
The level of economic activity rose considerably during 
1959 and by the end of the year it was clear that the boom threatened 
to get out of hand. Cost inflation threatened to increase in the 
near future, the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
having, on the 27th November 1959? granted a .28$ increase in the 
margins of metal trades employees. The Reserve Bank made a small 
attempt to damp down the inflationary pressure by monetary policy.
In December 1959 it asked the trading banks to keep their advances 
within moderate limits. Two months later Dr Coombs warned of the 
danger that the "creeping" inflation would grow into a "galloping" 
inflation Following this warning it was announced that the Prime
Minister would soon make a statement on the Australian economji.
In his statement, published on the 22nd February I960, the 
Prime Minister explained that the econony was in a strong position,
16 H. C. Coombs "Monetary Policy and the Businessman", University
of Adelaide, Fifth Summer School of Business Administration,
I960.
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"but that the recent rises in costs and prices were disturbing. It 
had been estimated that the 1959 basic wage decision had added about 
£65 million a year to the wages and salaries bill, and that the 
margins decision would add a further amount not far short of £100 
million. To counter the resultant inflationary pressure the government 
proposed four measures. The first three were unspectacular:
i) intervention in the current basic wage case;
ii) the avoidance of deficit finance in the 1960-61 budget;
iii) government support for the policy of restraining the 
growth of excessive liquidity through reserve 
bank action.
These proposals were not designed to have any significant effect. The 
first two measures could do nothing to ease the inflationary pressure 
which had already been created, and the third added little to what Dr 
Coombs had already said.
But to the general astonishment these three proposals were 
capped by an entirely unexpectedly decision to abolish virtually all 
import licensing overnight. As a solumtion to the current inflation, 
this decision was pointless, since it could not be expected to have 
any effect for three months at least, and probably its effect within 
the following six months would be trifling.
There was in fact a basic incompatibility in the government's 
aims, for it is not possible to guarantee to issue licences as 
required and at the same time impose an upper limit on the value of 
licences to be issued. The government was bound to be faceä eventually 
with the choice between tightening restrictions on goods in the
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replacement category and giving up altogether the attempt to impose 
a limit. The former would have been most unsatisfactory in the face 
of the inflationary pressure and because it would have carried the 
implication that it was no longer possible to regard the balance of 
payments crisis as temporary. If the government’s policy was any 
longer to carry conviction, it was essential that the government 
seek some method other than the reimposition of restrictions.
Rather than continually raise the importing ceiling as inflationary 
pressure forced the importing rate higher and higher, the government 
seems to have decided that it would do well to rid itself once and 
for all (as it hoped) of its burden: it would abolish the quantit­
ative restrictions and, while it had to accept as a fait accompli the 
inflation which had taken place in the past few months, it would take 
strong measures to ensure that nofurther inflation took place; it 
would solve any remaining problems by increases in tariffs and bounties 
and would gamble on the chance that receipts of foreign currency 
would suffice to pay for imports.
Chapter 9
MECHANICS OP IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
The economic policies of the government having been 
determined, it was necessary to administer the restrictions as 
efficiently and effectively as possible, and to enforce the 
regulations firmly but with allowance for the probability that, 
restrictions of such severity not having been imposed before in 
time of peace, many exceptions would have to be made so that the 
effect of those restrictions did not bear too heavily upon any 
individual traders. The main problems the government had to solve 
are discussed under the following headings:
(a) Extent of discrimination
(b) Recipients of licences
(c) Enforcement of regulations
(d) Supplementary quotas
(e) Machinery for appeals
(f) Special regional requirements
(g) Speculation
(h) Bribery
(i) Trafficking
(j) Attachment of conditions to licences
(k) Penalties
89
& 90
(a) Discrimination
A country might discriminate between sources of supply 
by means of:
i) a publicly announced limit on the value of goods which
may be obtained from a specified country; or
ii) a limit on the value of selected imports; or
iii) a departmental instruction that no licences are to be
granted to importers who wish to import certain
administrative category goods from a specified country.
The Australian restrictions against imports from Japan and the dollar
area were of the first type and were permitted under G.A.T.T. ^
The second type of limitation is tantamount to discrimination, but is 
2also pdrmissible ; there is mo evidence that it was practised by the
Australian government between 1952 and I960 While the third type
2of discrimination is forbidden , it would probably not be possible, 
except in the most flagrant instances, for G.A.T.T, to prepare a 
sufficiently conclusive case to prevent a government from indulging 
in this practice.
1 Articles XXXV and XIV (b) respectively. The latter provision of
G. A. T. T. depended in turn upon a special concession in the 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund; 
it could not be extended at will,
2 Article XIII para. 1.
3 An earlier example wasthe restrictions imposed by Australia in
1936 against the importation of textiles from "all foreign 
countries". While these restrictions were not formally 
discriminatory, it is clear that they in fact discriminated 
against Japan, since Japan was virtually the only foreign 
country exporting textiles to Australia.
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When restrictions were imposed on all imports in March 1952> 
the government announced that it would allow importers to obtain their 
goods from any source they pleased, but with the proviso that there 
would be no increase in the budgets for imports from Japan and from 
the dollar area.
When it was announced that the rate of importing would be 
reduced to less than £600 million a year,^ it was clear that the rate 
of importing from the United Kingdom would be reduced far below the 
current rate, and even below the rate of 1950-51* Public reaction 
was bitter. While tariff protection given to British exporters was a 
business deal, given in exchange for preferential tariff treatment 
for Australian goods entering the United Kingdom market, there was 
nonetheless a strong sentimental link between the two countries, 
partly because Australians were mainly of British stock and partly 
also because the United Kingdom was by far Australia's best customer. 
There had, it is true, been some minor restrictions during the 1914-18 
war and the early nineteen=thirties on Australian imports from the 
United Kingdom (as on all Australian imports), but they were very 
short-lived. Subsequently, in the trade diversion policy of 1936, 
Australia had deliberately restricted imports from other sources, 
notably Japan and the United States of America, in order that United 
Kingdom exporters should not lose their share of the Australian market. 
Under the restrictions planned in 1952, these markets of British 
exporters were threatened once more. While there was nothing in the
4 See Chapter 4> page 39
policy which threatened the British exporters’ share of the Australian
market, neither was there anything to safeguard the amount of their 
existing markets. In particular, since Australia's imports 
accounted for a large proportion of the external trade of the United 
Kingdom in the fields of motor vehicles and textiles (approximately 
30% and 13% respectively of United Kingdom exports in these two fields 
during 1950-51)> the restrictions would strike a severe Blow at these 
two sections of the British econony. It was suggested that it would 
he disloyal to impose restrictions on imports from the United Kingdom 
at a time when that country was itself in economic difficulties, and 
that Australia should have imposed import restrictions only on imports 
from countries outside the sterling area.
Given the severity of the March 1952 restrictions, it is 
clear that restrictions on imports from the United Kingdom were 
unavoidable. During 1950-51» 65% of Australian imports came from the 
sterling area; 10% came from the dollar area and were therefore already 
subject to severe restrictions. The remainder - slightly less than 
one quarter - came from countries not in either the sterling or the 
dollar area. Clearly it was out of the question that this third group 
should have absorbed all the restrictions. First, it was not large 
enough. Secondly, it included some essential imports: petroleum 
products valued at approximately £50 million; metals and machinery 
to the same value; textiles valued at approximately £20 million. 
Thirdly, if Australia had to consider the markets of British exporters 
as a quid pro quo for safeguarding her own export markets, she had a
I «3
similar, if smaller, obligation towards exporters in other countries.
Nine other countries had during 1950-51 each exported to 
Australia goods valued at more than £10 million. Three of them - 
Italy, Prance, Japan - had between them exported to Australia goods 
to the total value of slightly less than £50 million in 1950*5 1 > 
but had imported from Australia in the same period goods to the total 
value of more than £200 million. It could reasonably have been 
foreseen that any restrictions which singled out the exports of 
these countries would have caused them to invoke the provisions of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
(b) Recipients of licences
The official who allots each licence must bear in mind that 
his decision will be one of a large number of decisions which together 
will play an important part in moulding the shape of the economy, and 
that the pattern of importing business will take the form which the 
allocation of licences determines. Temporarily, the role of the market 
place is suspended, but after the quantitative restrictions are abol­
ished the market system will again play a role, and it is desirable 
for the sake of the stability of the economy that any businesses 
established during the currency of the restrictions should then be able 
to survive under competition.
If the restrictions are to be short-lived, this aim will 
probably be achieved if the government disturbs the existing pattern 
of business as little as possible. This was the basic principle behind 
the policy of March 1952. The government fully expected to be able to 
lift the restrictions in a short space of time. While no one seems
ever to have made so hold as to put a figure to the probable duration
of the restrictions, it seems likely that the government was thinking
in terms of two to three years at most. Obviously, it saw no need for
administrative flexibility such as was found necessary in the later
years of licensing. It therefore seemed reasonable to model the
restrictions on those which had existed during the 1939-45 war, even
though those restrictions had existed at a time when a certain amount
of disruption of industry was accepted more or less as a matter of
course and when government controls had been far more severe.
During the 1939-45 war it had been established that a sub-
ik-e.
stantial volume of imports could be licensed by allocation to each
oßimporter a quota which was a given percentage of his imports in some
earlier year (sometimes referred to as the "base year"). It had also
been established that certain items could not be so licensed, but had
to be considered individually.
The base year chosen for the new restrictions was 1950-51»
There were two reasons for this choice: "First it vjas the most recent
period of trading virtually free of quantitative restrictions. Secondly
it was the highest year of imports at that time (later exceeded by
1951-52) and consequently was considered to be a period in which the
5widest distribution of quotas would be achieved." While it does not 
follow that a large volume of imports must be spread over a large 
number of importers, there can be little quarrel with the government*s
5 Department of Trade, History of Australia's Import Licensing 
Measures, page 24.
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decision to select the most recent trading year as the year on which 
to base its quota system. To the extent that the restrictions froze 
tie pattern of trade, the selection of 1950“ 51 as the base year 
would at least ensure that they froze it in its current pattern 
rather than in that of an earlier period. Moreover, they would not 
reproduce any distortion which might have occurred during the 
importing boom of 1951-5 2*
By their nature goods in the administrative category did not 
lend themselves to a similar system of restrictions. The government 
seems to have adopted the general principle that imports in 1952-53 
of goods in the administrative category should not exceed imports of 
similar goods in 1950-5 1 ? but restrictions on individual items 
varied considerably. The restrictions were administered rigorously 
in the early days of licensing, but as Australia’s international 
reserves improved the department’s approach became more and more 
liberal.
When, during 1 9 5 5» it became clear that the restrictions 
were likely to last for several years more at least, the government 
was forced to reconsider its principles determining the allocation 
of licences. The main disadvantages of the existing system were: 
i) it was impossible for the efficient firms to raise 
their output by more than the inefficient ones, 
since they could not get extra raw materials; 
ii) existing firms could not get the import licences
they needed to expand their business or to extend
it into new fields;
ft «6
iii) new firms could not get the import licences they 
needed to enter the trade;
iv) old firms lingered on as nothing more than the owners 
of licensing entitlements;
v) it provided opportunities for trafficking.
The last two points are further discussed under the sub-heading 
"Trafficking" later in the present chapter. Much more important 
from the point of view of a developing economy are the first three 
points.
Since under licensing changes in the pattern of import 
industry necessarily took the course which the allocation of licences 
determined, the relative efficiency of firms in the economy no longer 
served as a regulator. The granting of a licence entitlement was 
tantamount to saying who should he allowed to carry on a business and 
who should be allowed to establish a new business. But if it was 
difficult to judge the relative efficiency of existing firms, it must 
have been virtually impossible to choose between businessmen who 
sought licences to enable them to establish a business. Added to this 
factor was the difficulty of distinguishing between applicants who 
were genuine in their desire to establish a new business (which would 
be permanent) and those who simply saw the chance of easy money.
Under its existing principles the government could only try 
to decide whether an applicant for a new licence was genuine, and
6 See page 112.
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whether there was reason to suppose that he was competent in his
proposed line of business. Since any general principles would he
extremely complicated, the decisions taken could not fail to have
a very large subjective element.
In the hope of avoiding these disadvantages various
economists have suggested that import licences should be auctioned.
The import licensing authority would invite importers to state the
value of import licences they would be prepared to buy at different
7prices specified. To quote an example given by Meade, "Mr X will 
purchase licences for the import of 1,000 cars if the import licence 
fee is $100 a car, licences for the import of only 800 cars if the 
import licence fee is $150 a car, and so on." The government would 
fix a fee at which demand was equal to the amount to which it wished 
to restrict imports and each importer would receive the licences for 
which he had bid at that price.
Auctioning reconciles import licensing with a free enterprise 
economy. It ensures that the selection of imports is determined by 
the price mechanism since firms can always get the licences they
I Q
need by simply raising their bids. It is likely to ensure that most ,
7 J. E. Meade, Balance of Payments (page 286 of the first edition)
8 In a competitive economy the whole, but probably less than the
whole if competition is imperfect. See (b) of the objections 
to the system. Note also that is it conceivable that profits 
may be less than the additional gross income from price rises 
because of increased costs from handling each unit of trade.
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if not all, monopoly profits accrue to the taxpayer in the form of 
revenue from the sale of licences and, as a corollary, it prevents 
trafficking in import licences.
In the main, the economic disadvantages of auctioning
are small:
(a) It would require a cumbersome administrative
organisation on the part of the government and an 
increase in office costs of importers,
(b) Advantage (ii) does not apply to firms which already
dominate the market, since no auction can succeed 
without competing bidders,
(c) In deciding to auction licences, a government would be
starting by assuming the worst, namely that prices 
would rise as far as the market would allow.
(d) It may cause a reorganisation of the economy at a
most inopportune time.
(e) Importing lags may vitiate the theoretical advantages
of auctioning.
Probably because auctioning had never really been more than 
a theoretical possibility there has been very little discussion of 
administrative difficulties of implementing it. In fact, these 
difficulties are considerable, both for importers and the government.
Importers would need to appoint an executive to draw up 
demand schedules. Conceptually, this work would probably be quite 
beyond many small importers. While it could no doubt be handled by 
large firms, it would require a complete reorientation of approach.
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It would be quite different from the type of work necessary for the 
preparation of tenders by large engineering companies. For the 
preparation of tenders, while perhaps the working is lengthy and 
complicated, is conceptually simple. The engineer adds up the prices 
of the component parts, the depreciation of capital machinery, allows 
labour charges for the time the job will take, and adds a margin for 
error and a margin of profit for the firm. But it is not possible to 
draw up a demand schedule by a similar process, and even for large 
companies which understood the theory the results would probably be 
largely guesswork.
The government would need to print different types of forms 
so that bids could be made separately for tariff items and sub-items 
numbering nearly 3,000. (it would be possible to lessen this work 
by the grouping of a certain number of items and sub-items. Perhaps 
the whole of category B could be grouped, but very little grouping 
would be possible in category A or in the administrative category, 
fbr if groups were too large, importers who wanted only one or two 
items may be deterred from bidding at all). Moreover, in category "A" 
it is necessary to ensure that a minimum amount of each item is 
imported, rather than a gross total for all groups. It would be 
necessary to specify the ceiling for each group, but this need not 
entail more work than the alternative system of licensing. The 
tabulation of bids would present a formidable task. Nowadays it would 
be handled by an electronic computer. In 1952 no such solution was 
possible; it would have been necessary to instal more punched card
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machinery, Without a precise programme it is not possible to say 
just what this would have entailed, but there is no doubt that it 
would have required considerably more work than a simple "yes" or 
"no" to specific applications to import goods in the administrative 
category•
Quite apart from the practical difficulties of execution, 
there would be many difficulties in the determination of policy on 
matters of detail. It would be necessary to explain the system to 
importers, to determine the groups of items for which importers 
would bid, the ranges of prices for which importers would be asked 
to quote, to organise an interim system until the results of the first 
bids were available. Even after the initial problems had been 
overcome, many continuing problems would arise. How would one handle 
importers who just did not understand the system? Would firms be 
forced to take all the licences for which they had bid, even though 
changed trading conditions caused them to make a less sanguine 
forecast? If so, how, even if the scheme had a statutory basis? If 
not, would a change be made in the price for which the licences were 
sold? Would refunds be made to firms which found that they could not 
use all the licences that they had bought? Would unused licences be 
an asset in bankruptcy proceedings? Since the results would be in 
the form of a discrete, and not a continuous curve, what would happen 
if the intervals were rather larger than expected? Certainly these
problems could be solved, although many of the solutions would be
Jk-e
arbitrary, but more frequently it was necessary to have recourse to 
an arbitrary solution the greater the pressure on the government to
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arrive at a different decision.
In the judgement of the writer, the administrative awkwardness 
is itself sufficient reason for rejecting the suggestion to auction 
import licences. Even if, however, the administration is practicable, 
the theoretical advantages of auctioning would, in Australia at least, 
be vitiated by the combined effect of the probability of errors in 
estimating by importers and the fact that errors made could not be 
corrected for about six months ( the average lag between a decision 
to import and the importation ).
(c) Enforcement of regulations
Every time an article is imported it is necessary to verify
that:
i) an import licence has been issued to cover the 
consignment;
ii) the goods imported are those specified on the licence;
iii) the licence correctly states the number of items, 
their value and their origin;
iv) the importer of the goods is the importer to whom 
the licence was issued;
I
v) any conditions of the licence have been observed.
Since all imports must be inspected whether import licensing 
exists or not, most of the work of enforcing the regulations is most 
conveniently done at the point of importation. For customs purposes 
it is necessary to verify the information on the invoice, and a 
comparison of the licence and the invoice establishes that the licence
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exists and is sufficient check for points (ii), (iii) and (iv).
The first three of these checks serve to ensure that funds 
provided in foreign currency are used for the purpose for which they 
were intended, and not as a means of circumventing the restrictions.
As a corollary it is also necessary to ensure that no foreign currency 
is used if the licence is not used. This check is most easily made by 
the requirement that no bank payments be made in anticipation of 
shipping documents.
The fourth check is a necessary step in the prevention of
Qtrafficking. This point is elaborated below .
The fifth check does not have to be enforced very frequently 
since it applies only to a small number of goods. It is discussed 
in greater detail below 
(d) Supplementary quotas
When import restrictions were intensified in March 1952 no 
administrative machinery existed for handling instances of hardship. 
All applications for supplementary licences on the ground of personal 
hardship were dealt with in the Canberra office. In the first few 
months of licensing no application for a supplementary licence was 
entertained except on the ground of personal hardship. Applicants 
were of three types:
9 Page 112.
10 Page 121.
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i) firms -which had started importing between July, 1951 
and March 1952» and who were thus not able to 
establish a quota based on imports in 1950-5 1»
ii) firms whose imports were lower than usual in 1950-5 1 » 
and whose quotas were consequently well below 
their current needs;
iii) firms which required a license only intermittently and 
which had not imported certain articles in 1950-5 1» 
The department did not decide early applications in accordance with 
any general principles. Rather it formulated its policy in the course 
of the year, as it gained more experience with the problems with 
which importers were faced. Usually it granted an application if 
the applicant could show that the restrictions had affected him to 
such an extent that he could not carry on his business.
Early in 1953 the department relaxed its conditions covering 
the grant of supplementary licences. About this time a large number 
of businessmen had made representations that they could establish a 
successful business if only they could get licences. On the basis 
of their claims, the department granted many of them licences to 
enable them to start a business. These concessions were made on an 
ad hoc basis : no principle lay behind them, but merely a general 
impression in the department that it no longer mattered very much who 
received licences since it would probably be only a matter of months 
before it became possible to abandon import licensing.
As it gradually became obvious that the earlier optimism 
was unjustified, the department changed its attitude. It grew less
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liberal and, believing that it had erred in granted licences to new 
importers rather than in increasing the quotas of importers whose 
quotas had been reduced so drastically in 1 9 5 2, it decided to examine 
the claims of competing importers before granting future supplementary 
licences. This work could only be done in the state offices, where 
quota cards were kept, and because the officials in those offices, 
with their immediate contact with importing activities, were better 
able to appraise the relative merits of an applicant and other firms 
interested in importing the same goods. Accordingly Import Licences 
Committees were set up early in 1955? one in each state capital, to 
take over the work of the Hardship Section in Canberra. Each case 
was reviewed by licensing clerks and submitted to a committee of three 
senior officers who made the decision. There was a right of appeal 
against the decisions through the Collector and the Comptroller- 
General of Customs to the Minister for Trade and Customs.
When restrictions were intensified in October 1955? the 
granting of special licences in addition to quota was discontinued.
The Import Licences Committees were disbanded, and all applications 
in the hands of the committees were refused. When the government again 
decided to grant supplementary quotas, the applications were heard by 
appeal committees, which were established in 1956. These committees 
are discussed in the next section.
(e) Machinery for appeals
The first appeals committee established was the Import 
Licensing Appeal Committee (I.L.A.C.). This committee was established
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early in 1956 by the Department of Trade, and consisted of three 
senior officers of the department (i.e. it had no statutory 
authority). An importer whose application for an import licence 
had been refused in whole or in part had the right of appeal to 
I.L.A.C. If I.L.A.C. considered that the appeal should be allowed, 
the licence was granted. It was not necessary to obtain the approval 
of the Minister since all members of the board were officers of the 
Department of Trade. (Legally the allowance of an appeal took the 
form of a decision by senior departmental officials to overrule a 
decision made by junior officials).
When the Senate met after the gazettal of the 1956
regulations the absence of any statutory provision for appeal was
criticised by the Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances,
and Senator Wood, on behalf of the committee, moved to disallow them.
Following discussions between the Leader of the Government in the
Senate and the committee, and then between the Leader of the
Government and the Minister for Trade, the Minister decided to set
up an appeal system. The system was not incorporated in the
regulations, but was established in accordance with a statement by the
Minister for Trade in a letter to the Leader of the Government 
12in the Senate . On this understanding Senator Wood withdrew his
11 See Chapter 2, page 14.
12 The Leader of the Government in the Senate read the letter to
that House, Parliamentary Debates (Senate) 22nd May, 
1957, pages 956 and 957.
his motion to disallow the regulations
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The new hoards were known as Import Licensing Advisory 
Review Boards (\I.L.A.R.B.) and one was established in each state 
capital city. Each board consisted of an officer of the Department 
of Trade as chairman and two non-departmental members chosen for their 
past and continuing experience in industry and commerce. They were 
nominated by the Chamber of Manufacturers and the Chamber of 
Commerce in each state. An importer whose appeal had been rejected 
by I.L.A.C. had the right of further appeal to I.L.A.R.B. The 
procedure envisaged was that "the applicant would first submit to 
the Board the facts of his case, upon which the Board would consider
, I
whether his application could be approved within government policy. If it 
could not be approved within government policy the applicant would be so 
If it could be approved within government policy the hearing would|_advi sed.j
proceed" The boards had no authority to go outside the policy
laid down in the departmental rules for the guidance of licensing
I 1
officers. They were also bound by certain principles which had 
been laid down by Cabinet: new importers were not to be admitted
while the imports of traditional importers had been restricted; 
adjustments were not to be made on the ground of personal hardship.
The board’s function was to recommend to the Minister for Trade 
whether the appeal should be allowed, in whole or in part, or 
dismissed. The final decision zested with the Minister.
13 Letter from Mr. McEwen, Parliamentary Debates (Senate) 22nd 
May 1957, page 957.
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Apparently there was no general pattern in the form of the 
hearing of appeals. The procedure was private and informal. An 
appellant had the right to an oral hearing, and might he represented 
hy his customs agent hut not, generally, hy a barrister or solicitor. 
The hoard had before it the files and a statement showing the reasons 
why the appeal had been refused hy I.L.A.C. hut this material was not 
available to the appellant. Since the hoards could not explain
government policyexcept in generalities, presumably they started an 
interview hy inviting an appellant to explain why he considered that 
the article he wished to import was essential to the economy and to 
state any matters which he thought had not been properly considered 
hy the department.
As the appellant was not told why his original application 
and his appeal to I.L.A.C. had been refused, he could not know 
whether the case that he was presenting to I.L.A.R.B. was relevant. 
If his case was not relevant, it was a waste of everybody^ time for 
him to appeal to I.L.A.C. and to I.L.A.R.B. for his appeal had no
chance of success. In such a situation it seems reasonable to ask
boards
precisely what purpose the appeal xtstcs served. Since they heard 
full particulars of both sides, perhaps they might best be regarded
H
as committees of ombudsman.
Up to the 30th October, 1959 I.L.A.C. heard 1,248 appeals, 
of which it upheld 271 in full or in part, and refused 977» Up to 
the same date I.L.A.R.B. heard 809 appeals and recommended that 188 
of them be upheld in part and 28 in full. Of the 216 recommendations, 
eight were rejected by the Minister for Trade on the grounds that the
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grant of a licence -would, be contrary to government policy and would 
form an undesirable precedent. Appeals were generally upheld for 
one or more of the following reasons:
i) a change of government policy since the original 
refusal of the application;
ii) error in the application of the rules;
iii) a difference of opinion between the board and the
officer who considered the original application in 
a decision involving a substantial subjective 
element, e.g. whether an applicant for a new 
importer's licence would be efficient in the business;
iv) the production of new information justifying the 
grant of a licence.
If we allow for appeals which had been refused by I.L.A.C. 
but which had not, on the 30th October 1959j been heard by I.L.A.R.B. 
it seems that most importers whose appeals were refused by I.L.A.C. 
appealed to I.L.A.R.B. as a matter of course.
Since the grant or refusal of a licence was at the unqualified 
discretion of the Minister, there was no scope for appeal to a court 
oflaw. Only if a Minister refused to even consider an application, or 
refused it on a ground quite unrelated to a system of import control 
could the High Court issue a writ of mandamus against the Minister.
Even so, it could not order him to issue a licence, but merely to 
consider the application and exercise his discretion on the basis of 
considerations having some relevance to a system of import controls.
In practice, therefore, the Minister's discretion was not subject to 
judicial control unless it could be shown that his action was
m. io9
arbitrary or capricious. An illustration of the legal position is 
afforded by the case of Election Importing Co Pty Ltd, whose licence 
to import a quantity of Swiss watch movements had been revoked in 
part, on the ground that, according to information received by the 
government, they were to be paid for in Swiss francs and that this 
would be a contravention of a condition of the licence. The company 
applied to the High Court for a declaration that the revocation was 
unlawful on the grounds that:
i) a licence could be revoked only before it had been 
acted upon by the importer;
ii) a licence could be revoked only as a whole and not 
in part;
iii) the Minister, in revoking a licence, was bound to act 
judicially (and thus acquaint the licensee with any 
statements prejudicial to him and to give him an 
opportunity to be heard in his defence);
iv) even if the Minister was not bound to act judicially 
his discretion was not absolute, but must be 
exercised bona fide, uninfluenced by irrelevant 
considerations and not arbitrarily or illegally. 
Williams J., on the bench of the High Court, rejected the 
first three propositions and, while accepting the fourth, held that 
the reason given for the revocation was not irrelevant to a system of 
import licensing, even though there was before the court no evidence 
of its truth
14 (1949) 80 C.L.R. 657
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This system calls for some justification. The basis of 
Western society is the rule of law, i.e. the rights and duties of 
the members of society are codified in legislation passed by the 
State; this legislation is publicly available and its application 
to any given situation may, with rare exceptions, by argued in open 
court. Furthermore, courts have power to review the administration 
by government departments of powers which they exercise over members 
of society. But under the import licensing system aggrieved importers 
were denied not only the right to argue their case in court, but also 
even the knowledge of the rules under which the system operated.
The department recognised this objection but considered that 
it was not practicable to frame many policies in legal form. Not 
only were policies changed frequently, and continually reformulated 
with experience, but frequently they took the form that the government 
did not propose to allow more imports (or even any imports) of certain 
types of goods at the existing level of import restrictions. Moreover, 
the department tried to assess the merits of individual cases on the 
basis of equity rather than of legalism. If an importer knew the rules 
according to which th§ department operated, he might often be able to 
frame a case to meet them.
(f) Special regional requirements
In the first few years of import licensing, difficulties 
arose because there was only one section in Australia (the Central 
Import Licensing Branch in Sydney) authorising licences for goods in 
the administrative category. However well-meaning, this section was 
inevitably out of touch with the special requirements of various
£i in
importers in distant parts of Australia. An attempt was made to 
overcome this by having special licensing officers travel to distant 
parts of the country periodically. These officers had authority to 
approve licences up to a certain amount, but could make recommendations 
to the head office if it appeared that an applicant for a licence for 
a larger amount had a strong case.
(g) Speculation
Importers could not obtain licences until they could specify 
the name of the supplier and the country from which they proposed to 
obtain their goods. If the specified supplier subsequently proved 
unable to meet the order, the importer had to apply for a new licence 
or else have the original licence amended. Each importer had there­
fore to lodge a tentative order in the fifst place, subject to 
confirmation after he had received his licence.
The design of the quota system prevented any large-scale 
speculation in goods in the quota categories. Importers knew the 
value for which they would receive licences, and while they could 
lodge, provisionally, additional orders on the off-chance of a 
relaxation of the restrictions in the near future, they were well 
aware that any extra quotas granted would, on the average, be a small 
proportion of existing quotas.
In the administrative category importers could not be 
certain that they would receive a licence to cover any given order, 
and hence, no doubt, they were obliged to place, and cancel, a higher 
proportion of tentative orders.
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But while importers made many speculative orders, they had 
very little opportunity for speculative importing. On only one 
occasion did they have a substantial opportunity for speculative 
importing - the six months from April 1954 to September 1954 > when 
most items that had previously been licensed in category A were 
transferred to the No Quota Restrictions category - and this
15opportunity was seized by a considerable number of importers .
(h) Bribery
As a check against bribery, a senior officer periodically 
sampled files of the C.I.L.B. to ensure that decisions given conformed 
to the general policy laid down by the department. If a decision did 
not appear to conform to this policy, the officer who gave it was 
asked to explain the reason for his decision.
(i) Trafficking
A consequence of the reimpositionc£ import restrictions 
in March 1952 was a tendency for prices to rise through the interaction 
of supply and demand. This tendency had to be resisted as far as 
possible if the economy was to be kept stable. A rise in prices
might have come about in a number of ways, but in particular there
i ;
was a danger that unscrupulous traders would findit more profitable 
to sell their import licences to the highest bidder than to accept 
importing and trading risks themselves.
The government did not wish to invite the criticism that it
15 See Chapter 6, page 5;^
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was handing out quick profits to traders at the expense of the tax­
payers. Still less did it wish to become a party to a new form of 
blackmarketing. It accordingly always took the view th$t the purpose 
of an import licence was to enable an importer to carry on his 
business, and insisted that a licence should be personal to the
importer to whom it was issued. It did not regard the licence as a
1commodity which a business could sell, whatever its reason for wishing 
to do so, nor even as a commodity to be traded when a business changed 
hands•
These general principles led to a considerable number of 
problems when the department tried to apply them. Business practices 
are many and varied, and no matter what practical tests the department 
adopted, ingenious sharpsters devised innumerable ruses for defeating 
the spirit of the regulations.
Most trafficking seems to have taken place in category B 
licences during 1955 and 1956, when the restrictions were intensified 
after many relaxations. A few traders advertised prominently:
" I M P O R T E R S  
W I T H  * B * Q U O T A  
W A N T E D
by Commonwealth-wide wholesale organisation 
for indenting goods from Europe. Excellent 
profits assured without financial outlay.
Deposit with order and finance available.
Also interested in long-period contracts.
m  ii4
Continuous business assured.
PHONE MANAGING DIRECTOR JA3571" 16
and again:
" I M P O R T E R  
W I T H  » B  '
Q U O T A
W A N T E D
We guarantee to double your income if you 
can make £22,000 per year available to a 
•well-established leading organisation with 
New South Wales rights. Correct procedure 
followed.
ALL ENQUIRIES TREATED WITH STRICTEST CONEIDENCE LX 2364 after 6 p.m." 17 
Other traders, whether more circumspect or unable to offer 
such large profits, confined themselves to an inconspicuous advertise­
ment in the "agencies" column of the press. Typical advertisements 
ran:
"Importer with 'B* licence seeks proposition from manufac-
18turer, etc. re distribution."
"Import licence required by well-established importer. ’B* 
quota licence to import from Norway and Japan. Good 
profitable lines. Share profit basis. No finance
„ 19necessary."
16 Melbourne Herald, 1/3/56> page 6
17 Sydney Sun, 1/5/56, page 2.
18 Sydney Morning Herald, 4/2/56, page 19, column 9*
19 Sydney Morning Herald, 25/2/56, page 23, column 3.
11 115
"Importer required, -with. B3 quota to indent goods for large
•wholesale organisation. Deposit with order and highest
profit margin assured and no financial obligation
20involved. Correct procedure followed."
One cannot of course be sure that all merchants who inserted
advertisemenxs of this type were profiteering. Nonetheless, when a
merchant advertises "highest profit assured", there is at least a
presumption that he is increasing his profit margin at a time of
shortage. There were, furthermore, a number of press reports,
presumably based on specific instances, of attempts to profiteer.
The Australian Financial Review, for example, reported in its issue
of the 8th May 1952:
"There are cases, however, where traders who have established 
a quota on, say, textiles, are offering to sell the use of that quota 
for a premium of as much as one-third of its value to the regular 
distributors of say, crockery, artificial jewellery, toys and 
cigarettes . . . "
21In another article , the Australian Knitting Industries 
Council was reported to have complained that agents unknown to 
established firms were offering licences for raw materials at 
premiums of up to 20% although the firms concerned were unable to 
obtain sufficient quotas to cover their own requirements.
20 Sydney Morning Herald, 1/9/56, page 23, column 8.
21 Canberra Times, 26/9/56, page 11.
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The basic difficulty facing the government was that there
was little difference in principle between "trafficking" in licences
and importing on someone else’s behalf at a commission, a perfectly
normal and legitimate business practice. If an importer did not wish
to run the risk of selling his licences, it was a simple matter for
him to enter into a firm contract with another merchant and to add
to his invoices the amount for which he might otherwise have sold
his licences. It is moreover quite impossible to police this loophole
without a general system of price control.
Government policy seems to have vacillated on the question
of a fair margin of profit. The Minister for Trade and Customs, Mr
P. M. Osborne, stated in March 1956:
"Some importers charge more than a fair percentage for goods
in short supply. The government regards an excessive charge as an
unfair use of a quota or licence, and where cases come to our notice
22they are dealt with by cancellation or reduction of the quota."
Several months later the Minister for Trade, Mr J. McEwen, 
had a slightly different approach to the problem:
"I rather feel that some people who find themselves called 
upon to pay a rather higher charge for the service are loosely 
describing this activity astrafficking . . .  I do not say that 
the claim for a higher level of profit by some people who find 
themselves in this situation should be condemned in principle, 
described as sinister or regarded as trafficking ... there is a
22 Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives), 8/3/56,page 65O
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variant between the person who raises his charge from a traditional
10% or 15% to 25% and a person who raises it to 75% or, if he can
23screw it out of someone, 100%."
When challenged to say what percentage profit was right, Mr McEwen 
refused:
"it is enough for the Australian trading community to carry 
the inconvenience of import licensing without having added to it 
an arbitrary price control component"• ^
In another context Mr McEwen stated of import licensing that:
"At best it cannot be divorced from some element of rough 
justice". ^
In general, it seems, the department confined itself to 
the prevention of "trafficking" in the narrow sense of the word. Its 
usual test was whether the person to whom the licence was issued was 
doing the work of importing the goods and taking all the usual business 
risks associated with importing. If he was, the department considered 
that there was no offence. On the other hand, the department held 
that it was a flagrant breach of the conditions of the licence if 
the role of the quota-holder was restricted to the sale of the right
23 Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) 3/IO/56, pages
1110 & 1111. The highest percentage profit which the writer 
was able to find mentioned in advertisements was "not less 
than 25%". ("Importer with *B* quota required to indent goods 
for large retail distributing company. Profit margins not less 
than 25% on landed price and correct procedure will be 
followed." - Melbourne Herald., 5/3/56, quoted by Mr Ward in 
the House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates,
2/5/56, page 1964.)
24 ibid, page 1111.
25 Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representaiives) 14/5/57» page 1305.
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to use his name on an application for a licence, and, if possible, it 
imposed penalties on persons caught at this practice.
Because trafficking was not a statutory offence, the depart­
ment was never called upon to substantiate any offence publicly, nor 
could any statutory penalty be imposed upon offenders. The penalty 
usually imposed on the seller of a licence was the reduction of his 
quota by the value of the goods covered on the licence sold. If a 
quota-holder was found to have sold licences to the full extent of his 
quota, it was held that he was not really an importer at all, and his 
quota was cancelled. If the buyer of a licence held a quota himself, 
his quota was debited with the value of the goods covered by the licence 
bought. The reason for this policy was explained by the Minister for 
Customs and Excise, Senator Henty, in a speech to the Senate:
"There have to be two parties to these transactions - a 
seller and a buyer - otherwise there would not be any selling 
of licences. The buyer is as much in the wrong as the seller.
"I know that arguments are put up that by buying licences 
the buyer has shown that he needs more quota, and sometimes this is 
claimed tothe department of Trade as a sort of final proof that 
he should be given more quota. As I see it, the true position is 
that he is willing to take an unfair advantage of his business 
competitors who are observing the rules, by getting imports by 
irregular methods. The way it appears to me is that the buyer has
in fact secured an advance on his quota, and as such a
26corresponding debit to that quota is made,"
26 Parliamentary Debates (Senate) 21/4/59» page 896
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Alternatively, if the trafficking was discovered before the 
goods had been imported, the licence might be revoked, with the result 
that on landing the goods became liable to seizure as prohibited 
imports. If the buyer was not an importer and the goods in question 
had already been imported, the department could not punish the buyer, 
but could only record the incident and take it into consideration if 
the buyer applied for a quota at a later date.
Since the department did not regard licences as a commodity 
to be traded when a business changed hands, the buyer of an established 
business did not become automatically entitled to whatever quota the 
business had formerly. The department found it necessary to inquire 
carefully into all aspects of the transaction. That is not to say 
that the department tried to deprive owners of an established business 
of the "goodwill" which it is normal business practice to pay. But it 
was necessary to ensure that the amount paid for "goodwill" could be 
justified from the organisation of the business, and did not represent 
a premium paid to obtain the licences of the business. In a number of 
instances, a firm whichhad virtually ceased business, but which still 
had an import quota was bought at a price out of all proportion to the 
value of its assets. The inference was likely to be drawn by the 
department in these instances that the high price paid for the firm 
was in effect aimed at securing the firm's import licensing quota, and 
any such action was treated as trafficking.
It is clear that most trafficking took place in 1955 and in 
early 1956. In March 1956> Mr Osborne told the House of Representatives:
"Special investigation officers of the department continuously
12 0
investigate alleged abuses, and in the last year quotas to the
27value of approximately £3,000,000 have been cancelled."
The following October, Mr McEwen stated that since the Department of 
Trade started "more than 100 licences - the figure (was) perhaps 
nearer 150 - (had) been cancelled because of the sale of rights
to import." ^
As restrictions were relaxed trafficking became less of an 
issue. In answer to a question by Mr Cairns, Mr Osborne supplied the 
following statistics to Parliament:
2QValue of Licences Cancelled for Trafficking
8.3.52 - 31.12.53 not available
1.1.54 - 31.12.55 £3,195,134
1.1.56 - 30.6.58 £1,048,714
1.7.58 - 31.8.59 £693,216
On the 21st April 1959, "the Minister for Customs and Excise 
(Senator Henty) announced to the Senate that an Import Licensing 
Advisory Appeals Board (i.L.A.A.B.) would be established to hear 
appeals against the imposition of penalties for trafficking. ^  
(Previously there had been no machinery for appeals.) The boards 
were to have the same organisation as the review boards and in fact 
Senator Henty hoped to arrange for the private members of the Hew
27 Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) 22/3/56, page 1028
28 ibid. 3/IO/56, page 1110.
29 ibid. 29/9/59, page 1547.
30 Parliamentary Debates (Senate) 21/4/59, pages 895-6.
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South Wales I.L.A.R.B. to serve also on the I.L.A.A.B., which was 
to be located in Sydney.
But it's an ill wind that blows nobody any good. Traffick-
ling did at least serve to draw attention to instances of aministrative 
inflexibility, in particular in the licensing of certain commodities 
whose sale was restricted by agency agreements, such as cameras.
The quotas for cameras were, like all other quotas, based on imports 
in 1950-5 1? but since that year some brands had increased in popularity 
while some had declined. The agent for a brand which had declined in 
popularity had licences which were of no use to him, and the agent 
for a brand whose popularity had increased was unable to get more 
licences. The result was that the latter bought licences from the 
former. The situation was eventually corrected in August 1959? when 
cameras were transferred to the replacement category.
(j) Attachment of conditions to licences
Most conditions attached to licences directly concerned the 
importation of the goods covered, e.g. the source from which they 
were to be bought, the currency in which payment was to be made. In 
general the government did not impose conditions to be complied with 
after the goods had been imported. When the government did impose 
such conditions it was generally with the aim of preventing 
profiteering. For example, it was the practice to permit the 
importation of a few American cars. Some of these cars were allowed 
into the country because the government wished to enable the makers 
to keep their names on the Australian market; some belonged to 
people coming from the United States of America to Australia; some
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were s e n t  as  g i f t s .  The d e p a r tm e n t  t r i e d  t o  a t t a c h  c o n d i t i o n s  
making i t  u n p r o f i t a b l e  t o  s e l l  t h e s e  c a r s ,  h u t  i t s  puwer was 
l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  t im e  o f  c l e a r a n c e  from cu s to m s .  A number o f  " g i f t "  
c a r s  w ere fo u n d  to  be n o t  g e n u in e ,  and c a r s  im p o r te d  a g a i n s t  an  
u n d e r t a k in g  t h a t  th e y  would  n o t  be s o l d  w i th i n  a  c e r t a i n  p e r i o d  
were s o l d  w i t h i n  t h a t  p e r i o d  a t  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  p r o f i t .  The 
d e p a r t m e n t ’s power was c h a l l e n g e d  s e v e r a l  t i m e s ,  and ea,ch t im e  i t  
e i t h e r  r e l e a s e d  p e o p le  from  s e c u r i t i e s  w hich  i t  a l r e a d y  h e l d ,  o r  
r e f r a i n e d  from  t a k i n g  l e g a l  a c t i o n ,  w h ich ,  s i n c e  i t  would a s s u r e d l y  
have l o s t ,  w ould have p u b l i c i s e d  th e  w eakness o f  i t s  p o s i t i o n .  
E v e n t u a l l y  th e  d e p a r tm e n t  r e f u s e d  to  a c c e p t  any r e q u e s t  as  g e n u in e ,  
and i t  r u l e d  o u t  g i f t  c a r s  a l t o g e t h e r  u n t i l  i t  was a b l e  t o  closfc 
t h e  l e g a l  lo o p h o l e .
S i m i l a r  p rob lem s a r o s e  i n  t h e  c l o t h i n g  i n d u s t r y .  Some 
im p o r t e r s  ha.ving found  i t  more p r o f i t a b l e  t o  s e l l  t h e i r  t e x t i l e s  
a c r o s s  th e  c o u n t e r  th a n  to  m a n u f a c tu r e r s ,  c e r t a i n  m a n u fa c tu r e r s  
c o u ld  n o t  g e t  enough s u p p l i e s  t o  e n a b le  them to  keep t h e i r  p l a n t  
f u l l y  o c c u p ie d .  I f  a m a n u fa c tu r e r  c o u ld  show t h a t  he was u n a b le  
t o  o b t a i n  s u f f i c i e n t  s u p p l i e s  from  h i s  u s u a l  s o u r c e ,  he was g r a n t e d  
a  s p e c i a l  l i c e n c e  a g a i n s t  an  u n d e r t a k i n g  t h a t  th e  t e x t i l e s  he 
im p o r te d  would be u s e d  f o r  a  s p e c i f i e d  p u rp o s e  o r  e x p o r te d  w i th i n  
a  c e r t a i n  t im e .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y , c e r t a i n  o f  t h e s e  m a n u fa c tu r e r s  a l s o  
found  i t  more p r o f i t a b l e  t o  s e l l  t h e i r  p ie c e g o o d s  a c r o s s  t h e  c o u n te r  
th a n  to  u s e  them f o r  m a n u fa c tu r in g .
The lo o p h o le  was c l o s e d  by an amendment t o  s e c t i o n s  50 and
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51 of the Customs Act which authorised Statutory Rules No 93 of 
1956. These regulations were to replace the former regulations on 
import licensing. Although the enabling legislation was passed in 
1952, the regulations were not presented to Parliament until late in 
1956. When they were placed before the Senate, they were reviewed
by the Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances in the
32Senate . In evidence given before this committee, the Chief
Inspector of Licensing of the Department of Customs and Excise said
that the power to be granted by the regulations would be used where
it was suspected that an importer's intention was to break his
undertaking. The new conditions would not hurt importers who were
prepared to abide by their undertaking and who were telling the truth«
The Standing Committee at first objected to the new
regulations on the ground that they provided no machinery for appeals.
The objection was withdrawn when the Minister for Trade promised to
33establish appeal boards .
The only material change in the amended relations was in 
regulation 12, which provided that the Minster might issue an import 
licence subject to a requirement to be fulfilled after the importation 
of the goods to which the licence referred. The licence might be 
made subject to conditions specified in it, or specified after it 
had been issued. The conditions were subject to the Minister's
31 Customs Act No 108 of 1952.
32 Eleventh Report of the Standing Committee on Regulations and
Ordinances in the Senate, issued on the 2nd May 1957«
33 See page 2. 105.
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discretion and might discriminate between persons and between countries 
of origin. Security might be required as the licensing officer 
thought necessary. The licence might be revoked. The Minister's 
decision was final.
(k) Penalties
1963
Section 234 of the Customs Act 1901 - 1 $ ^  reads, in part -
"No person shall -
(e) Make in any declaration or document produced to any
officer any statement which is untrue in any 
particular or produce or deliver to any officer 
any declaration or document containing any such 
statement;
(f) Mislead any officer in any particular likely to
affect the discharge of his duty."
The offence is limited to false statement made to customs offic4rs, 
i.e. it covers statements made in formal applications for licences, 
but not those made to officers of the Department of Trade. The 
penalty for an infringement of this section is a maximum of £100, 
a minimum of £5, and forfeiture of the goods concerned if they have 
already been imported.
PART 4
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
C h a p te r  10
"NORMAL" FLOW OF IMPORTS
The b a s i c  p rob lem  f o r  p o l i c y - m a k e r s  i s  t o  know w h e th e r  a 
d e f i c i t  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  payments a r i s e s  f rom some 
p a s s i n g  phenomenon such  a s  d o m e s t i c  i n f l a t i o n ,  i n c r e a s e d  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
of  s u p p l i e s ,  e x p e c t a t i o n s  of  f u t u r e  p r i c e  r i s e s ,  a t e n d e n c y  t o  b u i l d  
up s t o c k s ,  o r  w h e th e r  i t  a r i s e s  f rom a more l a s t i n g  t r e n d  such  a s  a 
change i n  t a s t e s ,  t e c h n i c a l  c h a n g e s ,  changes  in  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  change s  
i n  r e l a t i v e  c o s t s *  A change of  th e  fo rm e r  ty p e  can u s u a l l y  be r e l i e d  
on t o  c o r r e c t  i t s e l f  in  due c o u r s e ,  b u t  a change of  th e  l a t t e r  ty p e  
may n e c e s s i t a t e  a  change in  t h e  r e l a t i v e  c o s t - p r i c e  l e v e l s .  I t  i s  
cu s to m a ry  t o  d e s c r i b e  the  l a t t e r  s i t u a t i o n  as  one of  " f u n d a m e n ta l  
d i s e q u i l i b r i u m " .
In o r d e r  t o  be a b l e  t o  d e t e r m in e  w h e th e r  a fu n d a m e n ta l  
d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  e x i s t s ,  we need  t o  know what  im p o r t s  would be i f  the  
economy were i n  a p o s i t i o n  of  f u l l  employment w i t h o u t  i n f l a t i o n ,  i f  i t  
were n e i t h e r  b u i l d i n g  up n o r  r u n n i n g  down s t o c k s  ( e x c e p t  in  a c c o r d a n c e  
w i t h  a l o n g - t e r m  t r e n d ) ,  and were n o t  r e l y i n g  on q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c ­
t i o n s  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  l e v e l  o f  i t s  i m p o r t s .  I t  w i l l  be c o n v e n i e n t  t o  
r e f e r  t o  t h i s  l e v e l  a s  t h e  "no rm al"  l e v e l  o f  i m p o r t s .  But i n  no f u l l
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f i n a n c i a l  y e a r  in  A u s t r a l i a  s i n c e  th e  end of  t h e  1939-45 war have 
t h e s e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a l l  been s a t i s f i e d .  We can o n ly  c o n s i d e r  w he the r  
i m p o r t s  would p r o b a b l y  have been h i g h e r  or  lower  i n  any g i v e n  y e a r  i f  
t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  had been  s a t i s f i e d  ( i . e .  w he the r  im p o r t s  were above ,  
be low ,  or  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  e q u a l  t o  "no rm al"  i m p o r t s .
What v a r i a t i o n s  a r e  t o  be e x p e c t e d ?  In t i m e s  of  i n f l a t i o n  
and of  s t o c k  a c c u m u l a t i o n  i m p o r t s  w i l l  be h i g h e r  t h a n  no rm a l ;  in  t i m e s  
of  d e f l a t i o n ,  and when t h e  economy i s  r u n n i n g  down s t o c k s ,  im p o r t s  
w i l l  be low er  t h a n  n o rm a l .  I f  im p o r t s  a r e  b e i n g  a r t i f i c i a l l y  r e ­
s t r i c t e d ,  w h e th e r  by q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  o r  by s u p p ly  or  t r a n s ­
p o r t  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  i m p o r t s  must  be lower  t h a n  normal  u n l e s s  th e
c u r r e n t  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i s  t o  c o u n t e r  t h e  e f f e c t s  of
i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e  o r  a t e n d e n c y  t o  b u i l d  up s t o c k s .
T h i s  a p p ro a c h  was a d o p te d  by Lundberg  and H i l l  i n  an a r t i c l e  
in  th e  Economic Record  * in  1956« Lundberg  and H i l l  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t ,  
w h i l e  im p o r t s  of  some l i n e s  were above normal b eca u se  of  heavy i n v e s t ­
ment in  c a p i t a l  g oods ,  and d e s p i t e  some i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e  and 
i n c r e a s e s  i n  s t o c k s ,  im p o r t s  b e f o r e  1950 were below n o rm a l ,  b e i n g  
r e s t r i c t e d  by s h i p p i n g  s h o r t a g e s  and th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  g e t t i n g  
s u p p l i e s  ; i n  1950-51 and 1951-52 t h e y  were p r o b a b l y  above normal a s
s t o c k s  were b u i l t  u p ,  i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e  p e r s i s t e d  and a c c u m u la ted
im p o r t  o r d e r s  were b e i n g  f i l l e d ;  i n  1952-53 t h e y  were f a r  below normal  
b eca u se  of  im p o r t  l i c e n s i n g ,  d e f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e  and t h e  r u n n i n g  
down of  s t o c k s .
E r i k  Lundberg  and Malcolm H i l l ,  " A u s t r a l i a ’ s L o n g - te rm  B a lance  of  
Payments  P r o b le m s " ,  Economic R e c o r d , May 1956,  ¥ o l .  32,  pages  
2 8 -4 9 .
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This analysis may now be extended to cover the later years
of «:>quantitative restrictions.
1954- 55 : The economy was beginning to expand once more and there was
a relatively large increase in stocks and very little unemployment. 
Although quantitative restrictions were still in force, they had 
been very much relaxed : requirements for the importation of goods
in the "administrativeM category had been liberalised and for a 
large part of the year goods originally in category "A" were 
effectively not subject to restriction. We should therefore expect 
imports to have been above normal.
1955- 56 t Inflationary pressure increased and there was a small in­
crease in stocks; although quantitative restrictions were intens­
ified the restrictions of October 1954 and April 1955 did not begin 
to take effect until about the end of 1955, and the full effect of 
the more severe restrictions of October 1955 was not reflected in 
the level of importing until the second half of 1956. The net 
result seems doubtful i it may be that imports in 1955-56 were 
fairly close to normal.
1956- 57 : Inflationary pressure persisted for the first few months of 
the year and then gave way to a slight recession. There was a small 
increase in stocks ; the full effect of the intensifications of the 
import restrictions became apparent. There is no doubt that imports 
were below normal.
1957- 58 : The economy was in reasonable internal balance and the 
increase in stocks was fairly small. Nonetheless quantitative 
restrictions were still in force and while they had been relaxed in
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th e  p r e v i o u s  tw e lv e  months ,  t h e i r  e f f e c t  was t o  r e s t r i c t  im p o r t s  to  
a b o u t  £50 m i l l i o n  l e s s  t h a n  th e y  had been two y e a r s  e a r l i e r .  I f  t h e  
e a r l i e r  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  im p o r t s  were normal  in  1955-56 i s  c o r r e c t ,  
i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  i m p o r t s  in  1957-58  were below normal*
1958-  59 : As i n  th e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  th e  economy was f o r  most  of  the  y e a r  
i n  r e a s o n a b l e  i n t e r n a l  b a l a n c e  b u t  t h e  i n c r e a s e  in  s t o c k s  was com­
p a r a t i v e l y  l a r g e .  E x p a n s i o n a r y  t e n d e n c i e s  began t o  show tow ards  th e  
end of  t h e  y e a r  b u t  b eca use  of  i m p o r t i n g  l a g s  one would n o t  e x p e c t  
them t o  have i n c r e a s e d  t h e  r a t e  of  i m p o r t i n g  g r e a t l y .  Q u a n t i t a t i v e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  l i m i t e d  im p o r t s  t o  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  th e  same l e v e l  as  in  
t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r .  I t  seems p r o b a b l e  t h a t  im p o r t s  d u r i n g  1958-59 
were below n o rm a l .
1 9 5 9 -  60 : There was p r a c t i c a l l y  no i n c r e a s e  in  s t o c k s .  E x p a n s io n a ry  
t e n d e n c i e s  i n c r e a s e d  d u r i n g  th e  y e a r  and the  r a t e  of  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e  
r o s e .  A l th o u g h ,  f o r m a l l y ,  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o p e r a t e d  f o r  
th e  f i r s t  e i g h t  months of  t h e  y e a r ,  i n  f a c t  t h e y  had been c o n s i d ­
e r a b l y  e a s e d  v i r t u a l l y  s i n c e  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  the  y e a r .  I t  i s  
l i k e l y  t h a t  i m p o r t s  d u r i n g  1959-60 were above no rm a l .
I t  seems d e s i r a b l e  t o  c o n t i n u e  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  f o r  the  few 
y e a r s  s i n c e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were a b o l i s h e d ,  s i n c e  tem p o ra ry  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  a r e  th e  more l i k e l y  t o  o b s c u re  a l o n g - t e r m  t r e n d  the  
s h o r t e r  t h e  p e r i o d  b e in g  c o n s i d e r e d .
1 9 6 0 -  61 : So g e n e r a l  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were i n  f o r c e .  In­
f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e  c o n t i n u e d  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  f o u r  and a h a l f  months 
o f  th e  y e a r  b u t  i t  i s  c l e a r  in  r e t r o s p e c t  t h a t  i t  had p a s s e d  i t s
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peak and t h a t  th e  boom was d y in g  • S ince  th e  e a s i n g  of  th e  i n ­
f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e  was n o t  c l e a r  a t  t h e  t ime  ( a l t h o u g h  th e  S to c k  
Exchange in d e x  d i d  t u r n  downwards in  S e p te m b e r ) ,  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  
i m p o r t e r s  p l a c e d  heavy o r d e r s  f o r  im p o r t s  t o  s a t i s f y  p r o b a b le  
demand and a g a i n s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a r e i m p o s i t i o n  of  im p o r t  
l i c e n s i n g .  While th e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  m e asu re s  of  November 1960 p u t  on 
a b r u p t  end t o  e x p e c t a t i o n s  of  f u r t h e r  e x p a n s i o n ,  t h e y  c o u ld  n o t  
a f f e c t  im p o r t  o r d e r s  a l r e a d y  p l a c e d .  As a r e s u l t ,  s t o c k s  ap p ea r  t o  
have a c c u m u la te d  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  of  a b o u t  £250 t o  £300 m i l l i o n .  There 
i s  no d o u b t  t h a t  im p o r t s  in  1960-61 were w e l l  above n o rm a l .
1 9 6 1 -  62 * I n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e  gave way t o  r e c e s s i o n .  There were no 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  and s t o c k s  r a n  down by ove r  £100 m i l l i o n .  
Im p o r t s  must  have been  c o n s i d e r a b l y  below n o rm a l .
1 9 6 2 -  63 s The economy g r a d u a l l y  r e c o v e r e d  f rom th e  downturn  of  th e  
p r e c e d i n g  y e a r  b u t  t h e r e  were no i n f l a t i o n a r y  t e n d e n c i e s .  There 
was,  how ever ,  a much l a r g e r  b u i l d - u p  of  s t o c k s  th a n  t h e r e  had been 
f o r  s e v e r a l  y e a r s  ( e x c e p t  1 9 6 0 - 6 1 ) .  I t  seems l i k e l y  t h a t  im p o r t s  
were r a t h e r  h i g h e r  t h a n  n o rm a l .
1 9 6 3 -  64 : On t h e  b a s i s  of  p r e l i m i n a r y  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t h r e e  
q u a r t e r s  o f  th e  y e a r ,  i t  seems l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  b u i l d - u p  of  s t o c k s
ß
w i l l  be q u i t e  l a r g e  a l t h o u g h  p e r h a p s  l e s s  t h a n  in  1962-63 . There
c f .  H. F .  L y d a l l ,  "The 1959-60 Boom, R eco v e ry ,  L o n g - te rm  Growth",  
Economic R e c o r d , March 1962,  page 10.
Commonwealth S t a t i s t i c i a n ,  Q u a r t e r l y  E s t i m a t e s  of  N a t i o n a l  Income 
and E x p e n d i t u r e  No 15,  March q u a r t e r  1964.  The S t a t i s t i c i a n ' s  
l a t e s t  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  s t o c k  movements a r e  :
2
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are no g e n e r a l  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  but  t h e r e  i s  a danger  o f  
i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e  : the  Consumer P r i c e  Index  r o s e  by in  th e
March q u a r t e r ,  and d e s p i t e  s e v e r a l  c a l l - u p s  o f  t r a d i n g  bank fu n d s  
t o  r e d u c e  l i q u i d i t y ,  Dr Coombs, a s  r e c e n t l y  as  the  18 th  May, f e l t
4
i t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  warn t h a t  "we must be prepared  t o  s lo w  down’1 . I t  
seems l i k e l y  t h a t  im p o r t s  f o r  th e  y e a r  w i l l  be somewhat above  
n o r m a l .
Can we now, by r e l a t i n g  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  t o  im p or t s  d u r i n g  the  
p a s t  15 y e a r s  or s o ,  d i s c o v e r  a n y t h i n g  about  th e  l e v e l s  o f  "normal"  
i m p o r t s ?  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  compare the  import  t r e n d
w i t h  a curve  growing  a t  t h e  same r a t e  a s th e  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t
( i . e *  about  4j&). On th e  graph on page 132 are  shown:
( a )  the  Commonwealth S t a t i s t i c i a n ' s  f i g u r e s  f o r  th e  volume o f  
im p or t s ;
(b)  a curve  growing  a t  the  r a t e  o f  4$  a y e a r ;
( c )  a curve  gr ow ing  a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  a y e a r .
While  i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  draw f i r m  c o n c l u s i o n s  b e c a u s e  o f  
t h e  range o f  e r r o r  i n h e r e n t  in  the  in d e x  f i g u r e s  and the  l a c k  o f  pr e ­
c i s i o n  in  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  "normal i m p o r t s " ,  we may s u g g e s t  t h a t  th e  4^  
curve  c o n f l i c t s  w i t h  th e  a n a l y s i s  on a number o f  p o i n t s  :
i )  the  graph s u g g e s t s  t h a t  im p or t s  were some £70  m i l l i o n  above
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 1 9 6 3 - 6 4
f i r s t  q u a r t e r 62 58
s e c o n d  q u a r t e r 164 118
t h i r d  q u a r t e r 54 28
f o u r t h  q u a r t e r - 1 2 9 ( n . a . )
year 151
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n o r m a l  i n  1949—5 0 ,  w h e r e a s  L u n d b e r g  & H i l l  ha v e  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e y  
were b e lo w  n o rm a l  $
i i )  t h e  g r a p h  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i m p o r t s  were  s l i g h t l y  be low  n o r m a l  
i n  1 9 5 9 - 6 0 ;
i i i )  t h e  g r a p h  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i m p o r t s  were n o r m a l  i n  1 962 -63  and  
t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  a g a i n  be n o r m a l  i n  1 9 6 3 - 6 4 .
I t  seems  more p r o b a b l e  t h a t  t h e  n o r m a l  l e v e l  o f  i m p o r t s  i s  
g r o w i n g  a t  a  s l o w e r  r a t e  t h a n  t h e  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t .  I f  we t a k e  
1 9 5 5 - 5 6  i m p o r t s  a s  h a v i n g  be e n  n o r m a l ,  we have i n  t h e  3 ^  c u r v e  a  g r a p h  
w h ich  f i t s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  much b e t t e r .  On t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h i s  i s  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  c o r r e c t ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e  h a s  be e n  c o m p i l e d ,  i n  t e r m s  
o f  1 9 5 9 - 6 0  p r i c e s ,  t o  show t h e  a p p r o x i m a t e  s e v e r i t y  o f  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s .
SEVERITY OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
( £  m i l l i o n )
I m p o r t s Normal  i m p o r t s
Y e a r 1 9 5 9 - 6 0 a s s u m i n g  r a t e  o f S e v e r i t y
p r i c e s g r o w t n  a t  3 ,*> C o l . ( l )  -  C o l .  ( 2 )
(1 ) ( 2 ) (3 )
19 4 8 -4 9 590 685 - 9 5
1 9 4 9 - 5 0 734 706 28
1950 -51 876 727 149
1 9 51 -52 1 , 0 1 0 749 261
1 9 5 2 - 5 3 530 772 - 2 4 2
1 9 5 3 - 5 4 734 795 - 6 1
1 9 5 4 - 5 5 892 818 74
1 9 5 5 - 5 6 843 843 • •
1956*57 725 868 - 1 4 3
1 9 5 7 - 5 8 774 894 - 1 2 0
1 9 5 8 - 5 9 792 921 - 1 2 9
1 9 5 9 - 6 0 927 949 - 2 2
1960-61 1 , 0 9 0 977 113
1 961 -62 900 1 ,0 0 7 - 1 0 7
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 1 , 1 1 0 1 ,0 3 7 73
1 9 6 3 - 6 4 1 , 1 5 0 1 , 0 6 8 82
S o u r c e  o f Column 1 : I m p o r t s  d u r i n g  1 9 5 9 - 6 0  x i n d e x  o f volume f o r  y e a r
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While it ie unlikely that imports are such a simple function
%
of gross national product as the foregoing analysis implies, the 
figures shown in column (3) of the table are probably of sufficient 
accuracy to warrant the following conclusions :
i) During the excessive importing of 1951 and early 1952 stocks 
were built up to such an extent that the nominally severe restric­
tions of 1952 and 1953 can have imposed very little constraint on 
the level of economic activity.
ii) The 1954 relaxations enabled importers to obtain all their 
importing requirements for current usage (but not, obviously, for 
stock-piling against the possibility of more severe restrictions in 
the future.
iii) When it became necessary to intensify the restrictions in 
1955, the economy did not have the stocks to act as a buffer. 
Because of the time-lag before the new restrictions came into 
effect, those restrictions did not limit the level of economic 
activity substantially before 1956-57. Nonetheless, it was imme­
diately plain that they would eventually do so, and this fact no 
doubt accounts for the great increase in trafficking in 1955.
iv) It was during the three years starting 1956-57 that the main 
impact of the restrictions was felt by the economy. During that 
period imports were restricted by between £350 million and £400
million.
Chapter 11
EFFECT OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS UPON PRICES 
AND PROFITS
Inflationary pressure works in two ways to exacerbate a 
balance of payments crisis s
i) it is likely to be resolved by an immediate spill-over into 
imports;
ii) it makes exports less competitive in the international 
market and domestica lly produced goods less competitive in the 
domestic market.
Reside these two factors its effect on profits is relatively unimportant, 
but there is a case on social grounds against the government's increasing 
importers' profits by quantitative restrictions and allowing manufacturers 
to increase their profits when competition from imports is decreased.
The imposition of quantitative restrictions prevents the 
spill-over into imports, but the resulting increase in inflationary 
pressure makes it even more difficult to prevent a deterioration in the 
relative cost structure. There is, furthermore, a danger that the 
importing industry will be frozen.
As quantitative restrictions are generally administered only
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f i r m s  a l r e a d y  i n  the  b u s i n e s s  may o b t a i n  l i c e n c e s  t o  im por t  goods  in  
th e  q u o t a  c a t e g o r i e s .  There i s  no n e c e s s a r y  r e a s o n  why the  p a t t e r n  of  
i m p o r t i n g  goods in  th e  " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ” c a t e g o r y  s h o u ld  be f r o z e n ,  
b u t  t h e r e  i s  a  dan g e r  t h a t  o f f i c i a l  b i a s  w i l l  f r e e z e  i t .  In d e c i d i n g  
which of  a number of  com pet ing  f i r m s  s h o u ld  be g r a n t e d  a c e r t a i n  
l i c e n c e *  th e  l i c e n s i n g  o f f i c e r  has  t o  t r y  to  d e c i d e  which i s  the  most 
e f f i c i e n t ,  and he may w e l l b e  b i a s e d  (even  s u b - c o n s c i o u s l y )  tow ards  
f i r m s  a l r e a d y  in  e x i s t e n c e ,  and in  p a r t i c u l a r  tow ards  th e  l a r g e r  and 
conseq  u e n t l y  b e t t e r  known f i r m s ,  f i r m s  which have ’’p roved  t h e m s e l v e s ” .
With th e  f r e e z i n g  of  th e  im p o r t  t r a d e ,  i t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e ,  in  
i n d u s t r i e s  which  depend upon im p o r te d  raw o i a t e r i a l s ,  f o r  new f i r m s  to  
e n t e r  the  b u s i n e s s  and f o r  e x i s t i n g  f i r m s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  s h a r e  of  
t h e  m a rk e t .  Hence e x i s t i n g  f i r m s  have l e s s  i n c e n t i v e  t o  remain  
e f f i c i e n t .  For s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  may l e a d  t o  a r i s e  in  
p r i c e s  :
i )  i m p o r t e r s  g r a n t e d  l i c e n c e s  to  im p o r t  may add t o  t h e i r  own 
mark-up ;
i i )  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  may add t o  t h e i r  own mark-up  beca u se  of 
l e s s e n e d  c o m p e t i t i o n  ;
i i i )  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  may add t o  t h e i r  p r i c e s  in  an e f f o r t  to  
m a i n t a i n  p r o f i t s  in  th e  f a c e  of  r e d u c e d  e f f i c i e n c y ;
i v )  c o s t s  of  p r o d u c t i o n  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  i f  f i r m s  p ro d u c in g  goods 
which  r e p l a c e  im p o r t s  work more o v e r t i m e .
For  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  t h e  economic h i s t o r y  of  A u s t r a l i a  
d u r i n g  the  n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  to  e v a l u a t e  the  e f f e c t  of  
eac h  of  t h e s e  f a c t o r s .  I t  would n e v e r t h e l e s s  be e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t
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to get direct evidence of them. Price increases can easily be masked 
by differences in quality which are difficult to detect except in a 
thorough and detailed contemporary statistical investigation into 
production. But the available economic statistics are insufficient 
for this purpose s statistics of production are compiled from figures 
reported by manufacturers ; there was, und still is, no index of 
productivity ; the only index of production for the early years of 
quantitative restrictions was of liaiited scope ; there still is no 
official index of production; very little information is available 
on hours worked. Firms do not publicise their pricing policies or 
their efficiency. The small amount of information on efficiency that 
is publicly available is to be found in the reports by the Tariff 
Board, which has in general found that industries appearing before it
have been reasonably efficient. One suspects, however, that thesev
assessments have been rather superficial, since the Tariff Board 
does not include any persons with technical training.
If we are to get indirect evidence we shall need to know 
whether prices rose during the currency of the quantitative restric­
tions to an extent greater than was warranted by the increase in import 
prices, and if they did whether the price increases were due to any of 
the above-mentioned factors, or whether they were forced upon manu­
facturers by other factors, such as decisions and repercussions of 
decisions handed down by the arbitral authorities.
Over the period 1951—52 to 1953—54 prices of domestic goods,
both wholesale and retail, continued to rise while the price of imported
former was the
goods fell, but it is not clear how much of the f?Kjt££xffi*4txwfta result of 
unresolved earlier inflationary pressure. Between 1953 and 1960 domestic
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prices rose faster than import prices, but price indexes published by 
the Commonwealth Statistician do not enable us to determine how this 
rise was spread among various industries, nor what pricing policies 
were adopted by firms during the currency of the restrictions.
A considerable amount could be done by the Statistician 
from an examination of individual factory returns, but at this lapse 
of time it is unlikely that the Statistician would consider it justified 
to spare the resources that such a task would require. Failing this 
examination, it is possible for us to draw rough conclusions on the 
basis of the broad factory classes which the Statistician has published 
and the production indexes of the Australia and New Zealand Bank.
The A.N.Z. Bank production indexes were first compiled on the 
base 1948-49 = 100 from 1948-49 until 1956-57, and from then until 
recently were compiled on a revised and considerably extended basis on 
a base 1953-54 = 100. (This revised basis has since been superseded by 
a second revisiou on the base 1958-59 * 100.)
Since the revised series is available only from 1953—54 it is 
necessary for us to use the first index for the early part of the period 
in which we are interested. Unfortunately, no table of weights is 
available for this index to relate it completely to the Statistician’s 
production figures in Secondary Industries, nor does the A.N.Z. Bank 
think that one can be reconstructed satisfactorily * • It has therefore 
been necessary for the writer to reconstruct one to the extent permitted 
by explanations of the index supplied in contemporary issues of
Letter of 20th May 1964 from the Assistant Chief Economist of the 
Australia and New Zealand Bank to the writer.
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Quarterly Survey. The basis of the figures used for this computation 
and the figures used are set out in Appendix 4 on page 193. Because 
of the large margin of error which this procedure leaves, the results 
must be interpreted with considerable reserve.
Price indexes for each industry were computed according to 
the formula :
_ . T , Value of production Year.Price Index _______________________________ *_______________ l__________ _
Year i Value of production 1948-49 x Value of production Year^
The price indexes so computed for the period 1949-50 to 1953-54 are set 
out on page 140.
Certainly this was a period of rapid increases in prices and 
costs s the Consumer Price index rose by about 65^ and the Wholesale 
Price index by about 77^. With allowance of a margin for error, it 
seems fair to say that most prices do not seem to have fluctuated very 
widely from these averages for all industries. Of the price indexes 
computed, only that for non-ferrous metals fluctuates violently; this 
index is almost certainly wrong.
Most prices seem to have risen slightly between 1951-52 and 
1952-53. There is very little evidence of price increases between 1952—53 
and 1953—54. It seems probable that immediately after the restrictions 
were imposed prices for iron and steel, motor vehicles and machinery, 
textiles and clothing even fell slightly. Of the prices charged by 
the other industries only those for dairy products and cereal milling 
rose appreciably, ’eat canning and curing regained its higher prices 
after a (rather suspect) fall in 1952-53.
For the later years of quantitative restrictions the writer
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INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRICES
ä .N.Z. Bank Industrial Classification
(1948-49 = 100)
1 9 4 9 -5 0 1950-51 1951 -52 1 952 -53 1 9 5 3 -5 4
Building Materials 112 128 153 164 164
Timber 116 144 178 189 198
Iron and Steel 104 114 132 149 132
Non-ferrous Metals 107 146 172 113 97
Motor Vehicles 119 118 140 150 136
Household Machinery 103 113 147 168 140
Industrial Machinery 119 139 176 288 260
Woollen Textiles 128 147 167 203 201
Cotton Textiles 111 126 156 164 174
Rayon Textiles 105 116 126 114 113
Clothing n o 125 141 142 133
Dairy Products 104 141 187 192 219
Cereal Milling 114 128 166 184 215
Fruit and Vegetable 104 137 154 179 184Canning
Meat Canning and 111 109 134 125 154Curing
Breweries 105 106 120 126 132
Tobacco 98 118 120 150 160
Chemicals and Chemical 149 176 177 196Fertilisers
Paint 106 116 130 165 153
Soap 106 102 95 140 150
Rubber 106 128 154 208 160
Leather 107 129 151 150 170
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was able to reallocate figures supplied in Secondary Industries in 
accordance with the A.N.Z. Bank’s industrial classification for the 
revised index. Price indexes for each industry were computed according 
to the formula:
. Va lue of production Year.Price index v . v l
s — ■— — — - — ■— - * ~~ ■>— — ■ ■■■—*« — ' ■- ■■■■■ ■Yo 6tri Value of production 1953-54 x Value of production Year^
The price indexes so computed for the period 1954-55 to 1962-63 are set 
out on page 142.
We are interested to know the answers to two questions in 
particular: whether firms raised their prices about 1956, when the
q uantitative restrictions were at their most severe, and whether firms 
were forced to reduce their prices about 1959 and 1960, as the 
restrictions were progressively relaxed. If we exclude several industries 
in which prices seem to have fluctuated, this seems to have been t <' 
clearly true of only one industry, basic metals, which raiggd its 
prices by about 45$ over the two years 1954-55 to 1956—57, and dropped 
them again by about 9$ in 1961—62. A similar movement is spread over a 
much longer period in the chemical fertilisers industry : prices rose
by 10$ until 1957-58 and thereafter fell by about 18$.
2Of the other industries, ten seem to have raised their 
prices by 50,4 or more over a period during which the Consumer Price
index rose by 22$ and the Wholesale Price index by only 6^$. One
2 Non-metallic minerals 62$ Fats & oils 61$
Timber & board 53$ Tobacco 80$
Household appliances, 92$ Basic chemicals 74$electric Plastic mouldings 92$
Rayon textiles 70$ Leather 60$
Meat & fish 64$
142
INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRICES 
A.N.Z. Bank Industrial Classification
54-55 55-56 56-57 57-58 58-59 59-60
(1953-54 = 
60-61 61-62
100)
62-63
Basic Metals 116 139 159 153 152 155 165 150 150
Ind. & Ag. Mach, 109 114 117 125 123 133 134 135 139
Elect, Apparatus 98 96 102 98 101 105 113 122 122
Motor Vehicles 87 92 103 99 98 90 92 99 86
Other Transport 95 102 95 113 107 117 114 109 109
Non-metal1ic Min, 104 114 122 124 129 138 146 156 162
Structural Metals 102 72 86 100 87 123 138 98 115
Timber & Board 112 116 121 129 129 140 149 158 153
Building Fittings 99 104 110 113 111 118 126 126 123
Furniture 100 104 113 108 105 no 114 111 109
H*hold App,, Elec. 106 129 160 164 154 161 176 178 192
Radio, etc. 107 106 63 52 54 52 58 60 65
H*hold App,Non-el. 100 94 70 77 56 58 67 62 65
Woollen Textiles 100 109 106 102 113 108 112 108 108
Cotton Textiles 99 97 103 108 105 111 no 109 114
Rayon Textiles 94 82 98 85 117 148 152 170 170
Underwear 98 104 101 96 100 97 97 104 100
Outerwear 110 113 122 125 127 122 124 135 130
Footwear 104 109 108 108 104 104 116 116 115
Dairy Produce 92 101 108 116 120 132 134 136 135
Cereal Milling 97 99 114 131 134 140 136 141 149
Bakery, etc. 103 107 113 113 116 121 128 134 141
Fruit & Veg. 104 106 110 110 117 118 128 115 133
Meat & Fish 110 124 130 117 116 118 146 158 164
Fats & Oils 99 111 118 124 118 118 127 149 101
Alcoholic Bev. 104 102 109 117 119 129 128 134 137
Non-alcoholic 3ev,,104 105 112 116 124 130 123 125 135
Tobacco 110 100 112 109 129 154 158 174 180
Basic Chemicals 110 117 130 134 145 158 165 179 174
Chemical Fert. 95 104 104 110 104 97 99 98 90
Paints, Varnishes 100 103 110 112 108 114 123 122 127
Soaps 99 108 120 117 127 133 137 134 134
Plastic Mouldings 93 54 49 114 121 116 159 156 192
Leather 106 109 110 112 128 141 148 150 160
Paper 95 94 96 102 98 102 108 118 108
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other industry raised its prices by just under 50% •
The statistics in Secondary Industries do not enable us to 
determine how firms spent their funds other than on power, materials, 
wages and salaries. Hence the only profit figures which can be computed 
from the statistics given are gross profits, and these figures are shown 
for the thirteen groups mentioned above as percentages of the value of 
output for the period 1950-51 to 1960-Ö1 on the table on page 144. In 
the calculation of the figures for several groups in this table it has 
been necessary to impute figures for the costs of labour, power and 
materials in the industrial classification used by the A.N.Z. Bank.
This has been done on the assumption that these costs can be allocated 
to the A.N.Z. Bank’s groups in the same proportions as are the figures 
for the value of production, (in the A.N.Z. Bank's index some of the
Statistician•*, figures are redistributed to two or more of the bank’s 
groups in accordance with more or less arbitrarily determined 
percentages•) The formula used for this calculation was;
Wages and salaries ofGross profit Value of production —
as percentage = _______________________
of output
non-managerial staff, etc
Value of production + Po"er> fuel, lubricant.,matenals
For a wider industrial spcead sisilar figures have been calculated for 
the totals of the Statistician’s 15 major groips, and these percentages 
are shown in the table on page 145.
Summary
There is no doubt that whereas gross profit ratios were 
relatively stable during the inflation of 1948 - 1951 , there has been
 ^ Cereal milling 49^
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GROSS PROFITS AS PERCENTAGE OF VALUE OF QU PPU'T
Mine and quarry products 
Bricks, pottery, glass 
Chemicals, etc•
Industrial metals, etc. 
Precious metals, jewellery 
Textiles and textile goods 
Skins and Leather 
Clothing (Except knitted) 
Food, drink, tobacco 
Sawmills, joinery etc. 
Furniture of wood 
Paper,stationery, printing 
Rubber
Musical instruments 
Miscellaneous products
4 7 / 4 8 4 8 / 4 9 4 9 / 5 0
2 2 . 7 2 0 . 9 2 1 .1
23-1 20.1 2 2 - 7
2 3 - 6 23*2 2 5 - 0
2 0 . 8 2 0 - 7 2 1 . 6
21 .8 2 3 - 3 2 5 .1
2 0 - 4 1 7-0 17-1
13-7 13-0 14*4
2 0 . 3 19*6 2 0 . 3
15-7 15-1 1 4 .9
2 0 .1 19-7 2 0 . 9
2 0 . 7 2 0 - 3 21 .7
25*6 2 5 - 9 27-1
16*5 15*5 1 5 - 9
2 3 - 0 2 1 . 0 16 - 7
27-1 2 4 - 6 24-1
50 /51 5 1 / 5 2 5 2 / 5 3 5 3 / 5 4
2 0 . 3 1 8 .5 1 7 - 8 19*6
22 .1 2 0 - 9 23-1 2 3 - 8
2 5 . 2 2 3 - 3 2 5 .1 2 7 . 4
21 -0 2 0 . 3 2 0 . 5 20 .1
2 6 . 0 2 7 - 3 2 8 . 7 2 8 . 7
1 5 - 4 14-4 1 9 - 4 19-1
14-9 1 1-3 1 4 . 3 1 2 .9
19-8 1 9-0 2 0 . 8 2 0 . 3
15 -0 14*6 14 -9 15-1
21 -2 20 .1 2 0 . 3 2 0 . 7
2 0 . 9 20 .1 2 1 . 8 21 .7
2 7 - 4 2 4 - 4 2 5 . 8 2 6 - 9
13-9 16.1 21 -9
2 0 . 8
2 8 . 0 25 -5 2 7 - 0 26 -5
2 5 . 3 2 2 .1 24*4 25*6
5 4 / 5 5 5 5 / 5 6 5 6 / 5 7 57/58
2 0 . 6 2 0 - 9 22 • 3; b - 9
2 5 - 9 2 4 - 5 2 4 . 7 25-8
26 .1 2 6 . 2 2 5 - 8 7 5 .3
19 -8 2 0 . 0 2 1 . 6 2 2 . 0
2 8 . 0 2 9 - 7 2 6 . 2 3 0 .0
19 -5 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 3 19-8
13-7 14*6 1 2 . 3 13-5
2 1 . 0 21 .6 2 1 . 7 ?2*3
15-1 1 5 - 4 1 6 .3 17-0
21 .2 2 0 . 8 21 .0 21 .6
2 2 . 0 21 . 4 2 2 .5 ? 2 .3
2 7 - 2 2 6 - 6 2 7 - 3 28.5
17- 6 1 8 . 0 21 .1 21 -4
2 4 - 4 2 8 - 3 3 2 . 4 $6-3
2 6 . 6 2 6 . 2 2 7 - 8 27-3
5 8 / 5 9 5 9 / 6 0 60 /61 6 1 / 6 2
24-1 2 5 - 5 2 4 - 8 2 5 . 9
2 7 . 9 2 8 - 3 28*6 2 8 . 8
2 7 . 0 2 8 . 3 2 8 . 9 2 7 - 8
2 2 . 2 2 2 . 3 2 2 . 3 2 2 - 8
3 1 . 7 3 2 . 2 3 2 . 0 31 -7
2 2 . 7 2 1 . 5 2 2 . 0 2 1 . 8
1 6 . 4 1 4 .8 1 5 - 2 15 -7
2 3 - 0 2 2 . 8 2 3 .1 2 4 - 2
1 7 . 0 18.1 1 8 . 3 19*4
2 2 . 3 2 2 . 8 2 2 . 6 2 2 - 3
2 2 . 9 2 2 . 9 2 2 - 9 2 3 - 3
2 8 . 9 2 9 - 2 - 2 8 . 9 3 0 . 3
2 3 - 2 1 8 .8 2 1 . 8 24-1
3 8 . 4 3 8 . 3 4 1 . 7 4 3 - 5
2 8 . 6 2 7 - 2 2 7 . 2 2 8 - 5
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a s lo w  b u t  g e n e r a l  r i s e  i n  t h e  g r o s s  p r o f i t  r a t i o s  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  
o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  T h i s  h i g h e r  l e v e l  o f  g r o s s  p r o f i t  d i d  
n o t  d e c l i n e  a s  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were e a s e d  t o w a r d s  t h e  end  o f  the  
n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s ,  n o r  h a s  i t  so f a r  shown a t e n d e n c y  t o  d e c l i n e  s i n c e  
t h e  g e n e r a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were a b o l i s h e d .  I t  i s  s p r e a d  o v e r  q u i t e  a  
wide r a n g e  o f  i n d u s t r i e s ,  b u t  h a s  been  p a r t i c u l a r l y  m arked  i n  t h e  
p r e c i o u s  m e t a l s ,  m u s i c a l  i n s t r u m e n t s  and  t o b a c c o  i n d u s t r i e s .  On t h e  
b a s i s  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  s a y  w h e t h e r  
t h e  h i g h e r  g r o s s  p r o f i t s  have gone i n t o  h i g h e r  s a l a r i e s  f o r  m anagem en t ,  
h i g h e r  a d v e r t i s i n g  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  a  more i n t e n s e  c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  
l a r g e r  e x p e n s e  a c c o u n t s  and  p e r q u i s i t e s  o r  h i g h e r  n e t  p r o f i t s .
C h a p t e r  12
EFFECTS OF INCIDENTAL PROTECTION UPON 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Any a r t i f i c i a l  b a r r i e r  on t r a d e  d i v e r t s  r e s o u r c e s  t o  c h a n n e l s  
t o  w h i c h  t h e y  wou ld  n o t  have  gone  o f  t h e i r  own a c c o r d .  The s e l e c t i o n  
o f  r e s o u r c e s  t o  be r e a l l o c a t e d  may be l e f t  t o  t h e  p r i c e  mechan ism  (by 
means o f  d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  g e n e r a l  w a g e - c u t s ,  a u n i f o r m  t a r i f f ) ,  o r  i t  may 
be d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  (by means o f  s e l e c t i v e  t a r i f f s  o r  
q u a  n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s ) .  The d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  s e l e c t i v e ,  a s  op p o s e d  
t o  n o n - s e l e c t i v e , r e s t r i c t i o n s  a s  a  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  h a s  been  t h e  s u b j e c t  
o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e b a t e ,  b u t  i s  r a t h e r  a c a d e m ic  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t .  G r a n t e d  
t h a t  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were t o  be t e m p o r a r y ,  and  t h a t ,  once t h e y  were 
l i f t e d ,  p r o t e c t i o n  would  once a g a i n  be on t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  o f  t h e  
Ta r i f f  B oa rd ,  one wou ld  e x p e c t  g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c y  t o  be a im ed  a t  t h e  
p r e v e n t i o n  o f  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  i n d u s t r i e s  w h ic h  would n o t  l a t e r  be 
a b l e  t o  c o n v i n c e  t h e  T a r i f f  B o a r d  t h a t  t h e y  d e s e r v e d  p r o t e c t i o n .
Q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  may a l t e r  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
g r o w t h  i n  two ways : t h e y  may d i v e r t  r e s o u r c e s  i n t o  '’u n e c o n o m i c ” p r o t e c t e d
i n d u s t r i e s  ( i n  t h e  T a r i f f  B o a r d  s e n s e ) ,  and  t h e y  may d i v e r t  r e s o u r c e s  
a F a y  f r o m  e c o n o m ic  i n d u s t r i e s  d e p e n d e n t  upon i m p o r t s  o f  e q u i p m e n t  o r
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m a t e r i a l s .
The l a t t e r  seems t o  have  been  o f  l i t t l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  in  
A u s t r a l i a ,  s i n c e  a t  no s t a g e  were t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  so s e v e r e  t h a t  an 
i n d u s t r y  c o u l d  n o t  g e t  i m p o r t s  o f  e q u i p m e n t  and m a t e r i a l s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  
i t  t o  c a r r y  on .  I t  i s  t o  t h e  f o r m e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  we must  pay* ou r  
a t t e n t i o n #
When r e s t r i c t i o n s  were  i n t e n s i f i e d  i n  March 1952 t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  was c a r e f u l  t o  e m p h a s i s e  t h e i r  t e m p o r a r y  n a t u r e .  F o r  a  
number o f  r e a s o n s  ( s h o r t - s i g h t e d n e s s ,  c y n i c i s m  a b o u t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  
good  i n t e n t i o n s ,  b e c a u s e  t h e y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  would  be 
p e r m a n e n t  * ) b u s i n e s s m e n  uiay have  t e n d e d  t o  d i s r e g a r d  t h i s  w a r n i n g  and 
t o  e s t a b l i s h  une c onom ic  i n d u s t r i e s .  They may have  hoped  t h a t  t h e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  would  l a s t  l o n g  e nough  f o r  une c o n o m ic  i n d u s t r i e s  t o  
become e s t a b l i s h e d ,  f e e l i n g  c e r t a i n  t h a t  any  i n d u s t r y  which  managed t o  
become a s i g n i f i c a n t  e m p l o y e r  o f  l a b o u r  would  be i n  a s t r o n g  p o s i t i o n  t o  
e x e r t  p r e s s u r e  on t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  once  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were r em ove d .
Were any s u c h  i n d u s t r i e s  e s t a b l i s h e d ?  To a n s w e r  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  
we m us t  c o n s i d e r  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  and  t h e  T a r i f f  B o a r d ,  
and  a p p l i c a t i o n s  made f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  s i n c e  t h e  i m p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were 
l i f t e d .
G overnm en t  p o l i c y
The p o l i c y  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  been  e n u n c i a t e d  c l e a r l y  on 
a  number o f  o c c a s i o n s  s i n c e  t h e  g e n e r a l  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were 
imposed#  One q u o t a t i o n  s u f f i c e s  t o  show t h e  p o l i c y :
1 F o r  t h i s  b e l i e f  t h e y  c o u l d  q u o t e  l e a d i n g  A u s t r a l i a n  e c o n o m i s t s  a s  
t h e i r  a u t h o r i t i e s  c f .  C h a p t e r  5 ,  page  45#
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" S i n c e  i m p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were f i r s t  im posed  i t  h a s  been  t h e  
p o l i c y  o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  i m p r e s s  upon  p r o d u c e r s  and  
m a n u f a c t u r e r s  t h a t  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were  a p p l i e d  f o r  b a l a n c e  of
p a y m e n t s  r e a s o n s ,  and  t h a t  a n y  i n c i d e n t a  1 p r o t e c t i o n  a f f o r d e d  by 
them  was t e m p o r a r y *  Where p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  an A u s t r a l i a n  i n d u s t r y  i s  
c o n s i d e r e d  n e c e s s a r y ,  i t  i s  p r o v i d e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  c u s to m s  
t a r i f f  a f t e r  a  p u b l i c  i n q u i r y  and r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
by t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  T a r i f f  Boa rd  . * . The g o v e r n m e n t ,  i n  p u b l i c
s t a t e m e n t s ,  h a s  g i v e n  r e p e a t e d  w a r n i n g s  t h a t  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  have 
b e e n  im pose d  s o l e l y  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  r e c t i f y i n g  an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  
b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s  s i t u a t i o n  and  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  be r e l a x e d  and 
e v e n t u a l l y  r em oved  a s  s oon  a s  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  p e r m i t . "  ^
I t  wou ld  be d e s i r a b l e  t o  know how s t r i c t l y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
a d h e r e d  t o  t h i s  p o l i c y .  One m u s t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a l l o w  f o r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  S i n c e  one o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  g r a n t  
o f  a l i c e n c e  i n  t h e  " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e "  c a t e g o r y  was t h a t  a  s i m i l a r  
a r t i c l e  s h o u l d  n o t  be a v a i l a b l e  i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  i t  m us t  have  been  r a t h e r  
d i f f i c u l t  i n  many i n s t a n c e s  f o r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  h a n d l e  b o r d e r - l i n e  
c a s e s ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  i t  a d d e d  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  q u a l i t y  and  p r i c e  
be r e a s o n a b l y  c o m p e t i t i v e .
But i f  a  c e r t a i n  amount  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  was u n a v o i d a b l e ,  i t  
m u s t  have  b e e n  much e a s i e r  f o r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  d e l i b e r a t e l y  p r o t e c t  
an i n d u s t r y  i f  i t  w i shed*  E v i d e n c e  on t h i s  p o i n t  i s  p r o b a b l y  i m p o s s i b l e  
t o  p r o c u r e ,  s i n c e  any  c a s e  a b o u t  w h ic h  t h e  f a c t s  c o u l d  be p r o v e d  c o u l d
2 The D e p a r t m e n t  o f  T r a d e ,  "The A u s t r a l i a n  I m p o r t  L i c e n s i n g  S y s t e m " ,  
s t a t e m e n t  p r e p a r e d  f o r  C r .A .T .T . ,  page 12.
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probably be explained either as a mistake in judgement or as an 
example of unpalatable decisions forced upon the government by the 
existence of import ceilings. Nonetheless, one is tempted to suspect 
that the government did engage in deliberate protection, even if only
to a minor extent, since the latest statements of government policy
have been/
unreservedly protectionist. Introducing the Tariff Board Bill 
(No 2) 1962 into the House of Representatives, Mr McEwen said :
"It is the governments intention that protection shall be 
effective. It is this governments policy that so long as an industry 
remains economic and efficient it has an assurance that where 
necessary it will receive protection . . .  we must look to 
manufacturing industry as a principal source of increased 
employment."
When the general restrictions were lifted in February 1960, 
the government retained certain quantitative restrictions, and reimposed 
certain others shortly afterwards, to protect industries threatened by
4imports. Later in the year, the government amended the Tariff Board Act
to provide that a Deputy Chairman of the Tariff Board might inquire
whether urgent action was necessary to protect an industry which had
applied to the Tariff Board for protection. If a Deputy Chairman found
that urgent action was necessary, he might recommend the imposition of 
temporary
a/higher customs tariff pending the result of an inquiry by the Tariff 
Board. The higher duty might continue until three months after the 
government received the Tariff Board’s report into the industry, 
q Parliamentary Debates. 17th October 1962, pages 1600 - 1601.
4 By the Tariff Board Act 1960
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In  A p r i l  1962 t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a g a i n  amended t h e  T a r i f f  Boa rd  
A c t  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  " s p e c i a l  a d v i s o r y  a u t h o r i t i e s "  
who a l s o  m ig h t  recommend t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  a  t e m p o r a r y  h i g h e r  c u s to m s  
t a r i f f  p e n d i n g  an i n q u i r y  by t h e  T a r i f f  B o a r d ,  b u t  who, i f  t h e y  c o n s i d ­
e r e d  t h a t  h i g h e r  c u s to m s  t a r i f f s  a l o n e  would  be i n e f f e c t i v e  o r  f o r  any  
o t h e r  r e a s o n  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  m i g h t  a l s o  recommend p r o t e c t i o n  by 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o r  by a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  and  h i g h e r  c u s t o m s  t a r i f f s .  Each  i n d i v i d u a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
r e q u i r e d  was a d d r e s s e d  p e r s o n a l l y  by t h e  M i n i s t e r  f o r  T radd  t o  a  named 
" s p e c i a l  a d v i s o r y  a u t h o r i t y " .  Most i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  were made by S i r  
F r a n k  M eere ,  a f o r m e r  C o m p t r o l l e r - G e n e r a l  o f  C u s to m s ,  b u t  a  s m a l l  
number  have  been  made by two D epu ty  C ha i rm en  o f  t h e  T a r i f f  B o a r d ,
M e s s r s  V.A.  C l a r k  a nd  H . F . B .  Heyes*
A t h i r d  i m p o r t a n t  amendment  t o  t h e  T a r i f f  Board  A c t  was 
i n t r o d u c e d  i n t o  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  O c t o b e r  1962* By t h e  
T a r i f f  Boa rd  A c t  (No 2 )  1962 t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n s e r t e d  a  new s u b - s e c t i o n  
t o  g i v e  t h e  T a r i f f  Boa rd  a u t h o r i t y  t o  recommend q u a n t i t a t i v e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  f o r  a  s p e c i f i e d  t i m e .
T a r i f f  Board  Annua l  R e p o r t s
In  i t s  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  f o r  1952—5 3 ,  t h e  f i r s t  f u l l  f i n a n c i a l  
y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  t h e  T a r i f f
g
B oa rd  m e n t i o n e d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  i n c i d e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n ,  and s a i d
t h a t  n o t h i n g  i n  t h e  e v i d e n c e  p l a c e d  b e f o r e  i t  d u r i n g  t h e  y e a r  s u p p o r t e d
t h e  v iew  t h a t  a f l o o d  o f  i m p o r t s  would  e x t i n g u i s h  l o c a l  i n d u s t r i e s  when
^ By t h e  T a r i f f  Boa rd  A c t  1962
g T a r i f f  B o a r d ,  Annual  R e p o r t  f o r  Y ea r  1 9 5 2 - 5 3 , p a r a g r a p h  16.
Aomiarix ^ tevporrix *>fx xbbex \  ^ o rx  xlS9h5&w&8?yt ya?ru?grxfl$Jh\
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t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were r e m o v e d .
S h o r t l y  b e f o r e  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were l i f t e d ,  i n  i t s  a n n u a l  
7
r e p o r t  f o r  19 5 8 -5 9  , t h e  T a r i f f  Boa rd  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  i t s  i n q u i r i e s
" p r o v i d e d  no a p p a r e n t  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  
a f f o r d e d  by i m p o r t  l i c e n s i n g  had  f o s t e r e d  u n e c o n o m ic  g r o w t h  in  
i n d u s t r y  g e n e r a  l l y " .  The r e p o r t  c o n t a i n e d  n o t h i n g  t o  e x p l a i n  
" g e n e r a l l y " .
Two y e a r s  l a t e r  t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  a m p l i f i e d  t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n  
t h a t  t h e  1 9 58 -59  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  seemed t o  im p ly  :
" I n  g e n e r a l  t h e  B o a r d  f o u n d  t h a t  m os t  i n d u s t r i e s  a p p e a r i n g  
b e f o r e  i t  were  w o r t h y  o f  p r o t e c t i o n .  However ,  i n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s  t h e  
B o a r d  r e f u s e d  t o  recommend p r o t e c t i v e  d u t i e s  f o r  i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t
g
had  d e v e l o p e d  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  i m p o r t  l i c e n s i n g . "
9
A s i m i l a r  p a r a g r a p h  a p p e a r s  i n  t h e  1 961 -62  r e p o r t  :
"As i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  t h e  B o a r d  n o t e d  s e v e r a l  i n d u s t r i e s  
w h i c h ,  h a v i n g  commenced p r o d u c t i o n  b e h i n d  t h e  s h e l t e r  o f  i m p o r t  
l i c e n s i n g  o r  h a v i n g  e x p a n d e d  i n t o  u n p r o f i t a b l e  a r e a s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  
were  u n a b l e  t o  compete  w i t h  i m p o r t s  w i t h  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  o f  a 
r e a s o n a b l e  l e v e l  o f  p r o t e c t i o n . "
The a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  do n o t  s p e c i f y  t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  w h ic h  t h e  
T a r i f f  B o a rd  had  i n  m ind ,  a nd  one can  o n l y  c o n s i d e r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
i n d u s t r i e s  whose r e q u e s t s  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  were r e f u s e d .  The most  
l i k e l y  seem t o  be i
i T a r i f f B o a rd , Annual R e p o r t f  o r Y ea r 1 9 5 8 - 5 9 , p a r a g r a p h 6 .
8 T a r i f f B o a r d , Annual R e p o r t f  o r Y e a r 1 9 6 0 - 6 1 , p a r a g r a p h 4 1 .
9
T a r i f f B o a r d , Annua l R e p o r t f o r Y e a r 1 9 6 1 - 6 2 , p a r a g r a p h 4 5 .
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Metal-working milling machines (Tariff Board report of the 28th June 
I960)
The request was made by Vickers-Ruwolt Pty Ltd, which had in 
1955 signed an agreement with a German firm to manufacture under 
licence. The request was rejected because of the high cost of 
prote ction.
Roll-fim box-type cameras (Tariff Board report of the 29th June I960)
The main applicant was Hanimex Pty Ltd, which started 
production in 1957-58. Fotek Corp. Pty Ltd also applied for protection, 
but Kodak (A/asia) Pty Ltd did not. The request was rejected because of 
the high cost of protection.
Internal combustion engines and parts therefor (Tariff Board report 
of the 29th June I960)
The main applicant, B.M.C. Corp. Aust., began the local 
manufact ire of engines in 1956. It was supported by a number of other 
companies, including International Harvester Co. The application was 
opposed by G.M.H., Ford, Chrysler and Volkswagen. The minimum level 
of economic production of B.M.C. engines was 40,000 units a year, 
i.e. more than double the 1959 registrations of B.M.C. vehicles 
containing these engines. Rejecting the application, the Tariff Board 
said that a duty would not increase demand for B.M.C. engines, but 
could possibly induce other manufacturers to begin uneconomic 
uianuf acture.
Photographic Exposure meters (Tariff Board report of the 14th November 
1960)
The main applicant was Fotek Corp. Pty Ltd, which began
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manufacture in May 1958. Paton Electrical Pty Ltd supported the 
application.
Vitamin C (Ascorbic acid) (Tariff Board report of the 9th December I960) 
The applicant was C.S.R. Chemicals Pty Ltd. The production and 
consumption was small before 1952, but rose rapidly thereafter. The 
request was rejected because of the high cost of protection.
Tinsmen’s snips and shears (Tariff Board report of the 16th March 1961) 
The applicant was Litchfield Engineering k > Ltd, which began 
production of snips and shears in March 1958. because of traddsmen's 
preferences for well-known overseas brands, the firm had obtained only a 
small part of the market.
Styli for sound playback equipment (Tariff Board report of the 30th 
June 1961)
The request was made by Ernest Kuenzli Pty Ltd, which had been 
in production since 1946. The Tariff Board thought that there was scope 
for reducing costs, but that even with assistance the company could not 
increase its output in the immediate future beyond the 1959-60 level. 
Spirit Levels (Tariff Board report of the 11th September 196l)
The applicant, and sole manufacturer in Austhalia, was Varino, 
founded in 1953 after several previous manufacturers had gone out of 
business. On page 7 of its report the Tariff Board said :
’’After eight years of operations and incidental protection from 
import licensing controls, the local firm appears to have made no 
headway over the padt four years. In fact the general trend in its 
sales had been downward during the last four years."
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Musical Instruments of the Lute class (Tariff Board report of the 
8th November 1^61)
The applicant was Maton pty Ltd, Imports supplied a section 
of the market for which Maton had never catered. On page 9 of its 
report the Tariff Board said :
•'Guitar manufacture in Australia developed under the incidental 
protection of import licensing,"
Pentobarbitone sodium (Tariff Board report of the 17th October 1962)
The sole manufacturer in Australia was Abbott Laboratories.
On page 5 of its report the Tariff Board said :
"Abbott Laboratories produced pentobarbitone sodium • , •
between May 1960 and October 1961. Production was planned under 
what the company described as the Unintentional but effective 
protection of import controls*."
On the whole, the industries mentioned in the foregoing list 
are minor, both in terms of capital and employment. Only the application 
by B.M.C, Corp, Aust. for protection for parts in internal combustion 
engines concerns a major industry. B,M.C. had started production of 
this line in 1956.
It is not possible to draw any firm conclusions from this 
list. On the one hand, it is not possible to separate inefficient 
industries established because of the protection afforded by quantitative 
restrictions from those whose establishment resulted simply from errors 
of judgement. On the other, it may well be that the Tariff Board has 
given applicants the benefit of the doubt, and that the number of
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uneconomic industries established because of the protection afforded by 
quantitative restrictions was in fact much greater than the number of 
industries mentioned in the foregoing list.
Applications for urgent protection
In all Deputy Chairmen of the Tariff Board reviewed 35 
industries * They recommended urgent action to protect all except 
those marked with an asterisk in the footnote.
The industries were :
Chemicals Textiles
Industrial nitrocellulose 
Nitrogenous fertilisers 
Polyethylene 
Chloropicrin
Styrene polymers and copolymers 
Penicillin and streptomycin 
♦ftlycerine
Industrial metals, machines
Electrically operated clocks 
Copper strip and copper alloy 
strip
Cutlery
Automotive electrical equipment 
Certain internal combustion 
engine s 
Road wheels 
Taximeters 
Electric shavers 
Capacitors
♦Domestic knitting macnines 
Musical Instruments
Furnishing fabrics and ruoqufcttes 
Piece-goods »f wool or containing wool 
Man-made fibre piece-goods 
Weftless narrow fabric of man-made 
fibres
Fibre-glass textile materials 
♦Flax canvas 
♦Pile floor coverings 
♦Acrylic Yarn 
♦Textile handkerchiefs
Food, Drink, Tobacco
Edible gelatine 
Glucose
Peanut oils and sub—oils 
♦Poultry
Paper, Stationery
Paper and paperboards 
Bail-point pens 
Fine paper 
Paper cones
♦Guitars
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Up t o  t h e  end  o f  May 1964 t h e  S p e c i a l  A d v i s o r y  A u t h o r i t i e s  
had  r e p o r t e d  on 46 i n d u s t r i e s * *  . They recommended t h e  r e i m p o s i t i o n  
o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p e n i c i l l i n  and s t r e p t o m y c i n  and on 
t i m b e r .  No r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  was made on t r i c h l o r e t h y l e n e  s i n c e  t h e  
T a r i f f  B oa rd  had  a l r e a d y  r e p o r t e d  on t h a t  c h e m i c a l .  The re  was no
11 The i n d u s t r i e s  were :
B r i c k s ,  P o t t e r y ,  G l a s s T e x t i l e s
G l a z e d  c e r a m i c  t i l e s  
G l a s s w a r e
C h e m i c a l s
P .V .C *  R e s i n s  
P h t h a l i c  a n h y d r i d e  
W e e d i c i d e s  and  i n s e c t i c i d e s  
S y n t h e t i c  r u b b e r  
P o l y v i n y l  c h l o r i d e  p r o d u c t s  
T r i c h l o r e t h y l e n e  
P e n i c i l l i n  and  S t r e p t o m y c i n  
2 , 4 , 5 —T r i c h l o r o p h e n o x y a c e t i c  
a c i d
V i n y l  a c e t a t e  monomer
P o l y e t h y l e n e
P h t h a l a t e
S y n t h e t i c  o r g a n i c  p i g m e n t s  
I n d u s t r i a l  m e t a l s ,  m a c h i n e s
E n g i n e  b e a r i n g s  
S l i d e  v i e w e r s  and p r o j e c t o r s  
A u t o m o t i v e  e l e c t r i c a l  c o m p o n e n t s  
A i r - c o o l e d  i n t e r n a l  c o m b u s t i o n  
e n g i n e s
C o m p r e s s o r s  and  a l l i e d  e q u i p m e n t  
f o r  u s e  in  r e f r i g e r a t i o n  and  
a i r - c o n d i t i o n i n g  
S t e e l  f l a n g e s
T e l e v i s i o n  d e f l e c t i o n  y o k e s  
K n i v e s  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  '’W a t e r l o o "  
b o l s t e r s
A lum in ium  and a lu m in i u m  a l l o y  
w a s t e  and  s c r a p  
E v a p o r a t i v e  a i r - c o o l e r s
T ow els  and  t o w e l l i n g  
H a n d k e r c h i e f  s 
P i l l o w  c a s e s  
B e l t i n g  f a b r i c  
F u r n i s h i n g  f a b r i c s
P r o c e s s e d  p o l y a m id e  and  p o l y e s t e r  y a r n s  
P l a s t i c —c o a t e d  f i b r e - g l a s s  y a r n  
Man-made f i b r e  p i e c e - g o o d s  
C o t t o n  b e d - s h e e t i n g  and  p i l l o w - c a s i n g  
W ool len  p i e c e - g o o d s
S k i n s  and L e a t h e r
Conveyor  b e l t s  and b e l t i n g  
C y c le  s a d d l e s
Food ,  D r i n k ,  Tobacco
O l i v e  o i l  
C h i c o r y  
Canned  f i s h
S a f f l o w e r  s e e d  and  s y o a  be a n  o i l  
C i t r u s  j u i c e s
S a w m i l l s
T imber
P a p e r ,  S t a t i o n e r y
P a p e r ,  p a p e r  b o a r d s ,  p a p e r  f e l t
Mi s e e  1 l a n e o u s
P l a s t i c  b u i l d i n g  s h e e t s  
L i n o l e u m
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urgency in the requests for the protection of linoleum, cirrus juices 
and evaporative air-coolers* On all the other commodities they 
recommended temporary protective duties pending the inquiry of the 
Tariff Board.
Although the reports made by the Special Advisory Authorities 
mention the tariff items under which are imported the goods which they 
are reviewing, it is for various reasons not possible to estimate the 
value by which imports have been reduced since the additional 
restrictions have been imposed s frequently the goods concerned 
constitute only a part of clearances under the items mentioned; in a 
number of instances the tariff classification has been changed recently, 
sometimes as a result of recommendations made by the Special Advisory 
Authorities; a proportion of imports of certain items are allowed 
by-law entry under a separate tariff item. Nor is it possible to 
arrive at a meaningful approximation of this value, so great is the 
range of possible error on certain items.
In the majority of their reports the Special Advisory 
Authorities made no mention of the number of persons or the amount 
of capital employed in the industries being examined.
No clear pattern emerges from the reports made by the 
Special Advisory Authorities and the Deputy Chairmen of the Tariff 
Board. Production of one of the commodities for which protection was 
sought, synthetic rubber, did not begin until after the quantitative 
restrictions had been lifted. The company which manufactures this 
commodity, Australian Synthetic Rubber Co Ltd, started operations in 
October 1961, not expecting to make a profit until its sales reached
full capacity level (at the time of establishment estimated as 1965). 
After the company started operations overseas prices were reduced to a 
level with which the company could not compete.
Several other applications covered goods whose production 
either started or mainly developed during the period of import 
restrictions. Notable among them are applications covering plastics 
and air-cooled internal combustion engines. As the case for protection 
of the latter was based primarily on competition from engines imported 
from the United States of America, the industry is more likely to have 
been established as a result of the dollar than of the general 
quantitative restrictions. Of the chemicals for which protection was 
»ought, most were currently in over-supply throughout the world, and a 
certain number were being dumped in Australia.
On the other hand, a large number of applications concerned 
commodities which had been produced in Australia for many years - 
poultry, timber, paper and paper products, towels, handkerchiefs, 
chicory.
Tariff Board Reports on Individual Industries
Applications for tariff protection have increased sharply
as shown in the
since the general quantitative restrictions were lifted*, TOhte table on 
the following pa^e, bcasxhaaa compiled from information shown in recent 
Tariff Board annual reports.
While reports by the Tariff Board examine industries in far 
greater detail than do the reports of the Deputy Chairmen and the 
Special Advisory Authorities, they do not provide sufficient 
information to permit an estimate of the total number of persons
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"NORMAL" APPLICATIONS FOR TARIFF PROTECTION
Year
References Reports
Signed
Work on
hand at the end 
of the year
Time
lag
(months)
1955-56 24 35 22 12i
1956-57 34 24 35 144
1957-58 51 31 56 12
1958-59 38 50 41 15
1959-60 43 51 33 15
1960-61 59 40 48 10j
1961-62 53 61 45 10%
1962-63 75 54 66 10%
Source: Annual Reports of the Tariff Board
employed, capital used, and the value of production in industries which
have come before the board in any given period. The basic information
is available in many reports, but in many others the evidence is
supplied in confidence. In some hearings the evidence is not given at all
sometime s because the industries cannot themselves determine the
proportions of their resources employed in producing their smaller 
lines. Occasionally, as in the primary industries, the industry itself 
has no idea of the funds employed, and the employment varies widely, 
seasonally, and with climatic conditions. Any indirect estimate made 
from secondary production statistics would be subject to a wide margin 
of error because factories are classified to their main industry.
It would tie desirable, nonetheless, for our understanding of
101
the economic events of the nineteen-fifties, to have estimates of these 
items, but in view of tie work which it would entail no «estimate has been 
made in this paper, and the writer proposes to restrict himself to 
tentative conclusions of a qualitative nature. It seems fair to say 
that the period 1952-1960 did not see the beginning of many industries 
in Australia which were any less competitive than industries already 
existing* The only industries of which this does not seem to have been 
true were industries producing various organic chemicals, but as these 
products are closely associated with the petroleum-refining industry, 
it seems likely that the industries producing them would have been 
established whether quantitative restrictions had existed or not.
Chapter 13
IMPORT REPLACEMENT 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
With the expansion of the economy a certain amount of import 
replacement is more or less inevitable, first because doo.estic import- 
competing industries may become more competitive as the size of the 
market increases, and secondly because with a rising standard of living 
tertiary industry contributes an increasing proportion of the national 
income.
At times of a lasting balance of payments crisis, this process 
is likely to be accelerated as domestic industries gain markets 
previously held by importers. The balance of payments crisis can be 
resolved only by a cut in real expenditure. Whatever the method of 
import restriction used, the cut in real expenditure is unavoidable, 
for the country cannot afford to maintain the same flow of imports nor 
produce as cheaply itself the goods which it is forced to forgo. If 
the cut in real income is brought about by a rise in prices, previously 
uneconomic industries may become competitive; if the cut in real 
expenditure is forced by the creation of empty economic boxes, 
i.9 . by quantitative restrictions, uneconomic industries are enabled to 
grow behind the equivalent of a prohibitive tariff. In either situation
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domestic industries have the opportunity for expansion.
As quantitative restrictions are frequently administered the 
expansion of domestic industry tends to be concentrated in inessential 
industries. It is, therefore, imperative, once it becomes apparent 
that the balance of payments problem may be of long duration, that the 
authorities should make up their minds which industries they wish to 
encourage, and that they should administer the restrictions in such a 
way that undue protection is not given to other, inessential, industries. 
Rather they should try to encourage industries in which the country has 
a comparative advantage, and, if possible, those which areclikely to be 
able to develop and eventually contribute towards the expansion of its 
exports.
These theoretical considerations raise many problems about 
Australia^ economic development during the nineteen-fifties. Were 
any uneconomic industries encouraged? Has encouragement been given to 
the establishment of industries with export potential? Was there any 
import replacement? If so, how much was there, and was it natural or 
was it brought about or encouraged by the existence of quantitative 
restrictions? How has import licensing affected the rate and pattern 
of growth ?
The real growth of the Australian economy in the past 15 
years is shown in the table on page 164 and in the graphs on page 165.
It seems that the rate of growth of the gross national product has 
averaged about 4fo a year and that of the population about 1 a year.
The annual rqte of growth of productivity has therefore been about
2^ . <
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Gross National Product
Gross G.N.P
National Me an per head of
Year Product 
(constant 
prices)
Population
population 
(constant 
prices)
£m. '000 £
1948-49 4,291 7,796 550
1949—50 4,609 8,044 573
1950-51 4,854 8,303 585
1951-52 4,995 8,529 586
1952-53 4,961 8,734 568
1953-54 5,260 8,900 591
1954-55 5,586 9,090 616
1955-56 5,837 9,314 626
1956-57 5,947 9,533 624
1957-58 6,049 9,742 621
1958-59 6,483 9,948 652
1959-60 6,738 10,164 663
1960-61 7,023 10,391 676
1961-62 7,022 10,604 662
1962-63 7,382 10,811 683
Source : Commonwealth Statistician, Demography, Australian National
Accounts : National Income and Expenditure 1948-49 to 1962-63
(Figures for gross national product before 1953-54 have been converted 
to approximate 1959-60 prices by being expanded by the factor 5260/4517. 
Figures since 1953-54 are expressed in 1959-60 prices.)
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Gross National Product
£ million
7 ,0 0 0
6,000
5 ,0 0 0
4 ,0 0 0
48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62
49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
growth of gross national product 1 —  4rjo rate of growth
Gross National Product per head of Population
£
48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62
49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
growth of gross national product per head of population 
1 %f> rate of growth
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The g r a p h s  on page 165 s u g g e s t  t h a t ,  e x c e p t  f o r  a  s l a c k e n i n g  
a t  e a c h  r e c e s s i o n ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  g r o w t h  h a s  been  r e a s o n a b l y  c o n s t a n t  o v e r  
t h e  p a s t  f i f t e e n  y e a r s . ,  i . e .  i t  was much t h e  same d u r i n g  t h e  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a s  d u r i n g  t h e  o t h e r  y e a r s  o f  t h e  p e r i o d .  I t  
d o e s  n o t  seen», t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  had  v e r y  
much e f f e c t  u pon  t h e  r a t e  o f  g r o w t h .
What o f  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  g r o w t h  ? We n o t e  a  marked  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  
t h e  r a t e s  o f  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  and  s e c o n d a r y  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy.  
A g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  h a s  be e n  r i s i n g  a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  a b o u t  3^  a  y e a r  
w h i l e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e m p loym en t  h a s  been  s l o w l y  d e c r e a s i n g .  While  i t  
wou ld  n e e d  t h e  t e c h n i q u e  o f  i n p u t - o u t p u t  a n a l y s i s  t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  f u l l  
r a m i f i c a t i o n s  o f  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  demand f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  in  
A u s t r a l i a ,  i t  seems u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  g r o w t h  h a s  been  g r e a t l y  
a f f e c t e d  by t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s .
By c o n t r a s t ,  t h e r e  h a s  been  a p e r i o d  o f  marked  i n d u s t r i a l  
e x p a n s i o n  i n  A u s t r a l i a  s i n c e  t h e  1 939 -45  w a r .  The r a t e  o f  g r o w t h  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  h a s  b e e n  a b o u t  5 . 6 ^  a y e a r  a n d ,  l i k e  t h e  r a t e  o f  
g r o w t h  o f  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t ,  h a s  be e n  r e m a r k a b l y  c o n s t a n t .  In  
t o t a l  a t  l e a s t ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  seem t o  have  be e n  g r e a t l y  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s .
T h i s  r a p i d  g r o w t h  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  h a s  been  v e r y  
u n e v e n l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  among t h e  d i f f e r e n t  s e c t o r s  o f  i n d u s t r y .  In  t h e  
l e a t h e r  i n d u s t r y  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a p r o n o u n c e d  f a l l  i n  p r o d u c t i o n .  In  a 
number o f  o t h e r s  ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r  T im ber  & b o a r d ,  H o u s e h o l d  e l e c t i i c a l  
a p p l i a n c e s ,  Rayon t e x t i l e s ,  O u t e r w e a r )  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  v e r y  l i t t l e  
e x p a n s i o n .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  many s e c t o r s  o f  i n d u s t r y  have  i n c r e a s e d
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t h e i r  p r o d u c t i o n  by over 100$  in  the l a s t  t e n  y e a r s  •
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t ,  in  t h i s  l a s t - m e n t i o n e d  group  o f  i n d u s t r i e s  
a t  l e a s t ,  t h e r e  must  have been a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  what i s  cornu.only 
r e f e r r e d  to  a s  ' ' import r e p l a c e m e n t " .  But an a t t e m p t  t o  make a 
s t a t i s t i c a l  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  the  e x t e n t  o f  import  r e p l a c e m e n t  i s  made 
d i f f i c u l t  by a l a c k  of  p r e c i s i o n  in  the  c o n c e p t .
The pr imary meaning o f  "import  r e p la c e m e n t "  i s  t h a t  d o m e s t i c  
i n d u s t r i e s  b e g i n  t o  produce com m od i t i e s  which the  market  has p r e v i o u s l y  
i m p o r t e d .  But t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  m e a n in g f u l  o n l y  i f  the  s i z e  o f  the  
market  i s  c o n s t a n t  and i f  the  demand f o r  e ac h  commodity remains  
u nchan ged .  We Oiay e x t e n d  the  term t o  i n c l u d e  the  g a i n i n g  o f  a l a r g e r  
s h a r e  o f  an i n c r e a s i n g  m arket ,  but  the  c o n c e p t  re m ain s  b l u r r e d  u n t i l  we 
d e f i n e  i t  i n r e l a t i o n  to  new p r o d u c t s  (Do we c o n s i d e r  i t  import  
r e p l a c e m e n t  i f  annew i n d u s t r y  pr od u c e s  a new p r o d u c t  which may 
o t h e r w i s e  have been i m p o r t e d ?  ) und to  c hanges  in  demand ( i s  i t  
im port  r e p l a c e m e n t  i f  demand s w in g s  from prod u c t  A, which i s  im p o r te d ,  
t o  prod u c t  B, which i s  produced d o m e s t i c a l l y ,  and d o e s  t h i s  depend  
upon the  d e g r e e  o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  be tween A and B?  ) Even a f t e r  a l l  
c o n c e p t u a l  prob lems  have been s o l v e d ,  t h e r e  remain the  p r a c t i c a l  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  r e c o n c i l i n g  th e  commodity c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  use d  by the  
Commonwealth S t a t i s t i c i a n  in  Oversea  Trade and Secondary  I n d u s t r i e s .
A f u l l - s c a l e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n t o  the  d e f i n i n g  and m easur ing  of  
io ipor t  r e p la c e m e n t  i s  w e l l  beyond the  dcope of  the  p r e s e n t  pap e r ,  and the  
w r i t e r  p r o p o s e s  t o  r e s t r i c t  h i m s e l f  to  a s im ple  compari son  o f  v a r i o u s
B a s i c  m e t a l s ,  Motor v e h i c l e s ,  S t r u c t u r a l  m e t u l s ,  R ad io ,  Household  
n o n - e l e c t r i c a l  a p p l i a n c e s ,  P a p e r ,  P e t r o l e u m  r e f i n i n g .
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i n d e x e s  o f  t h e  volume o f  i m p o r t s  and o f  f a c t o r y  p r o d u c t i o n ,  and t o  a 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  v e r y  b r o a d  s t a t i s t i c a l  c l a s s e s *
U n f o r t u n a t e l y  A u s t r u l i a  i s  n o t  w e l l s e r v e d  w i t h  i n d e x e s  o f  
v o l u m e ,  and w i t h o u t  a l e n g t h y  s t u d y  we can  do no more t h a n  compare t h e  
few f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  volume o f  i m p o r t s  p u b l i s h e d  by t h e  Commonwealth 
S t a t i s t i c i a n  and  t h o s e  f o r  t h e  volume of  f a c t o r y  p r o d u c t i o n  p u b l i s h e d  
by t h e  A u s t r a l i a  and  New Z e a l a n d  Bank*
The Commonwealth S t a t i s t i c i a n  p u b l i s h e s  i n d e x e s  f o r  t h e  
volume o f  i m p o r t s  f o r  o n l y  f i v e  d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r i e s *  C o m p a r i s o n s  o f  
t h e s e  f i g u r e s  s i n c e  1 9 5 3 -5 4  ( t h e  e a r l i e s t  y e a r  f o r  w h ich  t h e  A .N .Z .  
B a n k ' s  r e v i s e d  i n d e x  i s  a v a i l a b l e )  and t h e  A .N .Z .  Bank i n d e x e s  f o r  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  i t e m s  a r e  s e t  o u t  on p a g e s  169^ 170 and  
171 .
T he se  c o m p a r i s o n s  a r e  n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  s i n c e  t h e y  
compare  m a n u f a c t u r e d  p r o d u c t s  w i t h  p r o d u c t s  a t  a  v a r i e t y  o f  s t a g e s  o f  
m a n u f a c t u r e .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  t h e y  do show q u a l i t a t i v e l y  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  
b e e n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i m p o r t  r e p l a c e m e n t  i n  c e r t a i n  f i e l d s .  The mos t  
o u t s t a n d i n g  i n s t a n c e  o f  i m p o r t  r e p l a c e m e n t  h a s  be e n  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  
p e t r o l e u m  p r o d u c t s ;  i t  i s  a l s o  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  been s i g n i f i c a n t  
i m p o r t  r e p l a c e m e n t  i n  t h e  " m e t a l s ,  m e t a l  m a n u f a c t u r e s  and  m a c h i n e r y ” 
g r o u p .  T he re  d o e s  n o t  seem t o  have  be e n  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  i m p o r t  
r e p l a c e m e n t  i n  t h e  " f o o d s t u f f s  and  t o b a c c o ” and t h e  " t e x t i l e s  and 
c l o t h i n g "  g r o u p s  a s  a w h o l e ,  b u t  t h e  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  l a t t e r  g r o u p  do 
n o t  p e r m i t  i s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  h a s  been  i m p o r t  r e p l a c e m e n t  i n  
t h e  ' f co t ton  t e x t i l e s ” s u b - g r o u p  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  t h e  " w o o l l e n  t e x t i l e s "
s u b - g r o u p
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RKLATIVE MOVEMENTS IN VOLUMES OF PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
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RELATIVE MOVEMENTS IN VOLUMES OF PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
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RELATIVE MOVEMENTS IN VOLUMES OF PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
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While t h i s  approach does  g i v e  a very  broad p i c t u r e  of  
im port  r e p l a c e m e n t ,  i t s  u s e  i s  s t r i c t l y  l i m i t e d .  I t  d o e s  n o t  e n a b l e  
us t o  judge  the  r e l a t i v e  im portance  o f  the few g roups  shown. As a 
b e t t e r  a p p r o x im a t io n  to  t h i s  aim, and s h o r t  o f  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n t o  
t o t a l  A u s t r a l i a n  demand f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  com m odi t i e s  and the  amount o f  
t h a t  demand s a t i s f i e d  from A u s t r a l i a n  p r o d u c t i o n ,  we may c o n s i d e r  
movements in  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n s  im ports  in  each  s t a t i s t i c a l  c l a s s  formed  
o f  t o t a l  i m p o r t s .
The v a r i o u s  c l a s s e s  o f  im ports  f a l l  i n t o  t h r e e  f a i r l y  
d i s t i n c t  g r o u p s .  In r o u g h l y  h a l f  the s t a t i s t i c a l  c l a s s e s ,  im ports  
h a v e ,  d u r in g  the  p a s t  15 y e a r s ,  remained a r e l a t i v e l y  c o n s t a n t  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  im p or t s  :
F o o d s t u f f s  o f  animal  o r i g i n Rubber and rubber  m anufactures
S p i r i t u o u s  and a l c o h o l i c  l i q u o r s  L e a t h e r  and l e a t h e r  m anufactures
L iv e  a n im a l s  
Animal s u b s t a n c e s  
O i l s ,  f a t s  and waxes  
P i g m e n t s ,  p a i n t s ,  v a r n i s h e s  
R ocks ,  m i n e r a l s  and h y d r oc ar b on s
Wood and wicker  
E arthenw are ,  e t c .
P u lp ,  paper ,  board  
S p o r t i n g  m a t e r i a l s ,  e t c .  
S p e c i e
T o g e t h e r ,  t h e s e  i t e m s  c o n s t i t u t e  s l i g h t l y  more than 25$  o f  i m p o r t s .  
With the  e x c e p t i o n  of  o i l s  f a t s  & w axes ,  rubber m a n u fa c tu r e s  and 
pap e r ,  t h e y  are  c o m m od i t i e s  f o r  which t h e r e  i s  n o t  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  
s c o p e  f o r  import  r e p l a c e m e n t .  The r e m a in in g  11 c l a s s e s  c o n s t i t u t e  
l e s s  than  10$ of  t o t a l  i m p o r t s .  To judge  from the S t a t i s t i c i a n ’ s 
f i g u r e s  f o r  the  v a l u e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  in  the t h r e e  i n d u s t r i e s  m en t io n e d ,  
i t  seems l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e r e  has  been c o n s i d e r a b l e  import  r e p la c e m e n t  
in  each  o f  them, a l t h o u g h  i t  w i l l  no t  be p o s s i b l e  to  measure i t s  
e x t e n t  u n t i l  a g r e a t e r  range  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n d e x e s  i s  a v a i l a b l e .
I n  s e v e n  s t a t i s t i c a l  c l a s s e s ,  the  p r o p o r t i o n  of  im ports  has
ftackk«u»xkyx$!i#!>tk
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fallen by about one-third over the past fifteen years, from slightly more 
than 5Qfi of total imports in 1947-48 to 35'fi in 1962-63. Apart from the 
three groups of industries already mentioned, it is here that we must 
look for most evidence of import replacement. The seven classes are 
discussed separately below.
Class II - Foodstuffs of vegetable origin
Imports were 4.9^ of total imports in 1947-48 and 2.6^ in 
1962-63. The main reason for the fall is that imports of tea and 
cocoa, which together account for well over half of tjhe value, rose 
by only a very small amount over the fifteen years* Neither tea nor 
cocoa is produced in Australia. There is, therefore, no question of 
import replacement in this group, but rather a decline in the 
relative importance of these items as standards of living rose.
Class IV - Tobacc_u
Imports were 2,3fi of total imports in 1947-48 and 1.1^ in 
1962-63. Over the same period Australian output of manufactured 
tobacco, cigars and cigarettes has risen from £17*4 million to about 
£60 million. The corresponding figures for the balue of production 
are £3.4 million and £20.2 million. In terms of quantity, Australian 
imports fell from 34.3 million pounds in 1947—48 to 30.1 million 
pounds in 1962-63, while Australian production rose from 19.7 
million pound in 1947-48 to 58.2 million pounds in 1960-61. This 
replacement has, moreover, been achieved without an increase in 
tariff protection. The latest tariff inquiry into the tobacco 
(industry was in 1940.
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Class VII — Vegetable substances and fibres
Imports were 2.9$ of total imports in 1947-48 and 2.3$ in 
1962-63. The decline seems to have been due to the replacement 
of natural fibres by synthetic fibres, and represents a change 
in tastes rather than import replacement.
Class Villa - Yarns and manufactured fibres
Imports were 6.8$ of total imports in 1947-48 and 2.4$ in 
1962-63. The main reasons behind this considerable drop were falls 
in bags and sacks for primary produce and in cotton yarns. There 
has been import replacement in the latter, for the Australian 
production of cotton yarn has more than trebled in the three years 
1958-59 to 1960-61.
Class VUIb - Textiles
Imports were 19.5$ of total imports in 1947-48 and 7.5$ in 
1962-63. The main changes in individual items were a 42$ rise in 
the value of cotton and linen piece-goods and the virtual
2disappearance of silken piece-goods. It has been suggested above
that there does not seem to have been a great deal of import
replacement in the textile since 1953-54. It may be, however, that
the quantitative restrictions prevented the loss of domestic markets
to imports, (imports of textiles rose sharply in 1950-51 and 1951-52.
to
Domestic production, according/the A.N.Z. Bank’s indexes, rose 
in 1950-51 by a much smaller amount than imports and fell sharply 
in 1951-52.
2 Page 168.
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Class VIIIc - Apparel and attire
laiports were 2*2% of total imports in 1947-48 and .9% in 
1962—63. The loss is spread widely over many articles of apparel 
and attire, and it is not possible to trace import replacement from 
a superficial investigation.
Class Xlla - Matals and metal manufactures
Imports were 13.8^ of total imports in 1947-48. They rose to 
thereafter fell
25.5% in 1949-50, but fexxsxxxHxsxfcKSxtxfailing more or less 
continuously and were 18.2% in 1962-63. It is rather difficult to 
isolate changes in any detail, but changes which stand out are falls 
in the value of imports of iron and steel beams, plate and sheet, 
and only a moderate rise in the value of imports of aircraft*
Against the gain by import replacement in various industries 
must be offset any loss of domestic markets to overseas manufacturers 
and the development by overseas manufacturers of markets for new 
products. There are six statistical classes in which one or the other 
of these factors has taken place s
Statistical Proportion of total imports
Class 1947-48 1962-63
12 b Dynamo electrical 
machinery 3.0% 5.5%
12 c Other machinery 8*3% 15.7%
16 b Paper, stationery 1.0% 2.1%
18 Optical instruments, etc. 1.2% 1.7%
19 Chemicals, etc. 2.9% 0.4%>
20 Miscellaneous 4.4% 7.1%
21.4% 38.5%
Much of the proportionate increase in imports of machinery
and chemicals undoubtedly follows from the increasing industrialisation
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of the Australian economy. A more detailed investigation into the 
significance of this factor is hardly practicable without a far greater 
range of official statistics. One can only urge that the Commonwealth 
Statistician hasten to develop a continuing description of the economy 
in terms of input-output analysis, and that he compile statistics of 
overseas trade and secondary production according to the same commodity 
classification.
Chapter  14
EHE EXISTENCE OF A »'FUNDAMENTAL DISEQUILIBRIUM"
The ’h o r m a l" l e v e l  o f  im ports  has  a l r e a d y  been d i s c u s s e d * .
What can we say  o f  the "normal" l e v e l  o f  the  o t h e r  i t e m s  in  the  b a la n c e  
o f  paym ents?  For the sake  o f  c o n v e n i e n c e  we s h a l l  group  t h e s e  i t e m s  
i n t o  m erchand ise  e x p o r t s ,  i n v i s i b l e  c r e d i t s ,  i n v i s i b l e  d e b i t s ,  o f f i c i a l  
c a p i t a l  movements ,  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w ,  p r i v a t e  o u t f l o w ,  the  
b a l a n c i n g  i t e m  and monetary movements .  The amounts o f  t h e s e  i t e m s  f o r  
t h e  p a s t  16 y e a r s  are s e t  ou t  in  the t a b l e s  on pages  178 and 179 .
Between 1948—49 and 1 9 6 2 - 6 3  the  in d e x  f o r  the  volume of  
e x p o r t s  r o s e  by s l i g h t l y  more than 90%, i . e .  a t  an a ve r age  r a t e  o f  
about  4% a y e a r .  But the  t o t a l  r i s e  r e p r e s e n t s  the  a ve r age  o f  w i d e l y  
d i f f e r i n g  movem ents:  e x p o r t s  o f  m i n e r a l s ,  m e t a l s  and metal  m anufactures
r o s e  by about  230% whereas  e x p o r t s  o f  pr imary p r o d u c t s  r o s e  by o n l y  
s l i g h t l y  more than 60%; e x p o r t s  o f  o t h e r  i t e m s  in  the  index  r o s e  by 
about  180%. I t  may be t h a t  th e  r i s e  in  t h e  l a t e r  y e a r s  o f  the  p e r io d  
i s  u n d e r s t a t e d ,  s i n c e  the  w e i g h t s  are  r e v i s e d  o n l y  a t  i n t e r v a l s  o f  
s e v e r a l  y e a r s .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  on the b a s i s  o f  th e  f i g u r e s  t h a t  are  
a v a i l a b l e ,  i t  seems f a i r  t o  s ay  t h a t ,  in  t o t a l ,  e x p o r t s  are r i s i n g  a t
Chapter 1 0 ,  pages  126 -  134 .
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AUSTRALIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(£ million)
47-48 48-49 49-50 50-51 51-52 52-53 53-54 54-55 
Current Account
Exports 397 522 593 975 664 846 812 762
Imports 332 411 526 724 1,021 503 664 824
Balance of Trade 65 111 67 251 -357 343 148 -62
Invisible credits 72 69 85 99 107 107 115 123
Invisible debits 131 149 187 225 294 256 265 299
Invisible balance -59 -80 -102 -126 -187 -149 -150 -176
Balance on
Current
Account
6 31 -35 125 -544 194 -2 -238
Capital Account
Official -
Government
securities -9 -16 -27 -17 23 9 7 24
Other -4 15 5 1 -7 9 -5 -1
Private inflow 38 43 68 69 86 26 69 105
Private outflow 3 1 • • 2 4 9 11 15
Net identified
Capital movements 22 41 46 51 98 35 60 113
Balancing item 57 91 102 3 51 -47 -37 -5
Net apparent 
Capital movements 79 132 148 54 149 -12 23 108
MONETARY MOVEMENTS 85 163 113 179 -395 182 21 -130
Source: Commonwealth Statistician, The Australian Balance of Payments,
1959-60, 1960—01, First Half 1961-62, page 16
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AUSTRALIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(£ million)
55-56 56-57 57-58 58-59 59-60 60-61 61-62 62-63
Current Account
Exports 770 979 807 808 932 925 1,067 1^665
Imports 803 695 765 781 911 1,035 857 1,032
Balance of Trade -33 284 42 27 21 -110 210 33
Invisible credits 134 157 168 169 184 210 225 236
Invisible debits 324 331 364 389 435 471 433 492
Invisible balance -190 -174 -196 -220 -251 -261 -208 -256
Balance on
Current -223 110 -154 -193 -230 -371 2 -223
Account
Capital Account
Official
Government
securities 22 1 10 31 33 10 5 42
Other 2 -3 -5 3 2 -23 -33 -5
Private inflow 117 105 104 125 193 236 140 224
Private outflow 9 12 11 16 6 5 7 3
Npt idpnt,ififtd
Capital movements 132 91 98 143 222 218 105 258
Balancing item 18 11 15 57 16 113 -18 39
Net apparent 
Capital movements 150 102 113 200 238 331 87 297
MONETARY MOVEMENTS -73 212 -41 7 8 -40 89 74
Source: Commonwealth Statistician, Balance of Payments 1961-62,
1962-63 and First Half 1963-64, pages 20 and 21.
180
a b o u t  t h e  same r a t e  a s  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t .
T h e re  h a s ,  h o w e v e r ,  been  v e r y  l i t t l e  n e t  g a i n  t o  A u s t r a l i a  
f r o m  t h e  r i s e  i n  e x p o r t s .  The t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  r o s e  s h a r p l y  d u r i n g  t h e  
n i n e t e e n - f » r t i e s , b u t  s i n c e  1 9 5 2 - 5 3  have  be e n  f a l l i n g  a g a i n  a t  a b o u t  
t h e  same a v e r a g e  r a t e  a s  e x p o r t s  a r e  r i s i n g .  The n e t  r e s u l t  h a s  been  
t h a t  A u s t r a l i a ’ s c a p a c i t y  t o  i m p o r t  h a s ,  w i t h  a few f l u c t u a t i o n s ,  been  
more o r  l e s s  c o n s t a n t  s i n c e  t h e n ,  ( i n d e x e s  o f  t h e  volume o f  e x p o r t s  and 
A u s t r a l i a ’ s c a p a c i t y  t o  . impor t  a r e  s e t  o u t  i n  t h e  t a b l e  on page 1 8 1 . )
The d e f i c i t  on n e t  i n v i s i b l e  t r a d e  h a s  been  a b o u t  10$ o f  
t o t a l  o v e r s e a s  t r a d e ,  and  h a s  t e n d e d  t o  r i s ö  s l o w l y  a s  a  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  
o v e r s e a s  t r a d e  b e c a u s e  i t  i n c l u d e s  an i t e m  f o r  t h e  s e r v i c i n g  o f  t h e  
o v e r s e a s  d e b t .  The l a t t e r  i t e m  h a s  been  r i s i n g  r e c e n t l y  a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  
n e a r l y  10$ a  y e a r .  The d e f i c i t  m us t  c o n t i n u e  t o  r i s e ,  a s  a  p r o p o r t i o n  
o f  o v e r s e a s  t r a d e  a s  w e l l  a s  a b s o l u t e l y ,  u n l e s s  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w  c e a s e s  
t o  r i s e .
How t h e n  h a s  A u s t r a l i a  managed t o  i n c r e a s e  h e r  i m p o r t s  
o v e r  t h i s  p e r i o d ?  T h r e e  f a c t o r s  have  p l a y e d  a p a r t .
i )  A u s t r a l i a  h a s  p e r i o d i c a l l y  f o r g o n e  a c e r t a i n  amount  o f  
i m p o r t s ,  p a r t l y  by means o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  and  p a r t l y  
by aieans o f  u n e m p lo y m e n t .
i i )  S i n c e  t h e  war p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  f r o m  o v e r s e a s  h a s  fo rm e d  a 
r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  and  i n c r e a s i n g  p a r t  o f  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e .  
I t  i s  now i n c r e a s i n g  a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  a b o u t  12$  a  y e a r .  On t h e  b a s i s  
o f  t h e  1962-63  f i g u r e s ,  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w  c o n s t i t u t e s  o v e r  14$ o f  
a l l  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  and  i s  e q u a l  t o  2 . 2 $  o f  i m p o r t s ,
i i i )  S h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h e r e  was a l a r g e  s u r p l u s  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f
t r a d e .
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Australia's Capacity to Import
Export Import Terms Index of Capacity
Year Price Price of Volume of to
Index Index Trade Exports Import
1948-48 58 68 87 79 67
1948-49 69 71 96 87 85
1949-50 79 78 102 93 94
1950-51 139 94 147 87 127
1951-52 98 106 93 79 73
1952-53 100 100 100 100 100
1953-54 98 98 99 99 98
1954-55 89 100 90 98 88
1955-56 81 102 80 108 86
1956-57 (91 104 88 122 106
1957-58 79 106 74 109 81
1958-59 69 107 65 124 81
1959-60 78 107 73 131 95
1960-61 73 109 60 139 92
1961-62 75 109 69 156 107
1962-63 79 110 72 152 109
Sources : Import price index Reserve Bank
Export price index ) 
Volume of exports ) - Commonwealth Statistician
Terms of Trade - col. (l) / Col. (2)
Capacity to import - Col. (3) x Col • (4)
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t r a d e .  With t h e  f a l l  i n  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  s i n c e  1 9 52 -53  and  t h e  r i s e  
i n  t h e  c o s t  o f  d e b t  s e r v i c i n g ,  t h i s  s u r p l u s  h a s  g r a d u a l l y  d e c l i n e d .  
Whereas  i t  a v e r a g e d  a b o u t  £65  m i l l i o n  o v e r  t h e  whole  p e r i o d ,  i t  
a v e r a g e d  l e s s  t h a n  £40  m i l l i o n  a  y e a r  i n  t h e  l a s t  s i x  y e a r s  o f  t h e
p e r i o d .
C l e a r l y  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  c a n n o t  o p e r a t e  i n d e f i n i t e l y ,  even  i f  we a l l o w  t h a t  
t h e  l a s t  two o f  them  were " n o r m a l "  ( i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e y  were t o  be 
e x p e c t e d  g i v e n  A u s t r a l i a ’ s s t a g e  o f  «economic d e v e l o p m e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  
n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s ) .  (She g o v e r n m e n t  i s  c o m m i t t e d  t o  a  p o l i c y  o f  f u l l  
e m p l o y m e n t ,  and  i n  any c a s e  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  made by unem ploym en t  t o  a 
s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s  p r o b l e m  h a s  been  m i n o r .  P r i v a t e  
c a p i t a l  i n f l o w  c a n n o t  c o n t i n u e  t o  i n c r e a s e  a t  i t s  p r e s e n t  r a t e .  I f  i t s  
r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  d o e s  n o t  f a l l  e a r l i e r ,  a t  l e a s t  t h e  e v e n 4 u a l  l i m i t i n g  
f a c t o r  m us t  be t h e  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  i n  t o t a l  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e .  
( P r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  i s  i n c r e a s i n g  a t  a b o u t  t h e  same r a t e  a s  t h e  
g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t . )
We a r e  l e f t  w i t h  h o p e s  f o r  a c o n t i n u i n g  t r a d i n g  s u r p l u s .  T h i s  
may n o t  be u n l i k e l y .  Even i f  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  o f  p r i m a r y —p r o d u c i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  do c o n t i n u e  t o  f a l l  ( b e c a u s e  o f  p r o t e c t i o n i s m  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  
c o u n t r i e s  and  b e c a u s e  o f  a  low e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  f o o d ) ,  A u s t r a l i a  
may hope  t o  be a b l e  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  h e r  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  b e c a u s e  
o f  h e r  e x p a n s i o n  i n t o  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r y .  In  f a c t  t h e  t e r m s  o f  
t r a d e  have  been  i m p r o v i n g  s i n c e  1961 ,  b u t  a t  l e a s t  a p a r t  o f  t h i s  
im p r o v e m e n t  must  be due t o  t h e  r e c e s s i o n  c a u s e d  by t h e  e conom ic  m e a s u r e s  
o f  November 1960 .
The f o r e g o i n g  a n a l y s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  i s  n o t  c u r r e n t l y
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s u f f e r i n g  f r o m  a f u d d a m e n t a l  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m .
To r e l a t e  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  was a 
f u n d a m e n t a l  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  a t  any  s t a g e  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  1952 -  1960 
we n®te t h a t  t h e r e  was a  marked  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  A u s t r a l i a ' s  r e l a t i v e  
c o s t  r a t i o  d u r i n g  t h e  n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s  and  t h a t  a f t e r  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  were a b o l i s h e d  an e x t e n s i v e  r e a d j u s t m e n t  o f  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  
was n e c e s s a r y  t h r o u g h  t h e  medium of  t h e  S p e c i a l  A d v i s o r y  A u t h o r i t i e s  and
I
e x t r a  T a r i f f  Board  i n q  u i r i e s .  I t  i s  n o t  p r a c t i c a b l e  t o  e s t i m a t e  t h e  
v a l u e  o f  i m p o r t s  e x c l u d e d  by t h e s e  t a r i f f  i n c r e a s e s ;  no r  a r e  t h e r e  any  
i n d e x e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  show movements  i n  i m p o r t  p r i c e s  a f t e r  t a r i f f s  have  
b e e n  l e v i e d .  We may, h o w e v e r ,  d raw some q u a l i t a t i v e  c o n c l u s i o n s  by 
r e l a t i n g  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  n o r m a l  l e v e l  o f  i m p o r t s  
g i v e n  i n  C h a p t e r  10 ,
In  C h a p t e r  10 i t  was a r g u e d  t h a t  p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  i m p o r t i n g  
r e q  u i r e m e n t s  f o r  c u r r e n t  u s a g e  were b e i n g  met  d u r i n g  1954 ,  and t h a t  t h e  
ii?ain i m p a c t  o f  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  was f e l t  by t h e  economy i n  t h e  t h r e e  
y e a r s  1956—57 t o  1958—5 9 .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  was no f u n d a m e n t a l  
d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  d u r i n g  1952 ,  b u t  t h a t  t h e r e  may have  been  a f t e r  1955 .  On 
t h i s  b a s i s  t h e  w r i t e r  s u g g e s t s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  :
T h e r e  was a  f u n d a m e n t a l  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  l a t e  n i n e t e e n -  
f o r t i e s ,  i n  A u s t r a l i a ' s  f a v o u r .  T h i s  a d v a n t a g e  was l o s t  i n  t h e  
i n f l a t i o n  o f  1951 -  1952 ,  b u t  t h e r e  was n o t  a t  t h a t  t im e  a 
f u n d a m e n t a l  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  t o  A u s t r a l i a ' s  d i s a d v a n t a g e .  C o s t s  began  
t o  g e t  o u t  o f  l i n e  i n  t h e  1955 i n f l a t i o n ,  and t h i s  f a c t ,  u n f o r t u n a t e l y  
com bined  w i t h  two po o r  e x p o r t i n g  s e a s o n s ,  f o r c e d  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  
s e v e r e  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  C o s t s  g o t  f u r t h e r  o u t  o f  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  i n f l a t i o n
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of  1959 ,  and t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was r e t r i e v e d  o n l y  by means o f  a p e r i o d  
o f  p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y  made p o s s i b l e  t h r o u g h  l e n g t h y  unemployment  , and 
by t a r i f f  i n c r e a s e s .  Very  few a p p l i c a t i o n s  a r e  now b e i n g  made f o r  
u r g e n t  p r o t e c t i o n  ( o n l y  two a p p l i c a t i o n s  were made i n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  
o f  1 9 6 4 ) .  A l t h o u g h  t h e r e  h a s  been  a l a r g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  number o f  
no rm a l  T a r i f f  Board  i n q u i r i e s ,  t h i s  f a c t  may w e l l  r e f l e c t  n o t h i n g  
more t h a n  i n d u s t r i a l  e x p a n s i o n  and  a  b a n k - u p  o f  r e q u e s t s  wh ich  
would  have  been  made much e a r l i e r  b u t  f o r  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e
r e s t r i c t i o n s .
PART 5
CONCLUSION
C h a p t e r  15
ASSESSMENT
Our a r g u m e n t  h a s  b e e n  t h a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  e r r e d  i n i t i a l l y  in  
a l l o w i n g  t h e  1951 i n f l a t i o n ,  and  t h a t  i t  e r r e d  f u r t h e r  i n  n o t  i m p o s i n g  
i m p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  by t h e  l a s t  q u a r t e r  o f  1961 .  Once t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
h a d  a l l o w e d  t h i s  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  t o  a r i s e ,  t h e r e  was no a l t e r n a t i v e  
t o  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  s e v e r e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  of  March 1952*
The l e v e l  o f  i m p o r t i n g  was u n d e r  c o n t r o l  i n  1954,  b u t  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  m i g h t  r e a s o n a b l y  have  f o r e s e e n  t h a t  t h e r e  would be a r u s h  
on i m p o r t i n g  a s  soon  a s  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were a b o l i s h e d  o r  r e l a x e d  
e x t e n s i v e l y .  I t  s h o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  have  t r o d d e n  more w a r i l y  i n  A p r i l  
1 9 5 4 .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  i t s  f a i l u r e  t o  do so was n o t  s e r i o u s ,  and  in  f a c t  
wou ld  have  m a t t e r e d  l i t t l e  b u t  f o r  t h e  po o r  e x p o r t i n g  s e a s o n s  of  
1 9 5 4 - 5 5  and 1 9 5 5 - 5 6 .
In  t h e  f a c e  o f  t h e s e  p o o r  e x p o r t i n g  s e a s o n s  t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  
p r e v e n t  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  o f  1955 and  1956 was so much t h e  more s e r i o u s .  
T h a t  a  g r o u p  o f  u n i v e r s i t y  e c o n o m i s t s  s h o u l d  have c o n s i d e r e d  i t  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  t a k e  t h e  u n p r e c e d e n t e d  s t e p  o f  i s s u i n g  a  p u b l i c  
m a n i f e s t o  c a l l i n g  f o r  a c t i o n  was a w i t h e r i n g  i n d i c t m e n t  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  
p o l i c y .
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To t h e  e conom ic  p r o b l e m s  of  1956 t h e r e  were  two main a n s w e r s  :
( a )  a d e p r d c i a t i o n , w h ic h  would  h a v e  p e r m i t t e d  t h e  im m e d ia te  o f  t h e  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  b u t  w h ic h  would  have  b r o u g h t  p o l i t i c a l  
u n p o p u l a r i t y ;
( b )  a g r a d u a l  r e l a  x a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  a c c o m p a n ie d  by a 
p r o g r e s s i v e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t a r i f f s .
The g o v e r n m e n t  c h o s e  b a d l y .  The c o u r s e  i t  f o l l o w e d  n e c e s s i t a t e d  
a c o n s i d e r a b l e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  m a c h i n e r y  a n d ,  i r o n i c a l l y ,  u n d o u b t e d l y  
e a r n e d  i t  f a r  more u n p o p u l a r i t y  t h a t  a d e p r e c i a t i o n  c o u l d  have  c a u s e d ,  
f o r  i t  was f o r c e d  t o  s u p p o r t  i t s  t a r i f f  i n c r e a s e s  by a l e n g t h y  p e r i o d  o f  
u n e m p l o y m e n t .
The c h i e f  l e s s o n  o f  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i s  t h a t  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  m us t  a c c e p t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  economy.  I t  
s h o u l d  n o t  go on h o p i n g  t h a t  m a t t e r s  w i l l  t u r n  o u t  a l l  r i g h t  i n  t h e  e n d ,  
a nd  i t  c a n n o t  r e l y  on e x h o r t a t i o n .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  s h o u l d  ex p a n d  
i t s  s t a t i s t i c a l  s e r v i c e s  so t h a t  i t  ma y ha v e  more t i m e l y  w a r n i n g  o f  
p r e s s u r e s  d e v e l o p i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  economy,  a n d ,  on b e i n g  w a r n e d ,  i t  must  
be  p r e p a r e d  t o  fca use  a l l  w eapons  a t  i t s  d i s p o s a l  t o  combat  i n f l a t i o n a r y  
p r e s s u r e  w i t h o u t  b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  a  r e c e s s i o n .
A c o r o l l a r y  i s  t h a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  c a n n o t  d e l e g a t e  t h e  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  wages p o l i c y  t o  t h e  a r b i t r a t i o n  a u t h o r i t i e s  u n d e r  t h e  
l e g a l  f i c t i o n  o f  an i n d u s t r i a l  d i s p u t e .  The C o u r t  i t s e l f  h a s  r e a l i s e d  
t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  m o s t  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  By s t r e s s i n g  I s  on a number 
o f  o c c a s i o n s  t h a t  i t  c a n n o t  a c c e p t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
o f  e c onom ic  p o l i c y ,  t h e  c o u r t  h a s  i n  e f f e c t  s e r v e d  n o t i c e  on t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  t h a t  i t  i s  e m b a r r a s s e d  by t h e  l e g a l  f r a m e w o rk  w i t h i n  wh ich  i t
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IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE, BULLION, SPECIE
(£  t h o u s a n d )
1 9 4 8 - 4 9 1949 -50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53
J u l y 3 5 , 6 8 8 3 5 , 4 4 6 5 1 , 0 7 4 8 0 , 8 0 7 4 9 , 8 9 8
August 3 0 , 0 6 7 3 6 ,9 9 5 6 4 ,6 2 3 8 0 , 2 5 6 4 0 ,2 3 1
September 3 6 , 9 2 7 4 1 ,1 4 5 5 6 , 9 5 7 9 4 ,6 8 2 4 2 , 5 3 8
October 3 5 , 1 3 4 4 2 ,4 7 1 5 4 , 8 4 5 1 11 ,301 4 5 , 2 7 6
November 3 0 ,1 9 1 4 0 , 1 2 3 5 7 , 9 1 3 9 7 , 7 3 6 3 5 , 9 0 6
December 3 1 , 8 4 9 4 4 ,9 7 1 4 9 , 5 6 5 6 8 ,3 9 2 3 8 , 6 6 4
January 3 1 , 4 0 0 4 4 , 4 8 6 6 2 , 4 4 9 1 1 4 ,3 9 6 4 4 , 8 3 1
February 3 7 , 8 3 2 4 4 , 2 8 0 6 7 ,5 0 5 1 0 6 ,5 7 2 4 1 , 9 5 4
March 3 7 , 5 5 0 5 4 , 0 4 3 5 8 , 4 4 2 8 5 , 5 0 5 4 4 , 2 5 2
A p r i l 3 3 , 2 3 2 4 4 ,0 0 2 6 8 ,3 5 5 8 1 ,6 7 1 4 3 , 3 1 8
May 3 8 , 7 4 6 6 1 ,6 6 3 7 6 , 0 2 0 7 6 , 4 5 0 4 4 , 2 4 8
June 3 6 , 5 7 8 4 8 , 4 4 4 7 6 , 1 2 3 5 5 , 6 5 5 4 2 , 9 9 3
Year 4 1 5 , 1 9 4 5 3 8 , 0 6 9 7 4 3 ,8 7 1 1 , 0 5 3 , 4 2 3 5 1 4 ,1 0 9
1 9 5 3 - 5 4 1954-55 1 9 5 5 - 5 6 1956 -57 1957-58
J u l y 5 2 , 0 5 6 7 0 ,3 5 2 6 1 , 5 3 8 5 7 , 5 0 8 7 1 , 0 0 6
August 5 2 , 2 4 5 6 6 , 7 3 6 7 1 ,3 9 5 7 8 ,8 5 5 6 8 , 2 8 6
September 5 3 , 6 2 9 7 0 ,4 4 8 7 5 ,3 0 9 5 3 , 9 1 6 5 7 , 0 6 4
October 5 0 , 6 7 2 6 5 ,0 5 7 6 8 ,2 9 7 5 7 , 2 6 7 7 2 , 0 2 5
November 5 0 , 8 2 6 5 5 ,1 4 1 7 3 , 3 7 7 5 9 ,8 3 1 6 4 , 5 0 5
December 5 8 , 7 2 4 6 4 ,0 9 9 6 3 ,2 0 2 5 2 , 4 8 5 6 2 , 0 3 7
January 6 0 , 8 4 4 7 6 , 4 1 6 6 4 , 3 0 3 6 2 , 6 0 8 7 7 , 2 9 5
February 4 6 ,0 7 1 6 9 , 8 5 4 5 9 , 4 5 2 5 1 , 3 6 6 6 2 , 7 0 2
March 6 7 ,3 3 2 7 7 , 6 7 3 8 0 ,7 2 1 5 8 , 9 0 2 5 9 , 5 1 2
A p r i l 5 2 , 2 5 8 7 3 ,7 2 9 6 8 ,1 5 5 6 0 ,9 9 4 6 7 , 3 0 8
May 6 0 , 1 9 8 7 9 ,0 5 5 71 ,7 7 1 6 9 , 3 7 8 6 6 , 7 2 6
June 7 6 , 7 5 4 7 5 ,1 8 2 6 3 , 5 6 8 5 5 ,8 8 1 6 3 , 4 7 4
Year 6 8 1 ,6 0 9 8 4 3 ,7 4 2 8 2 1 , 0 8 8 7 1 8 ,9 9 1 7 9 1 , 9 4 0
1 9 58 -59 19 5 9 -6 0 1960 -61 1961-62 1 962 -63
J u l y 6 4 , 2 2 8 7 0 ,8 4 8 8 8 , 9 5 6 6 9 ,8 4 1 8 9 , 2 8 4
August 7 2 , 9 5 4 7 0 , 9 3 3 1 0 3 ,4 6 2 7 3 , 2 5 3 9 7 , 6 9 3
September 6 5 , 6 9 4 6 3 ,9 0 2 8 8 ,1 0 1 6 7 ,1 0 7 8 7 , 6 7 7
October 6 5 ,6 5 5 7 4 , 0 6 3 1 0 0 ,2 1 5 6 8 , 8 4 6 9 3 , 5 3 5
November 6 7 ,5 2 2 7 4 ,3 2 1 8 9 , 7 6 2 7 0 ,2 9 1 9 5 , 3 5 5
December 6 2 ,3 6 2 7 5 , 9 5 5 9 1 , 6 6 6 6 1 ,9 1 1 7 4 , 7 7 7
January 7 4 ,4 0 3 7 5 , 5 0 8 9 9 , 8 8 9 8 2 , 1 6 5 1 03 ,751
February 5 8 , 9 4 6 7 8 , 5 3 0 9 5 ,0 7 1 6 9 , 3 4 6 7 8 ,6 9 0 ,
March 5 8 , 8 6 8 8 8 , 3 2 0 8 9 , 6 5 0 7 7 , 5 7 6 8 1 , 2 0 5
A p r i l 7 3 ,2 1 9 7 2 ,6 0 7 8 6 ,9 7 1 7 1 ,4 4 9 9 2 , 3 0 4
May 6 3 ,2 0 2 9 1 , 2 5 4 7 8 ,9 0 8 9 1 , 1 2 4 9 6 , 1 7 6
June 6 9 , 5 4 6 9 0 , 8 5 0 7 4 , 9 2 6 8 1 , 8 3 7 9 0 , 8 8 8
Year 7 9 6 ,5 9 9 9 2 7 ,0 9 1  1 , 0 8 7 , 5 7 7 8 8 4 , 7 4 6 1 , 0 8 1 , 3 3 5
S o u r c e :  Commonwealth Bureau o f  Census and S t a t i s t i c s ,  O ver se a  Trade
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EXPORTS OF MERCHANDISE, BULLION, SPECIE
(£ thousand)
1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53
July 53,621 37,138 49,185 58,316 58,254
August 33,873 35,652 38,466 45,856 43,548
September 34,664 36,188 46,389 39,145 54,725
October 41,954 45,068 86,680 56,986 86,219
November 50,012 52,267 95,794 66,841 86,697
December 51,971 51,679 72,240 49,652 84,364
January 39,593 52,241 98,840 65,934 67,828
February 51,784 61,110 85,145 56,754 66,471
March 47,842 66,791 94,568 67,717 91,473
April 37,659 50,120 136,053 59,110 81,469
May 55,950 77,814 98,663 51,925 75,225
June 43,749 47,629 79,773 56,772 74,999
Year 542,672 613,697 981,796 675,008 871,272
1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58
July 79,972 52,898 62,991 64,755 72,608
August 50,746 44,512 51,331 60,523 60,555
September 60,753 55,081 53,968 61,027 77,242
October 87,709 74,068 67,571 98,123 94,358
November 85,451 50,782 78,183 94,247 83,045
December 78,432 85,548 72,641 77,043 70,347
January 58,841 64,366 55,623 89,254 66,580
February 58,512 67,880 20,178* 89,775 59,963
March 86,301 82,122 77,662 97,585 61,106
April 65,803 58,208 78,437 88,922 53,014
May 59,288 68,382 90,1$0 91,945 64,513
June 56,794 70,317 73,089 79,707 54,615
Year 828,332 774,164 781,*64 992,906 817,946
1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63
July 61,547 66,662 66,509 87,461 79,759
August 47,567 63,940 66,276 78,085 73,497
September 56,252 69,326 64,571 83,548 74,514
October 75,096 83,955 69,111 96,395 87,048
November 66,354 87,426 95,073 101,967 102,763
December 76,389 96,342 83,591 83,535 88,043
January 68,244 73,264 82,572 95,754 95,284
February 73,653 82,969 79,905 86,449 90,475
March 66,509 88,145 87,866 89,705 95,71T
April 72,313 70,268 81,771 86,320 92,407
May 76,698 77,033 93,854 100,874 101,995
June 70,841 78,352 97,744 87,191 94,404
Year 811,463 937,682 968,843 1,077,284 1,075,906
* Affected by industrial dispute.
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Oversea Trade
APPENDIX I I I
M onthly B a lan ce  o f  Trade
( s u r p l u s  in  b la c k  -  d e f i c i t  in  r e d )
J u l y
A ugust
Sep tem ber
O c to b e r
November
December
J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
March
A p r i l
May
Ju n e
Year
1948-49  1949-50  1950-51
17 ,933  1 ,692  1 ,889
3 ,8 0 6 1
2 ,2 6 3 4
6 ,8 2 0 2
19,821 12
20 ,122 6
8 ,1 9 3 7
13,952 16
10 ,292 *2
4 ,4 2 7 6
17 ,204
7 ,171
16
127 ,478 75
343 26 ,157
957 10 ,568
597 31 ,835
144 37 ,881
708 22 ,6 7 5
755 36 ,391
830 17 ,6 4 0
748 3 6 ,1 2 6
118 67 ,698
151 2 2 ,6 4 3
815 3 ,6 5 0
628 237 ,925
1953-54 1954-55 1955-56
J u l y 27 ,915 17 ,4 5 4 1 ,453
A ugust 1 ,769 2 2 ,2 2 4 2 0 ,0 6 4
S ep tem ber 7 ,1 2 4 15,367 21 ,341
O cto b er 37 ,037 9 ,011 726
November 34 ,625 4 ,3 5 9 4 ,8 0 6
December 19 ,708 2 1 ,4 4 9 9 ,4 3 9
J a n u a r y 2 ,0 0 3 12 ,0 5 0 8 ,6 8 0
F e b ru a ry 12,441 1 ,9 7 4 3 9 ,2 7 4
March 18 ,969 4 ,4 4 9 3 ,0 5 9
A p r i l 13 ,545 15,521 10,282
May 910 10 ,673 18 ,419
Ju n e 19 ,9 6 0 4 ,8 6 5 9 ,521
^ e a r 146 ,723 6 9 ,578 39 ,2 2 4
1958-59 1959-60 1960-61
J u l y 2 ,681 4 ,1 8 6 22 ,447
A ugust 2 5 ,387 6 ,9 9 3 3 7 ,1 8 6
S ep tem ber 9 ,442 5 ,4 2 4 2 3 ,5 3 0
O c to b e r 9 ,441 9 ,8 9 2 3 1 ,1 0 4
November 1 ,168 *3 ,105 5 ,311
December 14 ,027 2 0 ,2 8 5 8 ,0 7 5
J a n u a r y 6 ,159 2 ,2 4 4 *7,317
F e b ru a ry 14,707 4 ,4 3 9 15 ,166
March 7,641 175 1 ,784
A.pril 906 2 ,3 3 9 5 ,2 0 0
May 13 ,4 9 6 14,221 14 ,9 4 6
June 1 ,295 1 1 ,698 2 2 ,8 1 8
Year 14 ,864 11 ,289 118 ,734
S o u r c e :  Commonwealth S t a t i s t i c i a n ,  O versea  Trftde
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(£  th o u s a n d )
1951-52 1952-53
22,491
3 4 ,4 0 0
55 ,5 3 7
54 ,3 1 5
30 ,895
18 ,7 4 0
48 ,4 6 2
49 ,8 1 8
17 ,788
22,561
24 ,525
1 ,117
378 ,415
1956-57
7 ,247
18 ,332
7,111 
4 0 ,8 5 6  
3 4 ,4 1 6  
24 ,558  
2 6 ,6 4 6  
38 ,409  
38 ,683  
2 7 ,9 2 8  
22 ,567  
2 3 ,8 2 6
273 ,915
1961-62
1 7 ,6 2 0
4 ,8 3 2
16,441
27 ,5 4 9
31 ,676
21 ,6 2 4
13 ,589
17 ,103
12 ,129
14,871
9 ,7 5 0
5 ,3 5 4
192 ,538
8 ,3 5 6
3 ,3 1 7
12 ,187
4 0 ,9 4 3
50 ,791
4 5 ,7 0 0
2 2 ,9 9 7
24 ,517
47 ,221
38,151
3 0 ,9 7 7
3 2 ,0 0 6
3 5 7 ,163
1957-58
1,602
7 ,731
2 0 ,1 7 8
2 2 ,3 3 3
18 ,5 4 0
8 ,3 1 0
10 ,715
2 ,7 3 9
1 ,5 9 4
1 4 ,2 9 4
2 ,2 1 3
8 ,8 5 9
26 ,006
1962-63
9 ,525  
2 6 ,1 9 6  
13 ,163  
6 ,487
7 ,4 0 8
1 3 ,2 6 6
8 ,4 6 7
11 ,785
14 ,512
103
5 ,8 1 9
3 ,5 1 6
5 ,4 2 9
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APPENDIX IV
The b e s t  a v a i l a b l e  s t a t e m e n t  o f  the r e l a t i o n  between the  
i n d u s t r i a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  u se d  in  Secondary  I n d u s t r i e s  and t h a t  used  
by the  A u s t r a l i a  and New Zealand  Bank f o r  i t s  f i r s t  index  o f  f a c t o r y  
p r o d u c t i o n  i s  g i v e n  in  t h e  t a b l e  adn page 17 o f  Q u a r t e r l y  R e v i e w , 
January  1955 .  S t a r t i n g  from the  f i g u r e s  g i v e n  in t h i s  t a b l e  and 
v a r i o u s  f i g u r e s  g i v e n  in  o t h e r  i s s u e s ,  the  w r i t e r  d e r i v e d  the  
f o l l o w i n g  form ulae  as  a b a s i s  f o r  the  com p u ta t ion  o f  the  f i g u r e s  g i v e n  
in  the  t a b l e  on page 140 .
B u i l d i n g  M a t e r i a l s ^ ( c l a s s  I + c l a s s  I I )
Timber "Sawmi 11 s"
Iron  and S t e e l '‘S m e l t i n g  e t c .  o f  i r o n  and s t e e l "
N o n - f e r r o u s  M eta ls £ ( N o n - f e r r o u s  m e t a l s  + e x t r a c t i n g  and 
r e f i n i n g  of  o t h e r  m e t a l s )
Motor V e h i c l e s vs (motor b o d i e s  + r e p a i r s  o f  motor v e h i c l e s  
+ c o n s t r u c t i o n  and a s s e m b ly )
H ouseh o ld  Machinery " E l e c t r i c a l  machinery"
I n d u s t r i a l  Machinery " P l a n t ,  Equipment and M achin ery ,  e t c .  "
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  Metal  P r o d u c t s  ( o m i t t e d )
Woollen T e x t i l e s "Wool -  C ard ing ,  S p i n n i n g ,  Veaving"
Cot ton  T e x t i l e s "Cotton S p i n n i n g  and Weaving"
Rayon T e x t i l e s "Rayon, Nylon and o t h e r  S y n t h e t i c  F i b r e s "
C l o t h i n g " T a i l o r i n g  e t c .  " + "Dressmaking e t c .  " +
" M i l l i n a r y "  + " S h i r t s ,  e t c .  "
D a ir y  P r o d u c t s "B u tte r  F a c t o r i e s "  + "Cheese F a c t o r i e s "  + 
"Condensed and Dr ied  Milk  F a c t o r i e s "
C e r e a l  M i l l i n g "Flour  M i l l i n g "  + "Cerea l  Foods and Starch"
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F r u i t  & V e g e t a b l e  Canning
Meat Canning and Curing
Other Food
B r e w e r i e s
Tobacco
Chem ica l s  & Chemical  
F e r t i l i s e r s
P a i n t
Soap
Rubber
L e a th e r
F l o o r  C o v e r in g s
"Jam, F r u i t  & V e g e t a b l e  Canning"
"Bacon Curing" + "Meat & F i s h  P r e s e r v i n g "  
( o m i t t e d )
"Brewer ies"
"Tobacco,  e t c .  "
" I n d u s t r i a l  c h e m i c a l s ,  e t c .  " + " E x p l o s i v e s "
+ " P h a r m a c eu t i c a l  and T o i l e t "
"White Lead,  P a i n t s  & Varnish"
"Soap and Candles"
"Rubber Goods ( i n c l u d i n g  Tyres  made)"
"Tannjng,  Curry ing  and L e a t h e r - d r e s s i n g "  
( o m i t t e d )
The v a l u e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e s e  i n d u s t r i e s  a r e :
B u i l d i n g  M a t e r i a l s  
Timber  
Iron  & S t e e l  
N o n - f e r r o u s  m e t a l s  
Motor V e h i c l e s  
H ousehold  Machinery  
I n d u s t r i a l  Machinery  
Woollen T e x t i l e s  
Cotton  T e x t i l e s  
9Jayon T e x t i l e s  
C l o t h i n g  
D airy  P r o d u c t s  
C e r e a l  M i l l i n g  
F r u i t  & Veg.  Canning  
Meat Canning & Caring  
B r e w e r ie s  
Tobacco
C h e m i c a l s ,  e t c .
P a i n t
Soap
Rubber
L e a t h e r
48 49 50
49 50 51
1 0 , 0 1 6 1 1 ,6 4 5 1 5 ,2 0 8
1 5 , 9 4 8 1 8 , 9 4 4 2 4 , 4 2 4
1 1 , 9 5 0 1 2 , 7 8 4 1 6 ,5 9 4
1 1 ,5 8 5 1 1 ,8 9 6 1 5 ,4 0 7
1 5 ,4 6 5 2 0 , 6 3 0 2 7 , 6 6 8
1 7 , 8 3 4 2 1 , 1 5 4 3 0 ,8 6 7
3 4 , 6 2 4 4 0 , 9 5 8 5 5 , 9 3 3
1 3 , 5 9 8 1 6 , 4 2 6 1 8 , 6 1 0
4 , 7 8 9 5 ,9 9 1 7 , 5 3 4
1 , 1 1 8 1 , 3 8 0 2 ,4 0 5
2 9 , 9 3 7 3 2 , 8 7 4 4 0 , 7 1 9
7 , 3 3 6 8 , 0 9 9 1 0 , 7 9 0
7 ,2 6 7 7 , 4 4 8 9 ,4 6 1
5 , 5 4 7 6 ,5 8 2 8 , 6 7 8
7 , 3 6 3 9 , 4 8 3 9 , 4 5 8
6 , 7 4 3 7 , 5 6 3 8 , 4 5 7
3 , 7 8 8 3 , 8 6 9 4 , 8 9 7
1 3 , 7 3 8 1 5 ,6 4 2 2 2 , 3 5 8
4 , 3 7 6 5 , 2 9 6 7 , 0 1 0
3 , 8 1 6 4 , 4 4 2 4 , 6 0 9
6 , 5 8 3 7 , 9 5 6 1 0 , 9 3 0
3 ,8 7 1 4 , 3 3 0 4 , 9 4 9
51 52 53
52 53 54
1 9 ,3 8 8 2 0 , 2 3 5 2 3 , 3 8 3
3 3 ,4 6 7 3 3 ,4 5 9 3 6 , 7 2 5
2 0 ,3 1 1 2 7 , 3 3 6 2 7 , 9 9 5
1 9 ,6 9 2 1 3 ,2 7 7 1 3 ,7 1 1
3 6 , 0 4 4 3 9 , 7 2 0 4 6 , 5 6 0
3 8 , 2 4 4 3 8 , 6 3 3 4 9 , 0 3 2
7 1 , 8 1 0 7 0 , 7 9 0 7 5 ,9 9 7
1 6 ,2 7 2 1 9 ,2 2 6 2 3 , 2 3 7
9 , 2 7 2 8 , 1 2 6 1 0 ,8 0 9
2 , 6 7 3 3 , 8L 0 4 , 5 0 9
4 5 , 1 3 4 4 4 , 2 9 9 4 9 , 8 4 6
1 2 ,5 3 5 1 4 ,3 5 0 1 5 , 9 1 4
1 2 ,0 1 1 1 3 ,6 9 2 1 4 , 8 1 4
1 1 , 1 4 6 1 0 ,3 1 9 1 2 ,6 3 2
1 2 ,6 5 8 1 6 ,1 5 2 1 5 , 7 8 4
1 0 ,2 9 8 1 1 ,4 5 8 1 3 ,0 4 8
5 , 2 0 6 7 , 0 7 8 8 , 3 4 9
2 7 , 4 9 4 2 7 , 0 6 6 3 3 ,6 1 2
8 , 0 6 0 8 , 5 8 3 9 ,8 9 1
4 , 6 3 9 6 , 3 2 4 6 ,7 3 2
1 5 ,1 8 9 1 3 , 3 9 4 1 7 , 5 7 0
5 , 9 1 2 5 , 9 8 3 6 ,6 7 2
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(£ Million)
1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53
July 780.6 358.7
August 708*8 369.5
September 650.6 363.4
October 590*4 389.6
November 557.6 423.9
December 665.9 506.3 460.8
January 463.3 471.9
February 431.9 486*4
March 418*6 514.3
April 399.6 530.3
May 381.9 546.7
June 446.6 629.5 803.7 372.5 561.2
1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58
July 555.4 546,1 415.5 361.6 566.0
August 545.9 520.4 381.8 351.7 562.8
September 541.5 504.4 360.9 350.3 568.7
October 558.3 512.6 355.3 369.4 578.9
November 579.7 505.2 360.2 405.2 588*1
December 607.4 505.9 372.9 425.3 589.8
January 600.9 500.4 366.6 444.7 582.3
February 611.1 490.3 330.1 472.6 574.4
March 613.5 476.7 331.5 505.0 566. 6
April 618.8 464.2 329.4 539.6 535.8
May 604.7 453.2 342,3 560.9 541..7
June 570.7 428.3 355.0 566.5 525.4
1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63
July 503.6 507.9 482.6 574.6 574.9
August 489.9 502.1 441.9 571.1 565.8
September 480.4 514.1 424.0 573.4 560.5
October 482.9 523.6 413.3 578.0 570.9
November 493.4 538.6 v 398.0 587.0 585.7
December 500.0 547.2 376.3 601.7 586.1
January 496*4 538.4 374.5 596.1 587.4
February 494.8 541.1 373.6 607.7 597.5
Siar ch 503.6 547.2 388.1 537.6 590.8
April 527.2 540.5 416.5 550.3 612.2
May 544.3 543.8 531.1 565.5 615.2
June 516.4 512.0 550.8 561.2 626.1
Source: Commonwealth Bank, Reserve Bank
Form A.I.L.
To be completed and 
lodged in sextuplicate.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Customs (Import Licensing) Regulations
ORIGINAL
Licensee to use for 
Custom s purposes.
APPLICATION FOR LICENCE TO IMPORT GOODS.
(Note the instructions on the back of this form)
T h e  C o l l e c t o r  o f  C u s t o m s  a t .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
I, ................................................................................................ ................................................................................ ....................
W e, (Full Name) (Address)
hereby apply for a licence to import from.......................................................at the port of............................... ......................
(Country)
the goods specified hereunder being goods of.................................................................................................................. origin.
(Country)
Category Quantity and Full Description of Goods
Unit Price
Item of Origin*
•O r in Australian currency if other not available. TOT
Total F.O.B.(£A) 
Freight (£A) 
Insurance (£A)
AL C.I.F. & E. £
F.O.B. Value 
(Australian 
Currency)
QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED BY APPLICANT
1. Have the goods been ordered?
2. Name and address of intended overseas supplier 
and expected date of shipment of goods to 
Australia _ _ _ _ .
3. Manner in which payment will be made (e.g., 
draft, letter of credit, etc.) ...  ....................... o ?
4. Currency in which importer will remit
>•8 “  
o ö g H  
3. g" a % ö
2 .1 i l l
■ o a o oHi
S. Name and address of Australian bank involved
6. If payment is to be made otherwise than to 
overseas supplier, state name and address of 
person to whom payment will be made ......... .
7. For what purpose are the goods to be used?
I DECLARE that the above particulars are true and correct.
Signature of Applicantt ..... .................................................
Date........... ....................
d o  be signed by the merchant or person directly interested unless the signatory has been specially authorised to sign on behalf of the 
merchant or interested person.
C u s t o m s
S t a m p
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Licence N o .......... ...........................
I HEREBY LICENSE the importation of the goods specified above to the value of
. C.I.F. & E. This Licence is valid until..............................
Licensing Officer.
THIS LICENCE IS NOT TRANSFERABLE
/19
Printed and Sold by  Smith & Lane P*y. Ltd., 
0 Bridge Street & 5 Bulletin Place, Sydney.
Applicants for import licences are requested in their own interests to fill up the form fully and correctly and to observe
the following directions:—
1. Use separate forms of application for goods listed in each Category.
riilqu:
2. Make your application as and when it is decided to order the goods in the quantities specified in the application and 
limit the application to goods which have actually been ordered or will be firmly ordered to be shipped to Australia as soon as 
possible after ai licence is obtained.
#
3. Do not include goods the produce or manufacture of different countries on the same application form, or goods the 
produce of any country where more than one supplier is involved. %
4. Do not include in the same application goods for which overseas payment will be arranged through different Banks or 
agencies or under different banking transactions.
5. If firm directions regarding delivery are not sent to the overseas supplier within one month after the issue of the licence, 
if such directions are countermanded or if all the goods are not imported within the time specified by the Licensing Officer, the 
Collector of Customs shall be advised.
THE ISSUE OF AN IMPORT LICENCE DOES NOT ABSOLVE THE LICENSEE FROM THE 
OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ANY OTHER LAW RELATING
TO THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS.
“nighO FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IMPORTATIONS
Type of 
Entry
Warrant
No. Date Quantity Value
BALANCE
Quantity Value
Officer’s
Initials
(Aa).a.o
( A l )
*  .3  a  •
ooT j 
Ifiioznl;
t i l ls
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I
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T h e o r e t i c a l  A r t i c l e s
T.  W. Swan, " L o n g e r - r u n  P r o b l e m s  o f  t h e  B a l a n c e  o f  P a y m e n t s " ,  p a p e r
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G. L.  Wood Memor ia l  L e c t u r e  1 9 5 4 ) ,  M e lbou rne  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1954
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Miscellaneous comments are to be Hound in the Australian
Financial Review, Parliamentary Debates and the daily press. The
more important of them have been cited in the text.
